Role of smart power in U.S.-Spain relations, 1969-1986 by Justice, David A.
 
THE ROLE OF SMART POWER IN U.S.-SPAIN RELATIONS, 1969-1986 
 
   By 
      DAVID A. JUSTICE 
   Bachelor of Arts in History  
   Athens State University 
   Athens, Alabama 
   2012 
 
   Master of Arts in History 
   University of North Alabama 
   Florence, Alabama 
   2014 
 
 
   Submitted to the Faculty of the 
   Graduate College of the 
   Oklahoma State University 
   in partial fulfillment of 
   the requirements for 
   the Degree of 
   DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
   May, 2020 
ii 




   Dissertation Approved: 
 
    
Dr. Laura Belmonte 
  Dissertation Adviser 
   
 Dr. Douglas Miller 
 
 
   Dr. Matthew Schauer 
 
   
 Dr. Isabel Álvarez-Sancho 
iii 
Acknowledgements reflect the views of the author and are not endorsed by committee 












 This dissertation, this labor of love, would not be complete if it were not for a 
number of people. First, I would like to thank my dissertation committee of brilliant 
scholars. My advisor Laura Belmonte was integral in shaping this work and myself as an 
academic. Since my arrival at Oklahoma State, Dr. B has crafted me into the scholar that 
I am now. Her tireless encouragement, editing of multiple drafts, and support of this ever 
evolving project will always be appreciated. She also provided me with numerous laughs 
from the presidential pups, Willy and James. Doug Miller has championed my work since 
we began working together, and his candor and unconditional support was vital to 
finishing. Also, our discussions of Major League Baseball were much needed during 
coursework. Matt Schauer’s mentorship was integral to my time at Oklahoma State. The 
continuous laughter and support during meetings, along with discussions of classic films, 
were vital to my time at Oklahoma State. Finally, Isabel Álvarez-Sancho provided 
brilliant insight into Spain, and offered encouragement throughout the writing process. Le 
estoy agradecido. 
 In addition to my committee, numerous academics helped develop me as a 
graduate student. I was taught or worked with in some capacity faculty members at 
iv 
Acknowledgements reflect the views of the author and are not endorsed by committee 
members or Oklahoma State University. 
 
Oklahoma State that influenced me as an educator and a scholar. They include Richard 
Boles, David D’Andrea, James Huston, Jason Lavery, Michael Logan, L.G. Moses, 
Richard Rohrs, Kristen Shedd, Elizabeth Williams, and Anna Zeide. Jeffrey Bibbee at the 
University of North Alabama also deserves special recognition as his impact is both 
professional and personal. He was pivotal in making me believe that I could achieve a 
Ph.D., helping me at various junctures along my doctoral journey, and happily officiated 
my wedding. Also at UNA, I would like to thank Scott Infanger, Alejandra Alvarado-
Brizuela, and Pat Sanders for the study abroad trip to Spain in the summer of 2016. This 
was a fantastic opportunity to immerse in Spanish culture, and not a day goes by that I 
don’t think of my time in Salamanca. Additionally, I would like to thank Igor Contreras 
Zubillaga and Giulia Quaggio for organizing the Arts and Models of Democracy in Post-
Authoritarian Iberian Peninsula at the University of Huddersfield. This was such a pivotal 
conference for me as it gave me the final push I needed for my dissertation. I am forever 
grateful for the opportunity they gave me and the support from the conference 
participants. Also, I would like to thank the group in Life Sciences East 213. Your 
support and Dungeons and Dragons games will be treasured forever. Finally, I would like 
to thank all the graduate students that have walked the hallow halls of Murray Hall. I 
especially would like to thank the constant presence of Jared Eberle and Andy Moser. 
 My research was vast and brought me in contact with a number of archives and 
archivists. They include Vanessa Lee at Columbia University, Mark Fischer at the Gerald 
R. Ford Library, Brittany Parris at the Jimmy Carter Library, Elisabeth Thomas at the 
Museum of Modern Art Archives, David A. Langbart at the National Archives II, John 
Zarrillo at New York University Archives, Meghan Lee-Parker at the Richard Nixon 
v 
Acknowledgements reflect the views of the author and are not endorsed by committee 
members or Oklahoma State University. 
 
Library, Renee Pappous at the Rockefeller Archive Center, Michael Pinckney at the 
Ronald Reagan Library, Geoffrey Stark at the University of Arkansas Library, and Laura 
Beth Schnitker at the University of Maryland Library. I was lucky to receive funding to 
travel to these archives. I would like to graciously thank the Gerald Ford Library for the 
Presidential Foundation Research Travel Grant, the Oklahoma State Graduate College for 
the Robberson Summer Research Fellowship, the Ashley Fund at Oklahoma State 
University for numerous travel grants, the Department of History for a Graduate 
Research Fellowship and various travel grants, and the Rockefeller Archive Center for a 
Research Stipend. 
 There are a number of family and friends that deserve recognition. Throughout 
this doctoral journey, they have been ever present in their love and support. First, I would 
like to thank my best friends, Evan & Chelsea Carter and Arron & Shayna Frasier. It is 
through their constant conversations on movies, music, and SEC football that I was able 
to survive this process. Additionally, I would like to thank my mother-in-law Ramona 
Shelton consistently offered love, support, and Chex Mix. My uncle Danny Fisher is 
always a person that I can go to for love and support, and I am happy to offer him with a 
history text that is not related to the Civil War. My cousin Micah Fisher deserves mention 
as well for his undying support. Finally, I would like to thank my parents Robbie and 
Tommy Justice. They sacrificed so much to provide me with a great education and 
worked hard to make sure I accomplished my undergraduate and graduate degrees debt 
free. They helped make this possible through their love, strength, and determination. I am 
forever in debt to them and I will carry them forever. 
vi 
Acknowledgements reflect the views of the author and are not endorsed by committee 
members or Oklahoma State University. 
 
 Last, but not least, is my beautiful wife and best friend, Caitlin. From the outset, I 
told her that her dedication would continue to grow with every major or minor step along 
the way. At this point I owe her a 100-page dedication, but I will try to be concise in my 
gratitude. Caitlin was my research assistant, my sounding board, and my greatest 
champion for this project. If not for her, this dissertation would be a totally different 
adventure. Her patience, kindness, and understanding throughout has been a beacon of 
light. Anyway, here’s Wonderwall: “Because maybe you’re gonna be the one that saves 




Name: DAVID A. JUSTICE  
 
Date of Degree: MAY, 2020 
  
Title of Study: THE ROLE OF SMART POWER IN U.S.-SPAIN RELATIONS, 1969-
1986 
 
Major Field: HISTORY 
 
Abstract: This dissertation offers a dual inquiry into the balance of U.S. defensive and 
cultural diplomacy with Spain during the transition to democracy mainly from an 
American perspective. First, it explores how the United States used hard power with 
Spain to maintain control of the military bases but employed soft power to offset anti-
Americanism. These negotiations provided Spain with economic assistance and promised 
integration into the West via the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 
European Community (EC), both of which Spain coveted, However, once the Spanish 
transition began, the United States emphasized soft power. These tactics included public 
diplomacy, educational exchanges, television, and human rights rhetoric. The United 
States Information Agency (USIA) utilized public diplomacy on themes as diverse as the 
Apollo space program, democracy promotion, and economic rights to build goodwill in 
Spain for Americans. The Fulbright program attempted to win hearts and minds in Spain 
through American Studies programs and educational exchanges. The USIA engaged 
television as a method to reach the Spanish general public with documentaries and 
programs that illustrated U.S.-Spanish cultural understanding. For human rights, the 
presidents often used Spain as an example to the world of how to transition to democracy 
peacefully and promote human rights. 
Second, this study examines how nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) played 
a role in the development of U.S. soft power. Through education, the Ford Foundation 
(FF) helped Spain develop and institute educational reforms while the preoccupation of 
Fulbright was with American Studies promotion and educational exchanges. For 
television, Children’s Television Workshop (CTW) developed an international co-
production of Sesame Street for Spain that Televisión Española (TVE) intended to use to 
develop a national identity. However, the American NGO’s lack of cultural 
understanding of Spain nearly caused Barrio Sésamo to end prematurely. Amnesty 
International (AI) along with other NGOs provided evidence of human rights violations 
in Spain while American presidents made speeches about how Spain’s transition 
represented the importance of human rights. Each of these NGOs directly or indirectly 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Chapter          Page 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................... iii 
 




INTRODUCTION – Bienvenido Guernica and Democracy .........................................1 
 
CHAPTER 1 – The Paternalism of Fascist Gunslingers: Leadership, Impressions, 23-F, 
and U.S. Hard Power ...................................................................................................22 
 
CHAPTER 2 – Quid Pro Quo: The Spanish Military Bases, NATO, The European 
Community, and U.S. Hard Power ........................................................................64 
 
CHAPTER 3 – Selling “tu amigo americano”: The USIA, Public Diplomacy, and Soft 
Power  ..................................................................................................................111 
 
CHAPTER 4 – No Dead Languages, Only Dormant Minds: Education and Soft Power 
..............................................................................................................................148 
 
CHAPTER 5 – D is for Democracy: Television and Soft Power ..............................177 
 
CHAPTER 6 – “A nightmare of noise without movement”: Human Rights and Soft 
Power ...................................................................................................................205 
 
















David L. Aaron – Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 1977-
1981 
Nuño Aguirre de Cárcer – Director General de América in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 1966-1970; Spanish Ambassador to the United States, 1982-1983 
Jaime Alba Delibes – Spanish Ambassador to the United States, 1974-1976 
Blanca Álvarez Mantilla – TVE Presenter and Original Producer of Barrio Sésamo 
Burnett Anderson – Public Affairs Officer at USIS Madrid 
José María de Areilza, Count of Motrico – Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1975-1976 
Jaime Arguelles – Spanish Ambassador to the United States, 1970-1972 
Carlos Arias Navarro – Mayor of Madrid, 1965-1973; Prime Minister, 1973-1976 
Reginald Bartholomew – U.S. Ambassador to Spain, 1986-1989 
Jack R. Binns – Deputy Chief of Mission to Ambassador Enders, 1984-1986 
Stephen C. Bosworth – Economic Officer at Madrid Embassy, 1967-1971 
John Brademas – President of New York University, 1981-1991 
Alan Brown – Retired Navy Officer in Madrid 
Zbigniew Brzezinski – National Security Advisor, 1977-1981 
Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo – Prime Minister of Spain, 1981-1982 
Luis Carrero Blanco – Vice President of the Government, 1967-1973; Prime Minister of 
Spain, 1973 
Santiago José Carrillo Solares – Secretary-General of PCE 
Jimmy Carter – U.S. President, 1977-1981 




Warren Christopher – Deputy Secretary of State, 1977-1981 
Pedro Cortina y Mauri – Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1974-1975 
Don Juan de Borbón – Father of Juan Carlos 
Thomas O. Enders – U.S. Ambassador to Spain, 1983-1986 
John P. Fitzpatrick – Gulf Oil Representative in Madrid 
Gerald Ford – U.S. Vice President, 1973-1974; U.S. President, 1974-1977 
Lois Fortune – CTW Producer 
Peter Fraenkel – Program Associate at the Ford Foundation 
Manuel Fraga Iribarne – Minister of the Interior, 1975-1976; Leader of AP, 1976-1986 
Francisco Franco – Dictator of Spain, 1936-1975 
Felipe González – Secretary-General of the PSOE; Prime Minister of Spain, 1982-1996 
Alexander Haig – Deputy National Security Advisor, 1970-1973; White House Chief of 
Staff, 1973-1974; Secretary of State, 1981-1982 
Robert C. Hill – U.S. Ambassador to Spain, 1969-1972 
Martin J. Hillenbrand – Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, 1969-1972 
Lutrelle Horne - Director of the International Division of Children’s Television 
Workshop 
U. Alexis Johnson – Under Secretary for Political Affairs in the State Department, 1969-
1973 
Juan Carlos I – King of Spain, 1975-2014 
Abraham Katz – Director of the Office of Regional and Political Affairs, Bureau of 
European Affairs, Department of State, 1967-1974 
Francis M. Kinnelly – Science and Technology Attaché at the Madrid Embassy 
Henry Kissinger – National Security Advisor, 1969-1975; Secretary of State, 1973-1977 
Virginia Knauer – Director of the Office of Consumer Affairs, 1981-1989 
Anthony Lake – Director of Policy Planning, Department of State, 1977-1981 
George W. Landau – Country Director of the Office of Spanish and Portuguese Affairs, 
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, State Department, 1966-1972 
José Pedro Pérez Llorca – Foreign Minister, 1980-1982 
Laureano López Rodó – Foreign Minister, 1973-1974 




Edward McBride – Cultural Attaché at the Madrid Embassy 
Robert J. McCloskey – Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, 1963-
1973 
Walter Mondale – Vice President, 1977-1981 
Fernando Morán López – Foreign Minister, 1982-1985 
Ron Nessen – White House Press Secretary, 1974-1977 
Enrique Nicanor González – Director of Barrio Sésamo pilot and first season 
Richard Nixon – U.S. President, 1969-1974 
Francisco Fernández Ordóñez – Foreign Minister, 1985-1992 
John Petty – Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, 1968-1972 
John Poindexter – National Security Advisor, 1985-1986 
Ronald Reagan – Governor of California, 1967-1975; U.S. President, 1981-1989 
John Reinhardt – Director of United States Information Agency/United States 
International Communications Agency, 1977-1980 
Elliot Richardson – Under Secretary of State, 1969-1970 
Horacio Rivero Jr. – U.S. Ambassador to Spain, 1972-1974 
Nelson Rockefeller – Vice President, 1974-1977 
William P. Rogers – Secretary of State, 1969-1973 
Donald Rumsfeld – White House Chief of Staff, 1974-1975; Secretary of Defense, 1975-
1977 
McKinney Russell – USIA worker at the American Embassy in Madrid 
George P. Schultz – Secretary of the Treasury, 1972-1974; Secretary of State, 1982-1989 
Brent Scowcroft – National Security Advisor, 1975-1977 
Narcís Serra – Minister of Defense, 1982-1991 
Robert E. Service – Political Counselor, American Embassy in Madrid, 1982-1987 
David E. Simcox – Counselor for Political Affairs, American Embassy in Madrid, 1972-
1975  
Sofía of Greece and Denmark – Queen of Spain, 1975-2014 
Wells Stabler – U.S. Ambassador to Spain, 1975-1978 
Adolfo Suárez González – Prime Minister of Spain, 1976-1981 




Cyrus Vance – Secretary of State, 1977-1980 
José Luis Villar Palasí – Minister of Education, 1968-1973 
Robert F. Wagner, Jr. – U.S. Ambassador to Spain, 1968-1969 
Caspar Weinberger –Secretary of Defense, 1981-1987 















Abbreviations in Text 
 
23-F – The attempted coup d’état in Spain on February 23, 1981 
AEDEAN – Spanish Association of Anglo-North American Studies 
AI – Amnesty International 
AIUSA – Amnesty International USA 
AMSPEC – American Specialists 
AP – Alianza Popular 
BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation 
CAT – Campaign Against Torture 
CSCE – Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
CTW – Children’s Television Workshop 
CU – Bureau of Cultural and Educational Affairs in the Department of State 
EC – European Community 
ETA – Euskadi Ta Askatasuna 
FF – Ford Foundation 
FRAP – Frente Revoloucionario Antifascista y Patriota (Revolutionary Antifascit 
Patriotic Front) 
GATT – General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GOs – Government organizations 
ICA – United States International Communications Agency 
INCI – Instituto de Cuentiones Internacionales  




NASA – National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGOs – Nongovernment organizations 
NMAs – Nonmilitary Aspects of U.S.-Spanish Agreements 
NSC – National Security Council 
NYU – New York University 
OAS – Organization of American States 
PAO – Public Affairs Officer 
PCE – Partido Comunista de España (Communist Party of Spain) 
PSOE – Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party) 
RTVE – Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española 
STAG – Short-Term American Grantees 
TVE – Televisión Española 
UCD – Unión de Centro Democrático (Union of the Democratic Center) 
UN – United Nations 
USIA – United States Information Agency 
USIS – United States Information Service 
 
Abbreviations in Footnotes 
 
CIES – Council for International Exchange of Scholars Records 
CTW – Children’s Television Workshop Archives 
CU – Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection 
CUL – Columbia University Library 
FRUS – Foreign Relations of the United States 
GRFL – Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library 
JCL – Jimmy Carter Presidential Library 
NARA – National Archives II 
NYUL – New York University Library 
RAC – Rockefeller Archives Center 
RNL – Richard Nixon Library 




UAL – University of Arkansas Library 
UMDL – University of Maryland Library 
WHCF – White House Central File 













Bienvenido Guernica and Democracy 
 
“Other details could be observed, but none of them is important, or relevant to the 
truthful narration of this history—and no history is bad so long as it is truthful.” 
-Miguel de Cervantes1 
 
A bull stands over a grieving mother as she clutches her deceased child. A horse 
screams in agony as it collapses over a dead soldier who grasps a broken sword. Two 
women look aghast over the tragedy. A structure catches fire as a woman screams inside, 
her hand in the form of an airplane flying over the building. Painted in black, white, and 
grey, Pablo Picasso’s Guernica depicts these striking images. The colossal oil painting—
eleven feet tall and twenty-five feet wide—portrays the violence of the 1937 German 
bombing of Guernica and is symbolic of the carnage in the Spanish Civil War. After 
proclaiming victory in the Civil War in 1939, the Nationalist leader Francisco Franco 
declared himself Caudillo de España (the Leader of Spain) and began a dictatorship that 
would span almost four decades. Picasso allegedly wished the painting to stay out of 
Spain if Franco remained dictator and only return after the restoration of democratic 
institutions. It was unveiled at the 1937 Paris International Exposition, toured Europe, 
and eventually landed in New York City. The Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) housed 
                                                   




the painting for decades as the Franco regime requested the return of the painting in 
Madrid. After the death of Franco and restoration of democracy in Spain, MoMA 
reluctantly gifted the painting to Madrid, which excitedly welcomed the “homecoming” 
of Picasso’s masterpiece. It settled in a heavily guarded annex of the Prado, El casón del 
buen retiro, among other acquired Picasso works and alongside the other great works of 
Spanish art.2 The repatriation of Guernica is symbolic of U.S.-Spain relations during the 
transition to democracy. 
 The efforts of the Franco regime to return Guernica escalated as the 1960s drew 
to a close. Picasso’s French lawyer, Roland Dumas, explained in a letter to Director of 
the Department of Painting and Sculpture William S. Lieberman how Franco “pretends 
that Picasso had, in the past, made a gift of this work to ‘Spanish Youth’ and that this 
youth now wishes to view it in Spain itself.”3 MoMA made it clear that it would not 
return the piece to Spain even after the death of Franco and the supposed ascension of 
Juan Carlos de Borbón and constitutional monarchy. Richard Koch, the General Counsel 
of MoMA, explained that the museum was aware of Picasso’s “wish” to keep the portrait 
out of authoritarian Spain, but “the time and manner of the disposition of the picture will 
have to be decided by Mme. Picasso and the other heirs of the artist.”4 One factor not 
discussed in MoMA’s decision to keep Guernica was that it was one of the most popular 
parts of the museum. Essentially, the museum did not want to give away something to 
Spain from which it was benefiting. 
                                                   
2 Eventually, the Guernica moved to Museo Reina Sofía. 
3 Roland Dumas to William Lieberman, November 12, 1969; Alfred H. Barr, Jr. Papers, XI.B.11; The 
Museum of Modern Art Archives, New York. 
4 Richard H. Koch to Mr. M.A. Clinch, September 16, 1976; P&S Guernica Records; Correspondence 




 With movement toward democracy, Spanish officials believed it was time for 
MoMA to give the Guernica back. As art historian Gijs van Hensbergen explains, the 
homecoming of Picasso’s work “would be read as nothing less than a complete catharsis; 
a recognition that a painful history had been surmounted and successfully assimilated, 
and that symbolically it might act as an imprimatur of the new democracy’s legitimacy.”5 
Spanish politicians shared this view. During a trip to the United States, future prime 
minister Felipe González visited MoMA to see the Guernica. Upon his return to Spain, 
he wrote to Koch that he enjoyed his visit to the museum. González expressed that he 
was sure for Koch “it would be hard not to see the painting occupying the wall of your 
Museum but you may agree with me that it would be nice to have it on our walls in our 
Prado.”6 Spain believed gifting Guernica would be the United States supporting the 
Spanish transition. Still, the painting remained in New York. Some U.S. Senators, 
including George McGovern and Joe Biden, approved a resolution in 1978 to have 
Guernica returned to Spain.7 However, this was simply a symbolic gesture and met 
resistance from Rubin and the MoMA staff.  
If the Guernica were to move to Spain, it would be with the approval of Dumas. 
He explained that “there was something very political about the whole situation” and he 
would not be cooperative.8 However, by November 1979, MoMA began the process to 
move the Guernica to the Prado, but feared Picasso's son Claude may halt the move. 
                                                   
5 Gijs van Hensbergen, Guernica: The Biography of a Twentieth-Century Icon (New York: Bloomsbury, 
2004), 284. 
6 Felipe González to Richard H. Koch, December 3, 1977; P&S Guernica Records; Correspondence 1970s; 
Museum of Modern Art Archives, New York. 
7 Section 409 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1979 was the U.S. Congress 
sending congratulations to the Spanish government for their restoration of democracy. Their present to the 
Spanish democracy would be Picasso’s Guernica arriving in Madrid. 
8 Letter to Richard Oldenburg, June 6, 1977; P&S Guernica Records; Doc. of Return and Extended Loan; 




Dumas proposed “some sort of indemnity from the Spanish government which would 
arguably permit us to send the postscripts notwithstanding the potential claim.”9 Cyrus 
Vance, the former Secretary of State under Jimmy Carter, became part of a small group 
of Spaniards and Americans who negotiated the moving details. Vance concluded that 
Dumas was Picasso’s designee, not Picasso’s family, and MoMA was “obligated to 
deliver these works to Spain with reasonable promptness upon the determination by 
Maître Dumas that Picasso’s condition has been satisfied.”10 The leadership of MoMA 
wrote a letter to the Spanish government explaining it was ready to deliver the painting to 
Madrid, and the Prado revealed the Guernica in September 1981. The artistic symbol of 
the Spanish Civil War and of the Spanish people was now in Spain. The United States 
appropriated the painting and made it an abstract symbol of U.S. sanctioned democracy. 
The new Spanish democracy received its acknowledgment, and the United States 
believed they provided it despite holding out to see if the transition succeeded. 
 The struggle to acquiesce the Guernica to Spain is representative of how the 
United States viewed the Spanish transition to democracy. The United States enjoyed a 
quid pro quo with the Franco dictatorship since the 1953 Pact of Madrid. Prior to the Pact 
of Madrid, the bilateral relationship between the United States and Spain was less than 
friendly. Following the global economic collapse in the early 1930s, the military 
dictatorship of General Miguel Primo de Rivera was overthrown, and republicans 
committed to ousting the monarchy of King Alfonso XIII to establish a republic. Alfonso 
fled to Rome and in 1931 the Spanish Second Republic was founded. The United States 
                                                   
9 John B. Koegel to William Rubin, November 13, 1979; Doc. of Return and Extended Loan; Museum of 
Modern Art Archives, New York. 
10 “Re: Guernica” by Cyrus Vance, August 12, 1981; Painting and Sculpture, Guernica 1981; box 64; 
Blanchette H. Rockefeller Papers; Series 4: Museum of Modern Art; Rockefeller Archives Center (hereby 




was skeptical of the Second Republic and believed they were susceptible to a possible 
Bolshevik turn. From 1932 to 1935, the State Department under Franklin D. Roosevelt 
feared that Spain’s “instability, immature political institutions, and economic troubles 
could still lead to its succumbing to communism.”11 During the Second Republic, a 
number of major reforms passed including a major effort at land reform. Increases in 
violence, popular uprisings, and strikes made it clear the republic was unstable. A 
military conspiracy led by Franco attempted a coup d’état in July 1936 and began the 
Spanish Civil War.12 Some in the State Department believed that the rebel faction was an 
attractive prospect to bring order to Spain and prevent the spread of Bolshevism. Yet, by 
the time Roosevelt decided to support the Loyalist cause, it was too late as Franco had the 
backing of Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy. Franco believed a German victory 
was imminent so he remained close to Hitler; but, as it became clear that Nazi Germany 
would not last, Franco moved to a neutral stance and looked to the Allies for support. The 
United States and Western Europe chose to ostracize Spain until 1947.  
The bipolar world of the early Cold War caused the United States to reconsider 
their views of Franco and Spain. One of the major factors in this reevaluation of Franco 
                                                   
11 David F. Schmitz, 98-9. 
12 For select books on the Spanish Second Republic and Civil War, see: Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil 
War (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1961); Gabriel Jackson, The Spanish Republic and the Civil War 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); Richard A.H. Robinson, The Origins of Franco’s Spain: The 
Right, the Repbulic, and Revolution, 1931-1936 (Newton Abbot: David & Charles, 1970); Edward 
Malefakis, Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971);  
Raymond Carr, Spanish Tragedy: Civil War in Perspective (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1977); 
Stanley G. Payne, Spain’s First Democracy: The Second Republic, 1931-1936 (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1993); George R. Esenwein and Adrian Shubert, Spain at War: The Spanish Civil War in 
Context, 1931-1939 (London: Longman, 1995); Martin Blinkhorn, Democracy and Civil War in Spain, 
1931-1939 (London: Routledge, 1996); Ronald Radosh and Mary R. Habeck, Spain Betrayed: The Soviet 
Union in the Spanish Civil War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001); Michael Seidman, Republic of 
Egos: A History of the Spanish Civil War (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2002); Helen Graham, 
The Spanish Civil War: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Paul Preston, 
The Spanish Civil War revised (London: Harper Perennial, 2006); Payne, The Collapse of the Spanish 
Republic, 1933-1936: Origins of the Civil War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006); Julián 




was his vehement anti-communism. The fears brought on by the spread of communism to 
China and Korea led to anxieties the Soviet ideology would spread beyond the Iron 
Curtain. With Franco controlling Spain, the West did not have to worry about a 
communist takeover. Further, the United States believed it would be better to have 
domestic stability in Spain than a regime change that would bring about political 
ambiguity.13 However, the major factor that led to the United States’ reevaluation of 
Spain was the use of military bases. Generals George Marshall and Omar Bradley were 
adamant that the United States acquired military bases in Spain despite Harry S. Truman 
being uneasy on recognizing Franco.14 By using the bases in Spain, the United States 
would be able to solidify Western Europe against the Soviet Union. 
The Pact of Madrid gave economic and military aid to Spain and the United States 
access to Spanish military bases for strikes in the Mediterranean and Middle East. 
Simultaneously, the United States and Spain established cultural exchanges through the 
quid pro quo. This arrangement benefitted Franco by propping up his dictatorship and 
providing an ally on the global stage, which Spain lacked since World War II. At the 
same time, it provided the United States with defensive capabilities in the Cold War. Yet, 
even after Franco died and Spain began liberalizing, the United States remained steadfast 
in preserving their grip over Spain despite protests from Spanish politicians and citizens. 
Washington could not accept a change to the status quo in Spain for fear of disrupting 
their Cold War defensive interests. However, once it became clear that the transition to 
democracy succeeded, the United States allowed the painting to move to Madrid. This 
                                                   
13 Heiberg, 15. 




happened to rebuild goodwill with the Spanish public despite decades of propping up 
Franco and anti-Americanism. 
This dissertation offers a dual inquiry into the balance of U.S. defensive and 
cultural diplomacy with Spain during the transition to democracy mainly from an 
American perspective. First, it explores how the United States used hard power with 
Spain to maintain control of the military bases but employed soft power to offset anti-
Americanism. These negotiations provided Spain with economic assistance and promised 
integration into the West via the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 
European Community (EC), both of which Spain coveted.15 However, once the Spanish 
transition began, the United States emphasized soft power. These tactics included public 
diplomacy, educational exchanges, television, and human rights rhetoric. The United 
States Information Agency (USIA) utilized public diplomacy on themes as diverse as the 
Apollo space program, democracy promotion, and economic rights to build goodwill in 
Spain for Americans. The Fulbright program attempted to win hearts and minds in Spain 
through American Studies programs and educational exchanges. The USIA engaged 
television as a method to reach the Spanish general public with documentaries and 
programs that illustrated U.S.-Spanish cultural understanding. For human rights, the 
presidents often used Spain as an example to the world of how to transition to democracy 
peacefully and promote human rights. 
Second, this study examines how nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) played 
a role in the development of U.S. soft power. Through education, the Ford Foundation 
(FF) helped Spain develop and institute educational reforms while the preoccupation of 
                                                   
15 For the purpose of this study, I use the term “the West” to signify First World organizations, specifically 
NATO and the EC. Though Spain is a Western country, it was not involved in these organizations due to 




Fulbright was with American Studies promotion and educational exchanges. For 
television, Children’s Television Workshop (CTW) developed an international co-
production of Sesame Street for Spain that Televisión Española (TVE) intended to use to 
develop a national identity. However, the American NGO’s lack of cultural 
understanding of Spain nearly caused Barrio Sésamo to end prematurely. Amnesty 
International (AI) along with other NGOs provided evidence of human rights violations 
in Spain while American presidents made speeches about how Spain’s transition 
represented the importance of human rights. Each of these NGOs directly or indirectly 
influenced the development of U.S. soft power in Spain. 
Spain and the transition to democracy are often overshadowed in studies of the 
Cold War. Scholars often focus on the political transformations in the Global South, the 
Middle East conflicts in the 1970s and 1980s, the Vietnam War, and the ideological 
battles beyond the Iron Curtain. However, the Spanish transition to democracy was a 
landmark event of the period as it showed a peaceful transition from authoritarianism to a 
constitutional monarchy. Further, it illustrated a nation standing up to one of the Cold 
War superpowers, much as Odd Arne Westad depicts in the Global South.16 The 
domestic framework of Spain felt the economic, political, and cultural influence of the 
United States, and Spanish leaders often used the United States to further their strategies.  
Moreover, the United States knew the importance of Spain to their Cold War 
agendas. Communism played a vital role in U.S.-Spain relations during this period. Both 
Richard Nixon and Franco had strong anti-communist pasts. Gerald Ford and Henry 
Kissinger continued this approach. As the transition began, Kissinger sought a slow 
transition for Spain and believed that the legalization of the Partido Comunista de España 
                                                   




would be disastrous. He warned that quickly liberalizing could lead to another coup d’état 
and a second civil war. However, Jimmy Carter and his national security advisor 
Zbigniew Brzezinski were open to working with Eurocommunism and the Spanish Left. 
They offered U.S. travel grants for Spanish communist leaders. However, the Ronald 
Reagan administration returned to a stauncher anti-communist stance, and had conflicts 
with Spain over communism in Latin America. However, the major U.S. Cold War 
agenda was the rights to the military bases in Spain.  
The obvious reason was the use of the military bases, but another key reason was 
the transition itself. The peaceful integration of a constitutional monarchy gave the 
United States an example of democracy it could export to the Global South. They could 
use the Spanish transition as a method of soft power; however, in Spain, the United States 
utilized smart power. The focus of this study on smart power brings together both the 
positives and negatives of U.S. foreign relations with an objective view of diplomacy. 
The three cultural aspects that are discussed in depth in this dissertation—educational 
exchanges, television, and human rights—show how the United States reached the 
Spanish public through refurbished and fresher approaches. 
 I utilize Joseph S. Nye, Jr.’s theory of smart power to explain American 
diplomatic efforts during the Spanish transition to democracy. According to Nye, smart 
power is the combination of hard power and soft power.17 Hard power is the use of 
“coercion and payment,” and soft power is the ability to “obtain outcomes through 
                                                   
17 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Smart Power,” New Perspectives Quarterly vol 26, no. 2 (2009), 7. Smart power also 
discussed in Don Doyle, The Cause of All Nations: An International History of the American Civil War 




attraction.”18 Further, hard power can rest on inducements or threats—the carrot or the 
stick respectively—while soft power rests on one country’s ability to attract.19 In the case 
of the Spanish transition, the United State utilized hard power to maintain control of the 
bases. This included dictating the base negotiations and using entrance to Western 
organizations as inducements. Yet, to use smart power, Washington had to employ soft 
power as well. Examples included promoting scientific and technological education, 
American Studies programs, documentaries on the U.S. democratic process, and 
economic rights promotion. Yet, as Nye explains, NGOs also produce their own soft 
power that may either complement or complicate a government’s soft power. In the 
instance of Spain, NGOs acted as both supplement and foil to U.S. soft power. The FF 
and CTW built soft power within Spain by supporting educational reform and providing 
children’s educational programming, respectively. However, AI and other human rights 
NGOs pointed out abuses within Spanish borders and the presidential administrations did 
not use this information to build attractiveness with the Spanish public. 
 In taking the American perspective of the Spanish transition to democracy, I have 
decided to frame this dissertation between 1969 and 1986. Most histories of the Spanish 
transition begin with the death of Franco in 1975 and continue to one of two destinations: 
the approval of the Constitution in 1978 or the election of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ 
Party in 1982. However, I appropriate a “long transition” paradigm and contend that the 
United States perceived the Spanish evolution as occurring from the late 1960s to the 
NATO referendum in 1986.  Two events led to my choosing of 1969 to begin this study. 
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This is the year that Richard Nixon began his tenure at the White House and Franco 
announced that Juan Carlos would be his heir apparent. Shortly after this, the United 
States began to anticipate how the transition to post-Francoist Spain would occur in 
tandem with the ongoing apertura (opening) of Spain. Throughout the transition and base 
negotiations, the United States utilized entrance to NATO as a hard power inducement. 
Nonetheless, Spain left entrance to NATO up to the public in a referendum in 1986. I 
therefore conclude my dissertation with the vote and Spain’s official ascension to 
Western organizations like NATO and the EC. 
This work is in dialogue with a few bodies of historical narratives. The most 
obvious is the historiography of U.S.-Spain relations. My work accentuates this historical 
field in two distinct ways. There is a plethora of monographs and articles that examine 
the Franco regime and the early Cold War implications on the bilateral relationship.20 
These scholars often hint towards the transition in their work, but do not extend their 
analyses beyond Franco’s death. My work expands on this by examining how Franco’s 
death and the reheating of the Cold War impacted the bilateral relationship. In addition, 
my work examines the role of culture in U.S.-Spain relations. Many works that do 
concentrate on the Spanish transition often focus on the economic and political impacts 
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of the base negotiations.21 Rarely, do these works focus on the significance of cultural 
exchanges and soft power.  
As one of the most recent entries into this historiography, Morten Heiberg’s U.S.-
Spanish Relations after Franco, 1975-1989: The Will of the Weak explores how the 
transition to democracy influenced the bilateral relationship. My work both complements 
and diverges from Heiberg’s monograph. His main argument is that the international 
elements of the United States and Europe, not internal dynamics, propelled the Spanish 
transition. It is important to understand the transnational aspects of the Spanish transition, 
but they are not the sole factors. The United States did want to influence how Spain 
integrated democracy, but the internal anger towards America made it clear that their 
influence could only go so far. Further, the United States constantly used NATO as a tool 
of their hard power, but the Spanish public ultimately decided it. In addition, Heiberg 
offers an analysis of U.S.-Spain relations from the Spanish perspective, and only uses 
U.S. archival research from the Ronald Reagan Library or what is available online. My 
work will offer the American perspective and utilize several American government and 
nongovernment archives.  
When framing this work within cultural diplomacy, there are a few ways that my 
work will build on previous monographs and edited volumes. This work will be a first to 
explore the role of smart power in U.S.-Spain relations. Often histories have fixated 
solely on hard power or soft power. One example is the edited volume of Spanish and 
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American scholars, U.S. Public Diplomacy and Democratization in Spain: Selling 
Democracy?22 This volume is full of excellent scholarship on the role of public 
diplomacy in U.S.-Spain relations during the late Franquismo and early transition. 
However, there is little to no analysis of the transition beyond Adolfo Suárez’s tenure as 
Prime Minister of Spain. This dissertation will continue the path laid by these scholars 
and extend the narrative. My work is a spiritual sequel to Neal Rosendorf’s Franco Sells 
Spain to America: Hollywood, Tourism, and Public Relations as Postwar Spanish Soft 
Power. Rosendorf spotlights the early Cold War and Franco using soft power to sell 
Spain to the United States through film productions, tourism, and public relations. 
Conversely, I argue that the later Cold War years saw the United States using soft power 
to sell American ideals to Spanish democracy to balance the problems caused by hard 
power.  
Other works on U.S.-Spain focus on how the base agreements (hard power) 
helped fund educational exchanges (soft power), few go beyond this. Education, as 
Michael Hunt explains, offers a “powerful antidote to the long-prevalent core ideas of 
U.S. policy.”23 This argument works in the context of U.S.-Spain relations. I intend to 
elaborate on the educational exchanges by focusing on science and technology attempted 
to promote a positive image of the United States during a period of rampant anti-
Americanism. Specifically, I complement the scholarship of Francisco Javier Rodríguez 
Jiménez. I continue to look at the growth of anti-Americanism in the 1970s and the 
attempt of the Fulbright program to utilize American Studies and educational exchanges 
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as soft power. However, I expand on his discussion of the Ford Foundation’s role in 
Spain. Rodríguez only discusses the role of the NGO until the early 1970s, but I argue 
that the Foundation played a pivotal role in the educational reform in Spain and continued 
scholarly pursuits in the country though at a reduced rate. In addition, I differ from 
Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla’s assertion that the United States gave up on 
Europeanization in Spain. He argues that the United States “passed the baton to Europe in 
the promotion of democracy in Spain.”24 I argue that the United States did not give up on 
democratization of Spain. The United States continued to use education, television, and 
human rights to promote democracy, but Spain’s anti-Americanism helped with 
Europeanization. 
In addition, I highlight how television played a role in cultural diplomacy with 
questions of national identity. Television was a fundamental aspect of cultural diplomacy 
in the 1970s and 1980s. Yet, few works on U.S. cultural diplomacy, the global 1970s, or 
even U.S.-Spain relations analyze how the medium was a vital part of cultural exchange 
between the two nations.25 Those who work on the global 1970s often overlook the 
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impact of television. The edited volumes The Shock of the Global and Reasserting 
America in the 1970s alongside Thomas Borstelmann’s The 1970s rarely, if even, discuss 
television in a decade that saw groundbreaking programing and expansion of news 
coverage. Other works discuss the exchange of the film industry. For example, Rosendorf 
focuses on how the Hollywood film industry used Spain to produce several motion 
pictures. Television was a growing medium during the Franco years; but, by the 
transition to democracy, it was an integral aspect of media for cultural exchange. As 
some scholars argue, television’s capacity to reach larger numbers of the public than film 
causes one to consider “TV as [a] historian.”26 This work will examine how television, 
especially children’s programming, provided the United States with a new venue for 
cultural diplomacy, and Spain with a way to establish a post-Franco national identity. 
These competing agendas further intensified U.S.-Spain relations. 
 My dissertation interacts with scholars of human rights in U.S. foreign relations 
as well. This study offers a case study on how human rights and NGOs affected U.S.-
Spain relations. It does not explore the origins of human rights nor does it analyze U.S.-
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Spain relations during the early Cold War (1953-1968).27 Rather, this article examines the 
impact of human rights during a nation’s transition from authoritarianism to democracy. 
The existing literature on human rights often provides the reader with a macro view of 
human rights and how it influenced policy decisions.28 On some occasions, these volumes 
produce case studies that connect certain countries to the greater human rights struggle.29 
One work in particular is Sarah B. Snyder’s From Selma to Moscow: How Human Rights 
Activists Transformed U.S. Foreign Policy. Snyder’s monograph on the “long 1960s” 
provides several case studies on how social movements stimulated human rights. 
Nevertheless, even those works that do provide case studies are shockingly quiet on 
Spain. This country was a key player in the third wave of democracy and witnessed 
grassroots activism for the establishment of democracy and for an end to torture in 
Guardia Civil stations.  
My work takes a similar course to Snyder by providing a case study on how 
human rights and NGOs affected U.S.-Spain relations. Further, this dissertation argues 
that human rights influenced U.S. foreign policy before the Jimmy Carter years. My work 
will provide an in-depth case study of how the United States reacted to human rights 
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from a transitioning democracy. As the country continued to transition, NGOs wanted a 
better human rights record from Spain, but the United States—even Carter—was willing 
to overlook human rights to maintain the status quo with the American bases. 
 The connected histories of U.S.-Spain relations, cultural diplomacy, and human 
rights illustrate how important the Spanish transition to democracy was. By focusing on 
U.S. smart power, I aim to inform the reader of this. Spain continues to be a guide on 
how to peacefully shift from dictatorship to democracy, and the United States endures as 
a country whose culture is transnational. However, the contentiousness of Cold War 
policies hindered the United States. It is of the utmost importance that those who read this 
understand that one country’s use of soft power cannot undo the consequence of their 
hard power. As evidenced by the transfer of the Guernica, even the return of a prized 
piece of Spanish history could not improve the perception of Americans in Spaniards’ 
eyes. 
 The story begins with the domestic impacts of U.S. hard power during the late 
Franco regime and transition to democracy. This allows the reader to understand how the 
development of anti-Americanism continued throughout the Franco regime and into the 
transition. I begin by illustrating how the U.S. administrations prepared for a post-Franco 
Spain and their approaches to maintain U.S. security interests. Yet, once the transition 
began, American leaders had to consider soft power elements to preserve a Spain that 
would work with them. In addition, U.S. hard power had an impact on American and 
Spanish publics. For Americans, Congress and the media voiced concerns about 
continuing to work alongside a dictatorship and concerns were raised that Juan Carlos 




public that he was the bastion for constitutional monarchy and became a favorite of the 
American media. Yet, the American response to an attempted coup d’état on February 23, 
1981 is an example of why Spaniards mistrusted the United States.  
  I explore the U.S. hard power that incensed the Spanish public in Chapter 2. I 
look specifically at how the United States used hard power to their advantage during the 
military base negotiations, exploited membership to NATO as a hard power inducement, 
and fought against Spain signing trade agreements with the European Community. The 
Franco regime faced isolation from the West due to his alliance with the Axis Powers 
during World War II, and the United States became their main ally during the Cold War. 
The U.S. administrations used their global position to tyrannize the military bases 
negotiations to benefit national security interests. To entice the Spanish side, the United 
States often used the possibility of granting Spain access to NATO in their negotiations, 
which the Franco regime desperately sought. Yet, when the transition to democracy 
occurred, the West began to reconsider Spain’s position on the global stage. Spain voted 
to join the EC and then held a referendum to join NATO taking the hard power 
advantages away from the United States. 
 Chapter 3 examines how the USIA utilized public diplomacy as soft power to 
combat the anti-Americanism in Spain. Each presidential administration offered different 
approached to public diplomacy with Spain. Nixon utilized the successful Apollo space 
program, Ford emphasized historical ties with the Bicentennial, Carter sought to promote 
human rights and democracy, and Reagan highlighted the importance of consumer rights 
in the new Spanish democratic economy. However, the USIA created a cohesive message 




to the creation of America and how the United States intended to return the favor with 
democracy. The subsequent chapters will provide a more detailed breakdown on soft 
power initiatives of American GOs and NGOs: educational exchanges, television, and 
human rights. 
 The Fulbright program and the Ford Foundation witnessed the implementation for 
educational reform and utilized educational exchanges to build U.S. soft power. Chapter 
4 outlines the 1970 General Law of Education in Spain, which was an ambitious attempt 
at reform by the Franco regime. The effort was to modernize the educational system in 
Spain into something that resembled the American educational system. Both U.S. 
organizations helped legitimize the reform, but the Ford Foundation played a stronger 
role by sending a representative—Peter Fraenkel—to help and oversee the 
implementation of the General Law of Education. While the Fulbright program and Ford 
Foundation worked together to build soft power, they did so in different methods. 
Educational exchanges, especially through American Studies, and promotions of various 
subjects were how the Fulbright program developed soft power in Spain. For the Ford 
Foundation, they helped with the education reform efforts well into the 1970s, and 
supported research in Spain during the 1980s. 
 Chapter 5 surveys the wider availability of television sets in Spain allowed both 
the USIA and Children’s Television Workshop to speak directly with the Spanish public. 
This technology became vital to the United States in the development of soft power 
through the media. The USIA provided Spanish state-run media, Televisión Española, 
with American news programs and documentaries that would provide the Spanish public 




Workshop helped Spanish television fill the void of educational programs with a Spanish 
version of Sesame Street. While the show proved popular, behind the scenes issues and 
cultural misunderstandings nearly ended the show before the first season could end.  
 I conclude the story by examining the role of human rights during the Spanish 
transition to democracy. This is where GOs and NGOs were in direct conflict. The United 
States used human rights as a rhetorical tool to build soft power. Carter especially used 
Spain as an example of the triumph of democracy and human rights. Yet, NGOs like 
Amnesty International provided evidence of stripped civil liberties and torture occurring 
in Guardia Civil stations. The U.S. administrations were aware of this research but did 
not call out the practices in fear that it would upend military base negotiations. For 
example, the State Department told Ford that they were in possession of NGO research 
on human rights violations in Spain under Franco. Instead of pushing for change in Spain, 
the administration chose to find loopholes in Congressional acts that allowed them to 
continue base negotiations. This illustrates that no matter what soft power the United 
States could produce from human rights did not come from GOs but from NGOs who 
sought positive developments under the new Spanish constitutional monarchy. 
The bilateral relationship was incredibly one-sided as the United States dominated 
Francoist Spain. However, the transition to democracy changed everything. Spain now 
had a working constitutional monarchy, their standing on the global stage rose, and their 
culture thrived. The United States, for the first time since before the Pact of Madrid, did 
not have the diplomatic high ground. Ultimately, one cannot investigate U.S.-Spain 
relations during the transition to democracy without exploring the role of smart power. 




argue that the United States’ use of smart power provided Spain with a democratic 
partner on the world’s stage but did not help end anti-Americanism among the Spanish 
public. The hard power of base negotiations and history with Franco built an ardent 















The Paternalism of Fascist Gunslingers: 




 In the mid-1980s, walls of Spanish buildings became canvases for political murals 
including one featuring Picasso’s Guernica. The recently arrived painting was part of 
anti-NATO and anti-American graffiti alongside hundreds of other murals across the 
nation. Other examples included Uncle Sam as God gifting Spain bombs, Don Quixote 
charging toward nuclear weapons adorned with the U.S. flag, Ronald Reagan as “a 
cowboy with a bullet through his head, as a rodeo rider astride a missile, and as a 
reptilian space invader from the television series ‘V.’”1 Reagan himself was greeted in 
Madrid with chants that included “NATO no—out with the bases!” and “Cowboy 
Reagan, fascist gunslinger!”2 This anger towards the United States had long festered in 
Madrid before the 1980s. A State Department Briefing Paper analyzed positive effects of 
the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States and Spain, but 
depicted a gloomy portrait of Spanish opinion of Washington. The paper posits that “a 
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combination of Spanish pride and Spanish sensitivity have what the Spanish consider 
U.S. paternalism, or lack of consideration on occasion [produced] strains in an otherwise 
excellent and mutually beneficial relationship.”3 The State Department postulated that 
some within Spain believed the treaty, much like other U.S. dealings in Spain, occurred at 
a time of Spanish weakness. Instead, Spain supposed the commitments of the treaty was 
“a floor rather than a ceiling for U.S. assistance.”4 
 The Pact of Madrid in 1953 was one of several factors that led to Spanish 
animosity towards the United States. Though it was not a full-fledged alliance with 
Spain, the United States provided the Franco regime with funding to help their economy 
and military recover from worldwide ostracism following World War II. The anti-
Americanism continued as the United States sought military bases in Spain and continued 
to irk Spaniards with each successive negotiation. The hard power of the United States—
keeping control of the Spanish military bases—kept Franco in power for decades. This is 
how the Spanish public perceived Washington, which caused instability in the balance of 
smart power. As Nye details, there is “danger that the United States may obscure the 
deeper message of its values through arrogance.”5 The perception of the United States 
continued into the Spanish transition to democracy and can be seen by how American 
leaders treated their Spanish counterparts, the perceptions of the American and Spanish 
public on each other, and the response to the attempted coup d’état in February 1981. 
From the moment Franco designated Juan Carlos as his successor to Spain’s 
acceptance into NATO and the EC in 1986, the United States monitored the leadership of 
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Spain. Each U.S. president had to approach leadership in a distinctive way. Richard 
Nixon had to appease the Franco regime to retain the military bases. As the transition 
began, Gerald Ford had to show support for the new monarch and political leaders while 
maintaining the status quo in U.S.-Spain relations. Jimmy Carter witnessed the 
introduction of new political parties into Spanish politics and spent most of his 
administration courting friendship with the Spanish Left. Reagan attempted to return 
U.S.-Spain relations to the early Cold War period by attempting to dominate Spain and 
the Spanish Left. Yet, the U.S. administrations that surveyed the transition had a shared 
hard power agenda. The United States was to support the Spanish transition, but not 
allow the key figures to jeopardize U.S. interest in the country. The hard power employed 
by the United States often influenced the decisions of these leaders, or the Spanish 
leaders felt the weight of U.S. hard power. 
 The hard power of the United States in Spain affected not only the Spanish public, 
but the American public as well. During the Franco regime, Americans and Congress 
were questioning the costs of America’s international engagement. Many years at war in 
Southeast Asia led to “Vietnam fatigue” and called into question U.S. military bases 
abroad and support of authoritarian regimes. This distrust of Franco carried over, 
initially, with Juan Carlos. However, as the transition occurred, Americans saw him as a 
departure from Franco and supported the king. Yet, the Spanish public remained 
disillusioned with America despite having four different leaders during the transition. The 
response of U.S. leadership to the attempted coup d’état in 1981 offered an opportunity to 
help alleviate the negative aspects of U.S. hard power. The Spanish military nearly ended 





communication failures within the military brought the coup to an end, Washington’s 
response to the coup was not ideal. Secretary of State Alexander Haig argued it was an 
“internal matter” and declared that the United States did not plan to get involved. This led 
the Spanish to believe the United States had abandoned them. 
U.S. Relationships with Spanish Leaders 
In 1969, Franco announced changes to his regime that would lay the foundation 
for a Francoist monarchy upon his death. He designated the return of the monarchy with 
Juan Carlos as his successor. However, Luis Carrero Blanco, the right-hand man of 
Franco, would take the reins of the government, not Juan Carlos, to carry on Franco’s 
policies. Carrero Blanco gained more power in the early 1970s, while Juan Carlos 
achieved more publicity. Carrero Blanco filled cabinet positions with technocrats and 
hardliners—referred to as the bunker—but also made enemies within and outside of the 
bunker. Those within—such as Carlos Arias Navarro, the Mayor of Madrid—believed 
the economic and social changes in Spain during the 1960s rendered Francoism as 
obsolete. The supporters of modernization argued for an aperturismo, an “opening,” of 
the Spanish government towards capitalism and social growth, but not a significant 
change.6  
The Nixon administration noticed this slow crawl towards liberalism. National 
Security Advisor Henry Kissinger described the aperturismo as “gradual and relatively 
controlled;” and, with increased cohesion with Europe, “there is a fair chance of political 
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stability, though almost certainly well to the left of the present situation.”7 Yet, Kissinger 
argued that U.S.-Spain relations might experience some problems due to the aperturismo. 
He detailed how the Spanish factions “will try to use, or abuse, the U.S. in their domestic 
power struggle, and the military role in Spain could become a target for the frustrations 
and defeats of the contending factions.”8 This is best illustrated in a letter Nixon and 
Kissinger received a letter from Jose María de Areilza, Count of Motrico.9 In the letter, 
Areilza depicted the current political climate of Spain. He conveyed a nation irritated 
with Franco’s dereliction toward a democratic form of government and lack of civil 
liberties. This caused some within Spain to turn on the regime, and those in power to be 
“more concerned about jockeying for position in the post-Franco succession than in 
movement toward a democratic system.”10 Kissinger commented on Areilza’s picture of 
Spain and the prospects of the future as evidence of a growing concern for the post-
Franco era. Kissinger warned that “we will be receiving more appeals for ‘benevolent 
neutrality’ from various contending groups and personalities,” and consider a posture for 
life after the dictator.11 Kissinger’s belief became a central tenet of U.S. hard power for 
the rest of the transition. The United States should not fall prey to liberalizing efforts in 
Spain and should instead focus on the defensive interests. 
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The Nixon administration believed it important to understand the man chosen to 
succeed Franco, and invited Juan Carlos to Washington in 1971 for an official state visit 
as a demonstration of U.S. interest in Spain after Franco. Further, the administration 
sought to “build up Juan Carlos’ position as an instrument of stability, although we fully 
realize that his role may not be an enduring one.”12 One specific champion of Juan Carlos 
was Ambassador Robert C. Hill. One worker in the embassy, Jon David Glassman, 
recalled a story of Hill calling him into his office. Glassman concluded in a research 
paper that Juan Carlos would reign but not rule over Spain. Hill rebuffed Glassman’s 
analysis, and stated he had seen Juan Carlos at the Cortes with “the walk of a ruler” and 
with the blood “of Polish kings, of French kings—all strong rulers.”13 Glassman recalled 
the absurdity of Hill’s analysis, but explained “notwithstanding the somewhat eccentric 
basis for his conclusions, Ambassador Hill was correct in asserting positive views about 
Juan Carlos’ potential.”14 Though the embassy and the administration on his side, Juan 
Carlos soon faced an obstruction in Spain. 
In a revealing conversation with Ambassador Hill, Juan Carlos believed the 
Franco bunker undercut his attempted strides at leadership. During the conversation, the 
prince explained that he did not want Foreign Minister Gregorio López-Bravo y Castro to 
“hold his elbow” throughout his visit because he wanted to impress the American people. 
He described this to Carrero Blanco, who then gossiped to López-Bravo that Juan Carlos 
had no confidence in him. López-Bravo confronted the prince about this and prepared to 
resign if necessary, but Juan Carlos expounded the situation to his foreign minister much 
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to his relief. However, Juan Carlos confided in Hill that “he could not have secrets or 
personal counsel with Carrero Blanco because the Vice President is not discreet.”15 In 
this shocking exchange with Hill, Juan Carlos admitted to Hill that he thought he was no 
closer to being put on the throne. This highlights two major American anxieties: Juan 
Carlos would not be the future of U.S.-Spain relations, and the United States could lose 
their defensive posts in Spain by backing Juan Carlos. 
The United States monitored the aperturismo and Juan Carlos for the next year 
and noticed a few trends and developments. Laborers, university students, professors, and 
the Catholic Church either continued being or became outspoken critics of the Franco 
regime, but his authority did not falter. Hill wrote that the succession of Juan Carlos 
provided Spain with its best opportunity for democracy. He expected “the pressures for 
liberalization will intensify after Juan Carlos takes office and that he will try to 
accommodate them in significant measure.”16 In addition, Secretary of State William P. 
Rogers provided Nixon with a projection of U.S.-Spain relations for the next five years. 
Rogers explained that the major interest in Spain is to preserve the pro-Western 
orientation, which meant integrating Spain into NATO. However, the preconditions of 
Spanish acceptance to NATO will require “some liberalization of Spain’s institutions.”17 
For the aperturismo to take hold, Juan Carlos would need to lead from the center of the 
political spectrum. Rogers suggested the United States do a similar balancing act. He 
proposed the United States remain out of involvement with the succession to avoid 
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branding Juan Carlos and his supporters “as pawns of the United States.”18 Rogers’s 
proposition received a test shortly afterwards. 
On July 18, 1972, the Spanish post-Franco plan changed and jeopardized the reign 
of Juan Carlos. Franco published a new law stating the Vice President of the Government 
Carrero Blanco would succeed Franco’s position as President of Government upon his 
death or retirement. From the prior law, “the selection of the President of Government 
was left to the Chief of State Designate, Prince Juan Carlos, if Franco did not make a 
selection in his lifetime.”19 In an evaluation of the new law, the United States considered 
the impact that this would have on U.S.-Spain relations. In the assessment entitled 
“Spain: Preparing Francoism After Franco,” the United States viewed Carrero Blanco as 
someone who would close off the aperturismo and “will doubtless disappoint those 
elements of the Spanish political spectrum who had hoped for at least a semblance of 
change after Franco.”20 Further, the document describes how Juan Carlos, though not 
removed from being the future king, appeared ousted from the Franco succession. The 
new law deprived Juan Carlos and the Council of the Realm “of the opportunity of 
choosing the first post-Franco President of Government. … Should Juan Carlos, in 
agreement with the Council of the Realm, wish to install a new President, he would have 
to dismiss an incumbent rather than simply fill a vacancy—undoubtedly, a difficult task 
in the circumstances likely to exist in the immediate post-Franco period.”21  
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However, this changed suddenly with the assassination of Carrero Blanco on 
December 20, 1973. Three Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) members detonated explosives 
so powerful that they blew Carrero Blanco’s car over the adjacent building.22 ETA 
claimed responsibility in a French newspaper, saying they killed Carrero Blanco for three 
reasons: “to aid the fighting repression in Spain; to revenge the death of nine Basque 
militants at the hands of the Spanish government; and to eliminate the key, tough figure 
in that Government.”23 The administration circulated National Security Study 
Memorandum (NSSM) 193 after the ascension of Arias Navarro to Vice President of the 
Government. There was concern the transition from Carrero Blanco to Arias would affect 
the upcoming renegotiations of the base agreements. The State Department did not 
suspect major policy implications in the change of power in Spain. However, U.S. 
officials stated if Franco died before the renewal “the government in office at the time 
will be more subject to political influence from various sides than past governments have 
been and will thus be under increasing pressure to derive political benefits, rather than 
purely military benefits from the relationship with the U.S.”24 The Nixon administration 
believed it was important to conclude negotiations quickly and “obtain the longest 
possible extension of our rights to the facilities we now enjoy, provided the price we have 
to pay is reasonable.”25 This is another example of the Nixon administration focusing 
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solely on the base issue. They feared that a political changeover not in their favor would 
jeopardize their standing and leverage over Spain.  
Franco died on November 20, 1975 and plunged both Spain and the United States 
into a period of transition. For Spain, the transition was obvious as the country sought to 
install a constitutional monarchy. For the United States, the transition was subtler. The 
Nixonian approach to U.S.-Spain relations was bygone after Franco’s death. Washington 
could no longer dictate the base negotiations. Ford and Kissinger, now Secretary of State, 
could not focus solely on defense in negotiations with Spain now, but had to worry about 
the political stability of a new government. There were two fears that the United States 
had after Franco’s death. The first was the concern of a possible military coup, and the 
second was the fear of retribution of anti-Francoists and a possible second civil war.26 In 
order to mitigate these fears, Ford and Kissinger needed to rely less on hard power and 
more on smart power. 
The Ford administration, particularly Kissinger, spotlighted three main interests in 
their reevaluation of U.S.-Spanish relations. First, the United States had to support a slow 
transition. Kissinger explained the United States “will play a stabilizing and supportive 
role” in the slowly paced democratic evolution within the Spanish kingdom.27 Second, 
the United States remained committed to the security relationship, but “with a Spain more 
closely linked to the Atlantic Community.”28 Third, the Ford administration believed 
Juan Carlos would lead the Spanish transition, but the United States needed to support 
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whatever political party ascended. Kissinger wanted to use the country’s “broad 
relationship with Spain to encourage and facilitate the evolutionary process.”29  
The stance of the Nixon and Ford administration during the Spanish transition 
showed that they ignored the five-year projection of Ambassador Hill in favor of hard 
power. Hill explained that for Juan Carlos to place Spain into the West, he would have to 
liberalize Spain and the United States would need to refrain from interfering. This was 
because Juan Carlos needed to shed the idea that he was a Franco or, by proxy, U.S. 
puppet. Yet, Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger took approaches to involve the United States in 
the Spanish transition. This included getting a “good deal” on the bases and being the 
international face of Spanish entrance to NATO. The reliance on keeping defensive 
interests ahead of Spanish interests show that the Nixon and Ford administrations placed 
a priority on hard power. For example, during his visit to Madrid in 1975, Ford and 
Kissinger spent copious amounts of time in meetings with Juan Carlos, but they devoted 
time to Franco as well. However, the time spent with the latter was mostly “posing for 
photo opportunities,” and Ford made it clear he intended to speak primarily with the 
future king.30 
The briefing book for Vice President Nelson Rockefeller’s trip to Franco’s funeral 
make clear Kissinger’s three points of U.S.-Spain relations. Prepared by the State 
Department, there are three sections for talking points to understand the importance of the 
Spanish transition. Under the U.S.-Spanish relations talking points, the State Department 
emphasized the “200th anniversary of our democracy” as a path for Rockefeller to 
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convey “our understanding and support” as Spain meets the challenge ahead.31 The State 
Department also prepared Rockefeller for meeting other European dignitaries at the 
funeral. They implored Rockefeller to emphasize that Europeans should show realism 
and responsiveness for the transition to democracy. Realistic expectations meant avoiding 
a fast transition, and responsiveness included encouraging democratic evolution “without 
arousing Spanish resentment about foreign intervention.”32 Finally, the State Department 
asserted that a successful transition hinged on the leadership of Juan Carlos. Triumph in 
Spain came down to “the extent to which it can attract the participation of the reform-
minded, including the presently illegal opposition parties while not sparking direct 
conflict with the hard-line rightists.”33 
In separate correspondence with Rockefeller, Kissinger and Ambassador to Spain 
Wells Stabler underscored the fears of domestic unrest in Spain during the transition. 
Kissinger explained that Juan Carlos had to steer the ship of the transition through the 
middle ground of the far right—“the stand-fast mentality of the old Falangists”—and the 
far left—“terrorists and … a large, hostile communist party.”34 In addition, Kissinger 
revealed that he was “a little more optimistic” about Juan Carlos’s ability to lead, but still 
a bit shocked at the prince’s uncertainty over key positions in his government.35 Stabler 
believed that Juan Carlos was not in any immediate danger or trouble, but worried that 
the venom from the right or left could cause problems. Stabler clarified,  
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Juan Carlos has a difficult road ahead, in which he will seek to move without 
pause but without haste. In this he has considerable support, first of all from the 
mood of the Spanish people, but also from the Church, the establishment 
aperturistas, and, in a tacit sense at least, from the military. Since our earlier 
analysis one problem has become sharper, the threat from the right. There is 
entrenched opposition to apertura from the ‘bunker’ and from violence-prone 
rightist groups who will have to be brought under control, and their links with 
certain police elements severed, if the transition is to prosper. The threat to 
evolution, in the initial stages, is stronger on the far right than the far left (the 
Communist Party and the violence-prone groups such as the FRAP) whose real 
turn would come later on, once popular reaction to continued right wing 
intimidation set in. But of course the extreme left and extreme right, united in 
their opposition to democratic reforms, feed upon each other.36 
 
The fear that domestic threats would derail Juan Carlos and the transition to democracy 
caused some stress within the Ford administration. Yet, this was not as concerning as 
being able to guide Juan Carlos through a nonviolent transition. 
The greatest concern of the Ford administration was for Juan Carlos and Spain to 
take a slow and peaceful approach to the transition. If the new government felt forced to 
hastily changeover then it could have disastrous results for not only Spain but for the 
United States. Kissinger believed if Juan Carlos tried “to move from weakness or if he 
moves too fast, the lid will blow off.”37 In a conversation with Stabler, Kissinger 
explained, 
I do not think the issue in Spain lies in accelerated democratization. I agree that 
there must be some democratization, but somehow we must find a position that 
lies between this and an Italian or a Portuguese situation. There must be authority, 
and people must know where we stand. I am not interested in the opinions of 
some of those fools in Congress. That is not our job. Our job is to lay down a 
policy. We must think this through, and I want to know where you think it is 
going to come out. … We just cannot have a democratization in a short time or 
the lid will blow off.38 
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In conversations with the new Spanish king, both Stabler and Kissinger stressed the 
importance of a gradual and smooth transition. Almost two weeks after Franco’s death, 
Kissinger sent a telegram to Stabler that he was to deliver to Juan Carlos. The telegram 
gave details on how Juan Carlos should approach the transition at a deliberate pace and 
the path he should follow. Kissinger disclosed to Juan Carlos that he should assert 
himself, choose the President of the Cortes, place trusted allies in key Cabinet positions, 
and create a small private council “which can follow in detail everything that is 
happening, prepare studies and options for him, and act as his independent channel into 
the government, the military and the private sector.”39 This does not show direct 
influence from the United States on the Spanish decisions during the transition, but it 
does illustrate American concern for a prosperous democracy in Spain. 
The first six months of 1977 were key to both the United States and Spain as both 
transitioned under new leadership. Juan Carlos and his appointed Prime Minister Adolfo 
Suárez swiftly enacted reforms to prepare Spain for their first democratic elections since 
the Civil War. Suárez formed the Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD, Union of the 
Democratic Center), a coalition comprised of Christian Democrats, social democrats, 
liberals, and some conservatives. They pardoned political prisoners, legalized trade 
unions, and allowed strikes. Suárez showed his willingness to work with the opposition 
by meeting with Felipe González, the leader of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español 
(PSOE, Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party). Though the UCD was a recently formed party, 
the PSOE’s origins came from the 1870s. The party went underground following 
Franco’s victory in the Civil War, and many of its leaders faced exile, imprisonment, or 
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persecution. The PSOE continued to hold congresses in exile, and by the late 1960s, a 
wave of youths joined its ranks. The new members ousted leadership, removed Marxism 
from its doctrines, and moved the party back to Spain during the transition.40 González 
ascended the party leadership, modeled himself after moderate left-wing leaders like 
Willy Brandt, François Mitterrand, and Pietro Nenni, and prepared the PSOE to regard 
itself as the party to lead Spain into the EC.41 González and the PSOE became the 
prominent opposition to Suárez’s UCD during the early years of the transition but other 
parties emerged or developed following the legalization of political parties. 
One of the major issues discussed between the UCD and the PSOE was the 
legalization of the Partido Comunista de España (PCE, Communist Party of Spain). 
Following the Spanish Civil War, the leadership of the PCE went underground or forced 
into exile. The PCE remained one of the best organized opposition parties during the 
Franco regime. Initially led by Dolores Ibárruri, the PCE obeyed directives from 
Moscow—they supported the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956—and strongly 
supported the use of guerrilla warfare. However, the ascension of Santiago Carrillo to 
party leadership in 1960 brought a host of changes to the PCE. Under Carrillo, a policy of 
national reconciliation became the PCE’s slogan, and they began to form “clandestine 
organizations that incorporated workers, students, women, and neighbors in an all-out 
societal effort to fight” the Franco regime.42 Further, Carrillo distanced the PCE away 
from the Soviet Union and towards Eurocommunism. The PCE were sharply critical of 
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the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and openly promoted a “pact for freedom”—the 
restoration of liberal democracy.43 
González demanded the legalization of the PCE in an early meeting, but Suárez 
warned that authorizing the PCE would solidify the growing resentment within the 
military.44 However, Suárez decriminalized the PCE in April 1977 just before the first 
elections occurred. The opening of political parties, especially the PCE, proved decisive 
in the Spanish transition as it allowed for fair elections.45 In June 1977, the UCD won the 
first free elections since before the Civil War but was just shy of an absolute majority. A 
second election occurred in 1979 with similar results of Suárez and the UCD winning but 
not the majority. Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance wrote a congratulatory 
message to Suárez following the election in 1977. Carter toasted Suárez by writing “I am 
confident that, with determination and cooperation, Spain will meet the challenges that lie 
ahead. You can count on our support in those efforts.”46 
 Suárez understood that he needed to cooperate with the opposition despite the 
UCD holding the majority. All parties needed to work together to continue the transition. 
The manifestation of this political participation was the Moncloa Pacts, named after the 
Palace of Moncloa in Madrid where the prime minister resides. Most of the agreements 
committed economic and political affiliation between the UCD and the opposition—the 
PSOE and the PCE. The parties “agreed on a comprehensive economic program 
including limitations on wages, currency devaluation, monetary policy, increased public 
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investment, restrictions on social security, tax reform, trade union activities, control of 
nationalized industries, and other matters.”47 Suárez could not avoid the Moncloa Pacts if 
the transition were to be successful. Historian Paul Preston stresses the pacts were “the 
only way, short of revolutionary measures, of confronting the inextricably linked 
problems of the burden of Francoist economic imbalance and the unfavorable 
international situation.”48 However, the Moncloa Pacts provided more than just an 
agreement. It supplied potent symbolism of national reconciliation to resonate through 
the following year with the establishment of a constitution.49  
The Cortes approved the Constitution on October 31, 1978, a year after the 
Moncloa Pacts. The Spanish public voted overwhelmingly in favor of the Constitution on 
a referendum held on December 6, which is a national holiday in Spain—el día de la 
constitución.  The new constitution abolished the death penalty and presented a new 
higher court for political crimes. The two largest political parties, the UCD and PSOE, 
crafted the majority of the document despite various political groups and the two chief 
autonomous regions—Catalonia and Basque—participating in the drafting.50 An analysis 
of the involvement of Catalans and Basques in the formulating of the Constitution shows 
how the UCD and PSOE dominated the writing. Catalan nationalists played a role as 
mediators while asking for an organization within the Spanish state, but the Basque 
nationalists demanded sovereignty, which proved unacceptable to other writers.51  The 
text of the Constitution did not meet the approval of extremists on the left or right, but the 
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general population approved of the document.52 The Moncloa Pacts and the Constitution 
played a vital role in the Spanish transition to democracy, and the credit often goes to 
those who wrote the document—los padres de la Constitución.  
The elections, Moncloa Pacts, and Constitution are significant to the Spanish 
transition, and brought to fruition by the work of Suárez. Historians often cite Suárez’s 
leadership as significant to the Spanish transition and it’s impossible to dismiss this view.  
The common denominator in the early transition was his attempts at political cooperation 
and coalition building. According to historian John F. Coverdale, Suárez used a two-
tiered strategy to form a political coalition. He arranged a center-right coalition “which 
provided a broad enough plurality to permit him to form a cabinet,” and he formed a 
broader coalition for the writing of the Constitution that allowed him enough control to 
make the document long lasting.53 Another historian, Omar G. Encarnación, sees Suárez 
working with the opposition as a requirement because he did not have an absolute 
majority, much to the chagrin of the far right and the military.54 However, it is foolhardy 
to believe Suárez lacked options and was forced to operate with the opposition. He could 
have chosen not to include the ideas of the opposition in the transition and taken a more 
Francoist hardline stance. Though he played a pivotal role in a smooth transition, 
Suárez’s popularity began to falter because of several issues that ranged from terrorism 
and crime to economic issues such as inflation and unemployment. Suárez always had an 
approval rating at “a majority,” but an October 1979 poll showed the Prime Minister 
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“retained the backing of a 43 to 35 percent plurality.”55 The economic downturn was a 
prevalent example that contributed to the questioning of Suárez’s leadership, even after 
guiding Spain to a smooth transition from dictatorship to democracy. 
 The Carter administration monitored the economic situation closely in Spain. 
Spain faced a major dilemma due to the economic shocks from Middle Eastern oil that 
Suárez exacerbated. This occurred in tandem with three other economic problems in 
Spain: inflation, deteriorating foreign balance, and unemployment. The declining labor 
market coupled with unemployment hurt the working population, particularly the 
younger age groups, with an average of 5 percent.56 Suárez faced difficulty in short-term 
economic policy because of the ever-changing political outlook during the transition. 
There was one area that the United States highlighted as one of the more important areas 
for Spain to look at—banking. Stabler explained in a telegram regarding monetary and 
credit policies in Spain that the country needed to reform the private banking system. 
Stabler detailed how Spain’s current banking system and structure “as it now exists is 
inefficient and is the subject of widening public discussion.”57 In September 1977, the 
Bank of Spain initiated a biweekly auction system to provide credits to private banks in 
need of increased liquidity. Before this, the Bank of Spain gave credit to private banks at 
fixed, low rates for terms of one day to several months. The first action resulted in 
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interest rates (12.75 percent and higher) much higher than drop-by-drop rates (7 to 8 
percent).58  
This banking reform impressed the United States, and they believed Suárez and 
the UCD made great strides. Vice President for Economic Affairs Enrique Fuentes 
Quintana especially impressed the Carter administration. In a message on television in 
December 1977, Fuentes expounded on Spain’s economic challenges. He expressed 
optimism “that measures approved by the Moncloa Pacts will be successful if adhered 
to,” but warned that premature reactivation of the economy “would lead to insolvency 
and ruin.”59 Nevertheless, the economy continued its downward spiral, which provided 
González and the PSOE with another potent message to defeat Suárez and the UCD. 
Preston explains that the PSOE used a public and private method to attack Suárez and the 
UCD. In public, PSOE members engaged in merciless criticism of the prime minister and 
his party for their failure of the economy. In private, the Socialists attempted to 
undermine Suárez by “continuing negotiations with the social democrat wing of the 
UCD” to break up the coalition party.60 The beginnings of the Spanish transition provided 
the Carter administration with several issues to discuss for U.S.-Spain relations. 
The first years of the transition illustrated issues in U.S.-Spain relations facing the 
Carter administration that previous presidents did not encounter. First, the legalization of 
political parties in Spain, especially those of the Left, provided the United States with 
political figures that were not affiliated with Franco. Members of the UCD and Juan 
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Carlos had ties to Franco, unlike González and the PSOE. Second, the Moncloa Pacts, the 
Constitution, and elections signaled the first evidence that Spain was moving forward 
with the transition. Third, Spain, like many other nations, fell prey to the economic 
hardships of the 1970s. Carter, unlike Nixon and Ford, had an opportunity to change the 
direction of their bilateral relationship with Spain for the first time since the Pact of 
Madrid. 
National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and the State Department worked 
on an approach to the development and expansion of the PSOE and the PCE. Both 
Brzezinski and the State Department placed the developing Leftist politics in Spain 
within a broader network of Left political parties in Europe. Brzezinski emphasized how 
previous administrations avoided contacts with the opposition for fear of agitating 
Franco. He argued this “rigid position seems counterproductive,” especially in Spain, and 
“a more flexible attitude should be issued” for the PSOE and PCE.61 Though he was not 
proposing the United States support the accession of communist parties, Brzezinski 
believed Carter should not immediately reject relations with that party. The State 
Department researched the rise of influence of communist parties in Italy, France, 
Portugal, and Spain before Carter’s tenure in Washington began. They revealed Spanish 
communists were more liberal than their Italian counterparts, and warned that the return 
of the leadership from exile “could precipitate a struggle for control.”62 Once Suárez 
legalized political parties, the Carter administration overcompensated by courting PSOE 
members for official visits to the United States. From 1978 to 1980, eight prominent 
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members of the PSOE traveled to the United States, and some met or proposed meetings 
with Carter administration officials. In January 1980, the State Department asked four 
prominent Spanish socialists who received United States International Communications 
Agency (ICA, new moniker for the USIA) grants to meet with Carter the day after 
Suárez’s official state visit. The State Department argued the meeting would be timely 
“before a group of influential socialists who have (up until now) taken a negative view of 
Spanish membership in NATO.”63 These meetings and courting of the PSOE seemed to 
illustrate the United States spurning the Spanish prime minister.  
Suárez hoped to make his first official visit to the United States as prime minister 
before the elections of 1977. However, the State Department initially turned down his 
visit until Juan Carlos pled with the White House.64 Stabler wrote to Brzezinski to 
implore the president to meet with Suárez during his visit to North America. He stressed 
how beneficial the visit was for both Suárez and Carter to affirm support for the 
transition. Stabler said that he “would strongly recommend that the President agree to 
offer a small working lunch for Prime Minister Suárez following a short office call. … 
The ceremonial aspects of it could be limited to the barest minimum, if not altogether 
eliminated. I realize that Suárez’s inability to speak English is a draw-back, but I would 
hope this aspect not to be a disqualifying one as far as a working lunch is concerned.”65 
The meeting occurred on April 29, 1977. Suárez expected a discussion on Carter’s 
restriction on exporting enriched uranium, and the impact this had on the Spanish-U.S. 
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Treaty on Nuclear Cooperation signed in 1974.66 However, the language barrier did affect 
the timing of the meeting as it only lasted an hour, and it left Suárez disappointed with 
the United States. This was his last official visit as Prime Minister though he would 
return on other occasions. This overcorrection to influence the Spanish Left threatened to 
derail U.S.-Spain relations. 
However, in 1980, Suárez planned a private visit to the United States. By this 
point, Carter’s opinion of the Spanish prime minister reversed course. During the 1980 
visit, the two leaders met to discuss a variety of world events such as the situation in the 
Middle East, Latin America, and Western defense. Carter wrote to Suárez after his return 
to the United States asking him that while he visited the Middle East “to pursue the idea 
we discussed last month of consulting personally on major foreign policy questions. … I 
am sure your talks in the countries you visit will be useful in obtaining a better 
perspective on Arab attitudes to these questions.”67 In addition, Carter believed Suárez to 
be an important intermediary between the United States and Latin America. As he wrote 
in his diary after meeting Suárez in 1980, Carter “underestimated Spain’s importance” in 
policy work in Latin America.68 The obvious transformation in the opinion on Suárez was 
due to the impending negotiations over the soon-to-expire treaty for the Spanish bases in 
1981. Though Brzezinski and the State Department initially believed they could use soft 
power during the Spanish transition, the Carter administration soon relied on similar 
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inducements of hard power from previous administrations—base negotiations, NATO, 
and admission into the EC. 
Though Carter worked toward courting better relations with the Spanish Left, 
Reagan mistrust of González and the PSOE nearly derailed U.S.-Spain relations. Much 
like the United States transitioned from Carter to Reagan, Spain saw Leopoldo Calvo-
Sotelo succeed Suárez. To further complicate matters, the base negotiations concluded 
under the rule of Calvo-Sotelo, but the election of González and the PSOE delayed the 
signing of the agreement. Ambassador Terence Todman explains the tensions 
relationship between Reagan and González, explaining that the PSOE thought “this right-
wing Republican is coming in, and the Republicans thinking of these left-wing Socialists 
out there.”69 In addition, there appeared to be a lack of understanding of Spain by the 
Reagan administration. Todman details a visit by Secretary of State George P. Schultz to 
Madrid. After reading the briefing book for Schultz, Todman noticed that Washington 
disregarded his comments or changed his words. He exclaimed to Schultz, “Mr. 
Secretary, you’ve been set up for total disaster by what they’ve put in your [briefing] 
book.”70 Todman salvaged a disastrous meeting after discussing last minute changes for 
Schultz before a meeting in Madrid. 
While Carter met with Gonzalez during his time as opposition leader, Reagan did 
the same with Manuel Fraga Iribarne. The administration received a few letters asking for 
the president to meet with the Alianza Popular (AP) leader either in a meeting or for a 
photo opportunity. Aline Griffith, Countess of Romanones and a friend of Nancy Reagan, 
wrote the First Lady in the hopes that her husband would meet with Fraga. Griffith 
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stressed that a meeting between Reagan and Fraga would provide “psychological strength 
to people of the right in Spain” and to avoid another military takeover.71 Retired Navy 
officer Alan Brown wrote a number of letters to Nancy Reagan in the hopes of 
persuading the Reagans to meet Fraga during Juan Carlos and Sofía’s visit to the United 
States. Brown insisted that Reagan and Secretary of State Haig meet “an intelligent 
leading Spanish politician of the Center Right,” and claimed that Fraga was “one of the 
few Spanish who can save Spain from going Socialist in the 1983 elections.”72 While the 
Reagans received these letters, the administration had yet to receive either Juan Carlos or 
Calvo-Sotelo for official visits. The administration denied the requests to meet Fraga not 
only because it was against protocol, but also because it would be viewed “as interference 
in the Spanish internal political situation.”73 The administration appeared to have learned 
from Carter’s mistake in courting political opposition to the United States before meeting 
with political leadership. 
While those outside the administration believed he should be allying with right-
leaning politicians, Reagan eventually found a good working relationship with González 
despite initial concerns. In an examination of the PSOE’s first six months in control of 
Spain in 1982-83, the United States applauded González for maintaining moderation in 
every field despite a platform that leaned to the left. Michael E. Parmly, a member of the 
State Department, prepared a document that examined González’s short time in office, 
which highlighted economic, military, and socio-religious policies. Parmly claimed that 
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the Spanish Prime Minister’s “prudence thus far demonstrates his sensitivity to the 
political climate.”74 In addition, Ambassador Thomas Enders voiced his approval of 
González as the prime minister especially regarding foreign policy. Enders demonstrated 
that González “emphasized Spain’s western democratic loyalties and generally avoided 
playing to the ideological preferences of the Spanish Left.”75 Coincidentally, this change 
in perception of González occurred as he and the PSOE began reconsidering entrance to 
NATO and proposed a referendum for approval. However, this misunderstanding and 
mistrust between the United States and Spain intensified after an attempted coup d’état in 
Spain on February 23, 1981. 
The Black Legend and Anti-Americanism 
The American perception of Francoist Spain was a negative one in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. This opinion of Spain goes back to the Spanish-American War in 1898 
and the “black legend.” As historian Kristin L. Hoganson points out, a fear of weakened 
manhood and national decay lead to some Americans to perceive the Cuban revolt 
against Spain in 1895 through a gendered lens. Cubans became “heroes and heroines of a 
romance novel,” the Spanish became the rapists, and the United States became the 
chivalrous knights to save Cuba’s honor.76 Into the twentieth-century, Americans 
continued this prejudice of Spain. Historian David F. Schmitz describes how American 
officials in the 1920s and 1930s viewed Spain as a “backward nation, still governed by 
medieval institutions of the monarchy and the church, which prevented the political and 
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economic developments that had advanced in the rest of Western Europe and accounted 
for the decline of Spain’s empire, its easy defeat in the Spanish-American War, and the 
current poverty.”77 
Though the Nixon administration hoped to change this perception due to the 
president’s friendliness with Franco, U.S. officials worried that popular fatigue over the 
Vietnam War and budgetary battles would hinder 1969 base negotiations. The optics of 
the Nixon administration networking with Francoist Spain and burgeoning domestic 
antiwar activism troubled U.S. politicians who questioned whether the United States 
should be working with an authoritarian regime to retain military bases abroad while 
continuing the unpopular war in Southeast Asia. The State Department warned the 
administration to anticipate “possible flak” by negotiating “on generous terms with a 
government which has recently clamped down on civil liberties.”78 There were also fears 
within the administration of the upcoming Symington Subcommittee. 
In January 1969, Stuart Symington formed the Senate Foreign Relations 
Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad. This 
subcommittee aimed to research U.S. foreign military commitments, one of which was 
Spain. Ambassador Hill and General David A. Burchinal expressed Spain’s desire for a 
swift conclusion to the negotiations to avoid any conflicts with the Symington 
Subcommittee hearings. However, the State Department felt that “the effects of the 
Symington Subcommittee hearings will be bad regardless of when the negotiations 
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occur.”79 The State and Defense Departments jointly conducted a base study that further 
alarmed the Nixon administration. Richard V. Allen, a foreign policy coordinator for 
Nixon, wrote to Kissinger and Deputy National Security Advisor Haig to suggest they 
give Symington a factual description of the base agreement instead of the base study, “if, 
indeed, we are to give him anything.”80 Allen clarified that the base study will denote 
“much material to charge the administration with expanding commitments beyond those 
approved by Congress. It will also have a basis to press us to close bases because the 
Study Group implies that they are not needed.”81 Haig believed it was best to give the 
Symington subcommittee a copy because they would get it one way or another. Further, a 
National Security Council staffer warned Kissinger to “anticipate a great deal of adverse 
publicity to accompany” the Symington hearings later in 1970.82 
Though the U.S. Congress appeared to be turning on the bases, editorials in 
newspapers showed this already happened to some of the American public. A New York 
Times editorial argued against the renewal of the U.S. bases in Spain because “it is too 
high a price to pay for four bases that are obsolete and in any case could be replaced by 
other arrangements. The 10,000 American troops currently stationed in Spain have no 
business propping up regimes like Franco’s.”83 Foreign Minister Fernando María 
Castiella y Maíz met with Ambassador Hill and brought this particular editorial and a few 
others. Hill noted that Castiella “may have wished mainly to register with me his 
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Government’s unhappiness over the recent unfavorable publicity in the American press; 
he did not seem really to expect, or want an answer from me.”84  
There were other instances of Spain voicing their displeasure over the optics of 
the negotiations. Some within Spain, including Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs 
Ramon Sedo Gomez, expressed displeasure with the “summoning” of Castiella for a last-
minute visit to the United States. Sedo argued that while Spain received political, 
economic, and military benefits from these agreements, the Spanish in and out of 
government understand they are in “an unequal partnership with [the] U.S.”85 Spanish 
diplomat Nuño Aguirre de Cárcer to Kissinger added: 
Logically, the Spanish people have a sense of disillusion and disappointment with 
this situation, and this has given rise to a trend towards disengagement, a general 
desire not to incur in risks on behalf of a collective system of defense that does 
not accept us; a wish to see a reduction in the American military presence, down 
to those levels and requirements which are strictly necessary for US and Western 
security.86  
 
The two sides continued working on an agreement through the negative public reaction. 
 Yet, after the death of Franco, Americans still had reservations regarding his 
successor, Juan Carlos. The American media, especially Time magazine, questioned the 
competency and loyalty of Juan Carlos. In an article from a 1962 cover story on Don 
Juan (Juan Carlos’s father) being Franco’s successor, Time focused on the youth of Juan 
Carlos and how he cut his honeymoon short with Queen Sofía to introduce her to 
Franco.87 The belief was that the Spanish prince was just a stooge for Franco and Don 
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Juan may be the post-Franco savior of Spain. American media uneasiness continued in 
Time’s November 1975 issue “After Franco.” Much of the cover story discussed the 
failing health of the dictator and the competing factions vying for control of Spain. Time 
questioned whether Juan Carlos—whom they refer to as “The Prince as Sleeping 
Beauty”—could manage the transition. The article argues that while Spaniards still had 
memories of the Civil War, the only way for Spain to transition peacefully “depends 
largely on whether Juan Carlos can convince Franco’s long-suppressed political 
opponents that he is more than a programmed appendage of the old regime.”88 
The public interest in Spanish domestic politics and the transition rose after Juan 
Carlos assumed the throne. Initially, the press coverage from sources such as Time led the 
American public to be apprehensive of Juan Carlos because of concerns as to whether he 
was Franco’s puppet or would integrate a constitutional monarchy. These concerns led to 
the formation of committees aimed at promoting human rights and democracy in Spain 
including the Ad Hoc Committee for a Democratic Spain, the Madison Committee for a 
Democratic Spain, the U.S. Committee for a Democratic Spain, and the American 
Committee for Iberian Freedom. These groups had a wide range of memberships, utilized 
comparable methods of advocating for Spanish democracy, and continually held the 
monarchy to a high standard of human rights promotion in Spain. 
The Ad Hoc Committee consisted of prominent historians, political scientists, 
scientists, economists, playwrights, novelists, publishers, political activists, religious 
leaders, a university president, and a former United Nations ambassador.89 This assembly 
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believed it was the United States’ obligation “to help assure freedom in Spain without 
threat of the kind of violence which could lead to a new civil war.”90 Some committees 
formed before Juan Carlos became king such as the Madison Committee. Located in 
Madison, Wisconsin, this group highlighted the human rights violations of the Franco 
regime, and decried the United States for perpetuating the regime and funneling money 
for defense in Spain. Following the executions in 1975 and the debate over promoting the 
base agreement to a treaty, the Madison Committee wrote to its members that all 
“American troops and arms must be removed from Spain. There must be no interference 
in the internal affairs of Spain.”91  
Two other committees utilized writing campaigns to air their grievances with the 
United States. The group with the broadest membership was the U.S. Committee for a 
Democratic Spain, which had chapters in northern and southern California, Seattle, 
Cleveland, Boston, and Chicago. The U.S. Committee urged their Congressmen not to 
sign the treaty. In one of their newsletters, they argued “it is vital that the [Congressional] 
hearings bring out all understandings accompanying the treaty if the American people are 
to avoid another Vietnam-type involvement.”92 Another committee even went so far as to 
write a letter to Juan Carlos seeking an audience with him during his visit to the United 
States. Joseph Lash and James Loeb, the American Committee for Iberian Freedom 
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chairman and director respectively, wrote that “as supporters of human rights, we find it 
disappointing” that Spain had not legally recognized political parties, nor was there any 
universal suffrage, free trade unions, or amnesty for political prisoners.93 Though each 
group had different members and methods, they all had a similar goal. Each committee 
wanted Spain to integrate democracy as fast as possible against the specter of Franco and 
do so peacefully to avoid another catastrophic civil war. 
As the transition continued, media coverage of Juan Carlos and the transition 
itself grew more positive. Time magazine began portraying Juan Carlos as a competent 
leader. As part of an article on the rise of prominence of European monarchs, Juan Carlos 
received glowing—though slightly backhanded—reviews from the magazine. The 
articles explained that though the Spanish King was “criticized for his seeming lethargy 
during the first three months of his reign,” Juan Carlos received praise for his response to 
riots in Barcelona by traveling to various Spanish regions to calm the tensions.94 Further, 
New York Times bureau chief James M. Markham wrote a complementary piece on the 
Spanish king after the attempted coup d’état in February 1981. He commended Juan 
Carlos for cultivating “the image of a populist monarchy, shorn of pomp and devoid of 
scandal and controversy,” and for consistently proclaiming the need for a united Spain.95  
This image of Juan Carlos in the American media changed over time, but the 
Spanish image of the United States did not. Anti-Americanism was prevalent in Spain in 
the early twentieth century. As historian Francisco Javier Rodríguez Jiménez describes, 
one of the most typical points of anti-Americanism was “the supposed lack of culture, 
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sophistication and historical tradition” within the United States.96 Spanish intellectuals 
and conservatives saw the United States as the antithesis of “the true Spain,” and U.S. 
interventions in Latin America, frequently referred to as “imperialismo yanqui,” led to 
questions of U.S. democracy and threats to Hispanic culture.97 By the 1920s and 1930s, 
the Spanish government attempted to move on from the Spanish-American War. 
Progressives, especially scientists and engineers, viewed the United States favorably, but 
conservatives perceived them negatively due to the war. Following the outbreak of the 
Spanish Civil War, Roosevelt’s decision to remain neutral led to strengthening anti-
Americanism. Roosevelt’s acceptance of appeasement “caused a great deal of unease 
among those progressive Spaniards who had previously been sympathetic towards the 
United States;” and conservatives, namely the Church, the Army, and the Falange, 
continued their adverse views of the United States.98 
During the negotiating period for the 1970 Agreement, the United States became 
keenly aware of criticism from the Spanish public. In a letter to Under Secretary of State 
for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson, Hill discussed the three focal points of criticism: 
(A) Spain is assuming risks disproportionate to the benefits it is receiving from 
the agreement. The presence of the bases of Spanish soil could involve Spain in a 
war not of its own choosing. The Spanish have no security guarantee, such as 
NATO members have, even if they use of the bases provokes an attack. (B) The 
U.S. military presence in Spain restricts Spanish sovereignty and freedom in 
foreign policy. (C) The Spanish do not have sufficient say in the operation and 
use of the bases of their own soil.99  
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Ford’s visit to Spain during the base negotiations in 1975 epitomized this Spanish 
disillusionment with the United States. There was speculation that the Ford 
administration planned the trip for two reasons: to provide “just enough attention” to 
appease the Spanish for base rights and to cultivate the Spaniards “who would assume 
responsibility when Franco was gone.”100 Regarding the first point, the Ford 
administration’s stopover in Spain was to have the president participate in base 
negotiations and illustrate his ties to other European NATO members. In most of his 
recorded conversations in Madrid, Ford spoke often of his recent visit to the Council of 
NATO in Brussels and his consideration of Spain in his speech there.101 In his memoir, 
Ford recalled the speech and emphasized how Spain “could make an important 
contribution to our mutual security. We had to consider ways to integrate her forces with 
others in the West.”102 
Ford emphasized the significance of U.S.-Spain relations on the Atlantic 
community in all his public statements and speeches in Madrid. However, the Spanish 
people greeted the president with a lukewarm reception, which juxtaposed the 
celebrations for Eisenhower and Nixon during their visits. There were large crowds 
everywhere Ford visited, but enthusiasm for the American president was indifferent in 
Madrid. One of the possible reasons is the negative association Spaniards made between 
the United States and Franco. A question and response prepared by National Security 
Advisor Brent Scowcroft for White House Press Secretary Ron Nessen dealt with 
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Spanish reactions to Ford’s visit as U.S. approval of a right-wing dictator, and to deflect 
to the importance of Spain to the Atlantic community.103 Over a week after the visit, 
White House Chief of Staff Donald Rumsfeld wrote a letter to Ford explaining why the 
crowds in Madrid were apathetic during his visit. Rumsfeld explains, 
I asked my friend why the large crowds that were out to see President Ford ride 
by were so quite, seemingly apathetic. He answered that for weeks the 
government, through the government press, had been making it seem that the 
prime purpose of President Ford’s visit to Europe was to secure a new connection 
for Spain with NATO. … The Spanish newspapers had headlines the day of the 
President’s arrival to the effect that the failure of Ford to obtain Spanish 
membership in NATO proved that “the United States is no longer the leader of 
NATO.” The crowds that had been brought out for the motorcade were obviously 
government employees and pro-Franco people. Since they had been told that 
President Ford had failed in the primary purpose of his visit, they did not know 
whether to cheer or not. They knew they had to turn out, but they didn’t know 
whether the government wanted them to show enthusiasm.104 
 
This illustrates that even pro-Franco factions had trouble reconciling with the visit of 
Ford to Madrid and the importance of the United States. 
The Spanish public had hopes that the Carter administration would be a change 
from the previous Republican administrations. As the transition occurred and their parties 
were legalized, the leftist coalition of Spain hoped Carter might “put more pressure on 
Madrid for internal reforms.”105 Yet, the administration continued the U.S. approach of 
the previous years by stressing the importance of Spain entering the West. Throughout 
the time Carter occupied the White House, the Spanish interest in entering international 
organizations was nowhere near the American concern. Domestic issues occupied Spain, 
especially the economic collapse of the late 1970s. According to an ICA briefing paper, 
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66 percent of Spaniards believed 1980 would be a disaster economically and were 
“particularly gloomy” in their outlook for the future.106 The economic situation caused 
considerable problems for the Suárez government. In 1980, Spaniards’ “growing 
disenchantment” with the government led the public to give “higher marks to the Franco 
regime than the present government in raising the standard of living.”107 The bleak 
outlook appeared to be spreading beyond just fears of economic depressions. Spanish 
integration into the EC presented an enigma for the Carter administration. In an April 
1980 survey, the Spanish public backed Spain’s efforts to join the EC by a twelve-to-one 
margin, but the survey also revealed that many were indifferent to Spain associating with 
Europe.108 
 Disinterest in joining the West can be traced to the Spanish perceptions of the 
Cold War that drew little distinction between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
They argued that the United States often intervened in foreign affairs of other countries 
and sought world domination despite helping promote human rights in developing 
nations. This is most evident in the reaction to Reagan’s hard power with Spain. During 
his May 1985 visit to Madrid, Reagan was greeted with over 500,000 protestors. While 
there he was greeted with demonstrations against his Nicaragua policy and his support for 
Spain entering NATO. Spaniards connected NATO and the West with the Cold War and 
wanted their country to remain neutral in the Cold War conflict. These protests provide 
the culmination of the Spanish views of the United States during the transition to 
democracy. They believed the Americans were only interested in Spain to further their 
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own needs from the Cold War to economics. The public argued that the United States 
kept Franco in power for longer because he helped further American national security 
interests with the military bases. Once Franco died and the transition began, the Spanish 
public vocally protested American interference in Spain.  
23-F 
The attempted coup d’état—commonly referred to as 23-F—occurred in Spain on 
February 23, 1981. The military held the government hostage and dealt a major 
complication to both Spanish politics and U.S.-Spain relations. The Spanish military had 
not approved of their minimized role in the transition. Some members of the military saw 
the weak economy, violence of ETA, decrease in Suárez’s popularity, and fracturing of 
the UCD as their opportunity to take control. On the night of February 23, the Cortes held 
a vote to confirm Calvo-Sotelo as the successor to Suárez. The coup began when Colonel 
Antoio Tejero led Guardia Civil into the meeting and held Parliament members hostage. 
At the same time, General Jaime Milans del Bosch attempted to overthrow the regional 
government in Valencia. Divisional General Alfonso Armada went to the royal palace to 
negotiate with Juan Carlos but was turned away. Armada went to the Cortes and declared 
that Juan Carlos had ordered him to become the military authority of Spain.109 
The attempted coup failed because of the role of political actors, lack of 
communication among the military, and Juan Carlos’s resolute televised speech. The 
political leaders—Suárez, González, Alfonso Guerra González (the second in command 
of the PSOE), and Santiago Carrillo (leader of the PCE)—reacted to the coup in unified 
fashion. Together they worked to keep the government together even after the Guardia 
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Civil removed them from the chamber. The disorganization of the military conspirators 
was their undoing due to a lack of communication and organization between those who 
participated in the coup. In addition, not all within the military supported Tejero or 
Milans del Bosch. The pivotal blow to the coup came from Juan Carlos when he went on 
television at 1:15 a.m. on February 24. In this speech, the King refused to abdicate, 
vowed to uphold the Constitution, and swore that the democratic process would continue 
for the Spanish people. After eighteen hours, Tejero and Milans del Bosch surrendered. 
The Cortes held a vote the next day to approve Calvo-Sotelo, and González offered to 
form a coalition government. The coup tested the new Spanish democracy and it 
survived.110 
The international response to 23-F illustrates the growing distance between Spain 
and the United States. Once the events in Madrid made international news, Europeans 
reached out to show their support for the young democracy. Historian Julio Crespo 
MacLennan argues, the threat of a return to authoritarianism in Spain made “political 
cooperation with Spain … more important than ever” to Europeans.111 While Europeans 
saw this as an opportunity to unite with Spain, the Reagan administration—especially 
Secretary of State Haig—believed 23-F was not a problem for the United States to solve. 
In a remark shortly after the seizure of the Parliament, Haig commented that this was “an 
internal matter” for the Spanish, echoing Nixon’s response to the Burgos trial—a human 
rights event in the Franco era.112 Todman defended Haig by disclosing that reporters 
approached the Secretary for comment after a meeting, and Haig had not been briefed on 
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the situation. Though he had given Juan Carlos numerous assurances of U.S. support of 
Spanish democracy, Todman said “that one little comment, caught at the wrong moment, 
created some doubts.”113  
Haig’s response squandered an opportunity for the United States to rehabilitate 
the U.S. image in Spain. The United States had military present in Madrid during the 
coup, and they could have easily gotten involved if given approval. As Foreign Service 
Officer Robert E. Barbour explained, the U.S. embassy faced criticism because of the 
hypocrisy of Haig and the Reagan administration as well as enraged Spaniards who took 
the comment at face value. Barbour highlighted that Spaniards had been criticizing the 
United States “for having said so much about other [internal] situations in other 
countries.”114 If the United States was willing to interfere in other country’s business then 
why are they choosing to stay out of Spain? The U.S. response to the 23-F coup is an 
example of why the Spanish did not trust the United States and their bases.  
The administration quickly worked to show Spain that they sincerely cared about 
the transition to democracy. Reagan authored a letter Juan Carlos on February 27 to 
reiterate the importance of Spanish democracy. He wrote, “You and your people are not 
alone as you reassert the principles of democracy which distinguish today’s Spanish 
example.”115 There was a meeting held between Haig, Juan Carlos, and Calvo-Sotelo in 
April 1981, and there was talk of preparing a visit of Juan Carlos to the United States.116 
The reason for the quick meeting between Haig and the Spanish government dealt with 
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the ongoing negotiations of the Spanish bases and the preservation of American standing 
in Spain. Although the administration attempted a soft power approach, Haig’s comments 
had damaged U.S.-Spain relations. 
To build goodwill, the Reagan administration provided Spain assistance in 
combatting domestic terrorism. In May 1981, ETA attempted an assassination on General 
Valenzuela, a member of Juan Carlos’s personal staff. Reagan wrote that the United 
States stood firm “against those who would oppose democratic government.”117 The 
attack on Valenzuela came three days after another general was killed. The Spanish 
government believed the Soviet Union funded ETA to serve their objective to undercut 
NATO discussions.118 Yet, some within Spain believed that France was aiding terrorism 
in Spain. Fraga claimed that France was protecting the headquarters and agents of ETA 
because the French did “not want Spain as a political or economic competitor.”119 In 
addition, Fraga stressed in a meeting with the Ambassador Enders that Spain did not have 
years to fight terrorism, because it would descend into chaos within months. This scared 
the Reagan administration into investigating how to help Spain with counter-terrorism. 
The United States sent Robert Oakley to Spain to discuss a number of proposals for 
counterterrorism, such as: “a high-level Spanish delegation visit to the United States to 
work out the scope and details of cooperation, joint training, including through the Anti-
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Terrorism Assistance Program, [and] cooperation with the CIA, Defense, Justice, and 
State.”120 
The fascist gunslingers of the United States abandoned their paternalism of 
Spaniards. The hard power of American leadership, anti-Americanism, and the response 
to 23-F had drastic effects on U.S.-Spain relations and smart power. As seen through the 
negative reactions by the Spanish public, the U.S. hard power utilized by Nixon, Ford, 
Carter, and Reagan almost derailed U.S.-Spain relations. These administrations illustrate 
that the United States believed they could control all aspects of the bilateral relationship 
with Spain. Nixon knew that Franco’s friendlessness on the world’s stage would benefit 
the United States in securing U.S. rights to the Spanish military bases. Further, Nixon and 
Kissinger believed that Juan Carlos could be the next leader of Spain with the possibility 
of being Franco-esque in his deference to the United States. But once the transition to 
democracy began, Ford and Kissinger had to change. They realized that they must 
support Juan Carlos or face the possibility of losing the bases. Carter attempted to change 
the course of U.S.-Spain relations by courting the PSOE, but Reagan arrived on the scene 
and undid the progress made by Carter. 
The public perception of the United States and Spain during the transition to 
democracy shows that the U.S. and Spanish public were not enthusiastic about U.S. hard 
power. Congress and the media questioned whether the United States should be working 
with a figure like Franco. However, as the transition began, the U.S. public change its 
mind on Spain as Juan Carlos and pushed for establishing a constitutional monarchy. For 
the Spanish public, the transition to democracy highlighted the disappointment with 
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American leadership. This discontent continued after the United States failed to defend 
the nascent democracy in Spain during the attempted 23-F coup. Increasing Anti-
Americanism led to hardening opposition toward the base negotiations, Spanish entry 
into NATO, and membership in the European Community. Despite long-standing 
American declarations about valuing an alliance, Spaniards realized that the United States 
only wanted what was best in its defensive interests—Naval Station Rota (Cadíz), 














Quid Pro Quo: 




 On September 22, 1975, Secretary of State Kissinger met with members of the 
American negotiating team after a conference with their Spanish counterparts. The 
subject of the meeting was the renegotiations for American control of Spanish military 
bases in Rota, Seville, Madrid, and Zaragoza. Pedro Cortina y Mauri, the Spanish Foreign 
Minister and leader of the Spanish negotiating team, threatened to terminate the 
American use of the bases if the Ford administration did not strengthen Spanish ties to 
NATO, a promise that Spain coveted since the 1950s. Cortina threatened the U.S. 
negotiators with a suspension of American use of the Zaragoza and Torrejón bases for 
three months “to show NATO that Spain meant business.”1 The U.S. negotiating team 
attributed Cortina’s obsession over the NATO decision to his erroneous conviction that it 
was vital to Spain’s survival. U.S. Ambassador to Spain Wells Stabler explained to 
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Kissinger that Cortina was “persuaded that they must get either an arrangement with 
NATO as a bilateral security guarantee.” Kissinger bellowed, “He’s nuts!”2 
 This exchange epitomizes how the United States took advantage of their hard 
power. Spain believed that part of their quid pro quo with the United States meant that it 
would be accepted into Western organizations such as NATO and the EC. However, 
Washington was aware of this desire and used it as leverage to maintain hard power over 
Madrid. This is best seen in how the United States approached negotiations to maintain 
control of the military bases. For American leadership, the bases were important because 
they gave the United States quick strike capabilities in the Mediterranean and the Middle 
East. The agreements and one treaty3 established a quid pro quo between Madrid and 
Washington. Spain received economic and military aid while the United States obtained 
base rights. Further, Spain now had a friend on the world’s stage and hoped to use this 
rapport to enter the West. Yet, the presidential administrations that participated in 
negotiations for the bases were aware of Spain’s global predicament and took advantage 
to benefit the United States. 
 The Western organizations that Spain desired to enter were NATO and the EC. 
They viewed the United States as “leaders” of NATO and hoped to join for defensive 
benefits. American leaders consistently used NATO as hard power leverage over Spain 
during negotiations. They did this despite knowing that members of the Atlantic Alliance 
did not want another dictator to join. The same can be said for the EC, which Spain 
hoped would provide economic assistance and Europeanization. However, the United 
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States did not want Spain to join the EC because it would jeopardize their hold over 
Spain and ability to use Spain as an intermediary with other world regions such as the 
Middle East and Latin America. However, all of this changed as the transition to 
democracy took place. As a democratic Spain won global attention, U.S. power over 
Spain diminished. Further, the quid pro quo no longer became necessary as the Spanish 
public voted to join the EC and NATO. 
The Spanish Military Bases 
 
The Cold War drove the United States into a hard power stance with Spain and 
the insistence on control of the military bases. In 1953, the United States and Spain 
signed the Pact of Madrid in which Spain received U.S. economic and military aid in 
exchange for granting air and naval bases occupied by the United States. These 
installations included the Rota, Morón, Torrejón, and Zaragoza. Each presidential 
administration knew of the strategic importance of the stations in Spain for proximity to 
the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Both regions were points of concern due to 
global uneasiness from international oil crises, similar transitions from dictatorships in 
Portugal and Greece, and popularly elected communist parties in Italy and France. In 
addition, the proximity of the Soviet Union to the region and the possibility of 
communism spreading beyond the Iron Curtain made the Spanish bases a priority for the 
United States. Even during the period of détente in the 1970s, the United States believed 
it needed to control military bases in Europe for a close strike against the Soviet Union or 
Soviet proxies. 
The Yom Kippur War in 1973 was an example of the United States intending to 





against Egypt and Syria caused a volatile eastern Mediterranean. This conflict worried 
the United States and the Spanish bases provided a defensive post in case of an 
emergency strike.4 The administration considered using the Spanish bases to support 
Israel during the Yom Kippur War, but they were met by a surprising opponent—Franco. 
In a letter to Nixon, Franco discussed his opposition to the operation of the bases during 
the conflict and urged peace, but requested that Washington not hold this against Spain: 
Thus it is mandatory, in these movements of great danger in which we are living, 
not to curtail efforts to achieve negotiated bases of an agreement that could be 
accepted without placing any of the disputants in desperate peril. Otherwise, 
leavening of a terrorism both permanent and without quarter would create a 
situation of latent war that would perpetuate itself without achieving solutions to 
the grave tensions existing between Israel and the Arab states. For this reason I 
wish to communicate to you, Mr. President, that Spain stands ready to consider, 
with the utmost celerity, the most effective method of using her good offices in 
favor of a quick cease fire in the hostilities and a just and negotiated peace, in 
accordance with our constant policy favoring understanding between countries, 
and also in accordance with our firm position, put to the test during the two World 
Wars, that did not succeed in breaking our firm resolution to maintain the peace.5 
 
Foreign Minister Laureano López Rodó stated that the conflict in the Middle East caused 
great preoccupation for Spain. He worried that the United States using the Spanish bases 
to launch strikes for Israel would imperil Spanish diplomacy with Arab nations. López 
Rodó asserted that “any use of these bases in the Middle East conflict, whether direct or 
indirect, would violate [the bases] agreement.”6 
The major source of concern dealt with the United States housing two F-4 
Phantom Aircrafts at the Torrejón airbase in Madrid. López Rodó asked about the sudden 
large number of tanker aircraft at Torrejón and why the two F-4s were “painted 
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differently from customary [United States Air Force] colors and which bear no 
numbers.”7 U.S. Ambassador Horacio Rivero Jr. explained that the two F-4s were part of 
an ongoing sale with Iran, and the Iranian government asked that the aircraft be painted in 
desert camouflage colors.8 Yet, Spain continued to seek assurance from the United States 
that they would not use the bases for the Yom Kippur War. This angered the Nixon 
administration, which dispatched Rivero to deliver a message to López Rodó regarding 
how the United States planned to use the bases. The message detailed that the Soviet 
Union launched “massive airlifts of arms to Syria, Egypt, and Iraq,” and the United States 
“will not remain passive in the face of this Soviet adventurism.”9 The administration 
reprimanded Spain for “an inward looking attitude” towards the crisis in the Middle 
East.10 López Rodó responded that Spain was not “inward looking,” and declared the 
Yom Kippur War was “neither an attack on nor a threat to [the] West, but a continuation 
of historical Jewish-Arab struggle.”11 Spain requested the removal of tankers for security 
reasons, but Rivero said to postpone this until new base agreements. This conflict over 
the use of the bases led the United States to be prompt in the search for a solution on how 
to use the bases in the future. 
The priority of preserving the military bases in Spain superseded all U.S. 
initiatives, which can be seen by the Carter administration’s human rights objectives and 
the State Department’s pushback. The Deputy Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs David Aaron explained in a memorandum to Carter that the naval base at 
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Rota and the Bardenas Reales aerial gunnery range “are virtually irreplaceable.”12 The 
State Department clarified to the president that any new foreign policy goals in Spain 
were to fall below the bases. One document from the administration discussed achieving 
human rights objectives abroad, but the State Department made it clear that human rights 
promotion in friendly countries would not detract from national security interests. They 
resolved that the concern of human rights in Spain may produce “a threat to maintenance 
of U.S. military bases.”13 In another briefing paper, the Carter administration developed 
three principal interests in Spain: democracy promotion, supporting European integration, 
and “preserving a favorable atmosphere for our security interests in Spain, particularly 
for our use of Spanish bases.”14 This illustrates that the retention of Spanish bases for 
national security purposes was of the utmost importance to the United States whether this 
meant using the bases in a conflict or curbing administration goals. 
The United States lease of the Spanish bases came from agreements signed every 
five years. Both the negotiations for and the nature of the arrangement was the carrot and 
the stick. The stick was securing the best deal possible for the United States not Spain, 
but the carrot came from funding for exchanges. For example, the 1970 Agreement 
included financing educational, cultural, and scientific cooperation. The United States 
and Spain agreed to exchange teachers, scientists, and students as well as endorse the 
Fulbright Program. Further, the United States “agreed to aid Spain in research, 
development, and advanced training of professors, particularly in the sciences.” The 
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American Bicentennial received some of these funds including 120 students visiting U.S. 
universities and various other projects. In addition, both the United States and Spain 
agreed to “attach special interest to civil uses of atomic energy, the exploitation and use 
of space, marine sciences, medical and biological sciences, industrial technology, 
electronics and social sciences.” The exchange of radio and television programs, “to 
mutually assist their respective information media,” was an important aspect of the 1970 
Agreement. Other areas discussed in the 1970 Agreement included environmental and 
urban development, agricultural issues, and economic help.15  
These aspects carried over to the renewed agreements and treaty between the 
United States and Spain. The quid pro quo of the agreements was smart power—the hard 
power of holding defensive interests and the soft power of cultural diplomacy. Yet, the 
negotiations for these agreements focused almost entirely on defensive aspects and hard 
power. The core of the agreements dealt with money used for funding of the bases. In 
addition, the tactics of the U.S. negotiators were often hardline on this topic. Three of the 
four presidents actively participated in negotiations with Spain for the military bases. 
Nixon, Ford and Reagan made sure that American interests were met first. The reason 
American leaders knew they could take advantage of the negotiations was because Spain 
remained ostracized on the world’s stage. Though they made other agreements, Spain 
remained on the outskirts of NATO and the EC, which meant the relationship with the 
United States was pivotal for Spain on the global stage. This exploitation by the United 
States is best seen by Nixon and the negotiations of the 1970 Agreement. 
                                                   
15 Summary of 1970 Agreement, 1974, folder: NSDM 268 – Renegotiations of Bases Agreement with 





Spain presented a “shopping list” of over $1 billion as the Nixon administration 
entered the White House. The United States chose from six options that were 
significantly smaller than the number Spain requested. Both the State and Defense 
Departments recommended “a top negotiating ceiling of $175 million in grants over a 
five year period, and if the Spanish request, up to $100 million in Ex-Im Bank credit or 
guarantees for military purchases, plus the possibility of post-Vietnam excess material (at 
no cost to US).”16 Negotiations continued between the two sides with continued de-
escalation of the monetary amount. Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson disclosed 
the limited options for the United States in negotiations. He detailed that the United 
States wanted “a base rental for which we are willing to pay $175 million over five years. 
The Spanish want a security commitment and they wanted to be treated as a formal ally 
and not as a leaser of real estate. The fundamental difference in approach makes a 
satisfactory solution difficult.”17 Spain responded with an eighteen-month offer of $52.5 
million in grant aid and $30 million in credits, but the United States countered with a 
two-year renewal at $50 million in grants and $35 million in credits.18 Spain accepted the 
counter offer but there continued to be debates over the title of the offer. 
Questions later arose over how to sign the agreement and whether it would be an 
agreement or a treaty. Secretary of State Rogers officially visited Europe with a stop in 
Spain from May 28-29, 1970. Initially talks discussed having a grand signing ceremony 
with Rogers present, but there were concerns over the finished technical language of the 
agreement. Spanish Ambassador to the U.S. Jaime Arguelles suggested Rogers “could 
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initial the agreement rather than have a formal signing in Madrid.”19 The Nixon 
administration scrapped the idea when it was discovered that to have a signing ceremony, 
they would have to submit the entire package “including the new language of the 
agreement and the quid pro quo to the foreign relations committee.”20 By June, Spain 
began to inquire whether the agreement could be submitted as a treaty. Rogers explained 
to Foreign Minister López-Bravo and Arguelles the complexity of the Spanish case was 
that the “proposed agreements are so comprehensive and complex and of such a long-
term nature, that under these conditions the Senate may well consider the agreements so 
important that they will have to take the form of [a] treaty.”21 Arguelles argued that Spain 
would prefer a treaty over an agreement to provide the Spanish people with a security 
agreement, which the Spanish press pointed to as a cause of concern. Yet, Rogers and the 
administration did not want a treaty for fear of the optics and Congressional interference. 
The possibility of a treaty faced U.S. domestic pressures as well as from 
Congress. The pressure on Congress due to Vietnam fatigue forced the Nixon 
administration to approach the negotiations with a resolute tactic. There were some 
members of the administration who believed the previous events might provide a better 
negotiating position for the United States. Former Ambassador to Spain Robert Wagner 
wrote to Nixon that he believed the U.S. press coverage and the Symington subcommittee 
forced Spain into a corner. Wagner exhibited that the “manner in which the Spanish have 
accepted and adjusted themselves” to the recent coverage “is a clear indication, I believe, 
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that the Spanish government has decided to extend the defense agreement, come virtually 
what may.”22 The Spanish leadership believed adverse domestic and international 
repercussions were in store if an agreement could not be reached. Knowing that they 
could take advantage of Spain, the Nixon administration now had to discover a way to get 
the agreement by Congress. 
Armed with the understanding that negotiations must be completed in 1970, the 
administration began exploring how to get the budget of the agreement through Congress. 
There was immediate cause for concern over Section 620(m) of the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961. This section stated that military grant assistance cannot be given “to any 
economically developed nation capable of sustaining its own defense burden and 
economic growth.”23 Spain fell under this provision, but the administration discovered a 
loophole. According to Section 614(a) of the same act, the president may waive 
restrictions of the act, including 620(m), “when the President determines that such 
authorization is important to the security of the United States.”24 Therefore, Nixon made 
the argument that the bases are vital to U.S. national security, and could bypass this 
hindrance. 
During the negotiations for the 1970 Agreement, the Nixon administration relied 
on the stick more than the carrot by lowering the budget, dismissing the calls for a treaty, 
and bypassing Congressional approval. The Franco regime entered the negotiations with 
a high number to continue building up Spanish defensive and economic capabilities. Yet, 
the United States decided to lowball Spain in negotiations. The reason that the Nixon 
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administration was able to do this was because of the exile of Spain to the West. Franco 
and his authoritarian regime made it difficult to find respectable partners on the world’s 
stage. Therefore, Spain would be desperate for the help, and accept whatever offer was 
made. Nixon continued his hard power stance of negotiations by ignoring requests to turn 
the agreement into a treaty. The Franco regime continued looking for ways to legitimize 
them to the West and believed a treaty with Washington would do this. The Nixon 
administration argued it would be impossible due to the U.S. Congress. Yet, in future 
negotiations, the United States did not dismiss the calls outright. 
For the next five years, the Spanish leadership pressed the United States to 
upgrade the 1970 Agreement to a treaty. Despite consistently being told the U.S. 
Congress would not allow this to happen, Kissinger placed blame on the U.S. Congress 
for delaying the negotiations by floating the idea of upgrading the agreement to a treaty. 
He disclosed that those in the Senate who pushed for a treaty “were opposed to closer 
relations with Spain; Senator Fulbright frankly admitted he hoped that a treaty would be 
concluded so that he could kill it in the Senate.”25  Further, the U.S. Congress refused to 
sign a treaty as long as Franco retained power over Spain. Yet, once Franco died and the 
transition began, there was consideration on turning a new agreement into a treaty. Juan 
Carlos directed Areilza and his negotiating team to quickly formulate a new agreement 
that would provide Spain with a backchannel to NATO. While the new agreement did not 
exclusively require the United States to attain NATO membership for Spain, the 
negotiators devised a plan to have the agreement upgraded by the Senate to become a 
treaty. The Spanish negotiators excitedly accepted the idea and promoted it during talks. 
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Kissinger did warn of possible pushback from the U.S. Congress and citizens as occurred 
during the Nixon administration. Kissinger told Areilza that if they proposed a treaty that 
“the streets will be full of people,” but Areilza responded that “as ambassador in Paris, 
I’ve had the streets really full of angry people, they don’t bother me.”26 As Robert 
Barbour remembers, the Spanish Foreign Minister “was like a little terrier that had 
Kissinger’s leg and would not let go.”27 
Ultimately, there were two reasons for upgrading the agreement to a treaty. First, 
the treaty gave the U.S. Congress—still recovering from backlash of the Vietnam War—
assurance of Spain’s democratic transition from authoritarianism and intended integration 
into the West. Second, the treaty showed the United States and the world that Juan Carlos 
and Spanish democracy achieved something Franco did not—“a degree of commitment 
from the United States.”28 Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations 
Robert J. McCloskey floated the suggestion back in June 1975, but with Franco still 
alive, the chances of a Democratic Senate turning the agreement into a treaty was naught. 
The Ford administration previously ran into problems with the Senate regarding Spain in 
1974 when they stalled the appointment of Peter Flanigan for Ambassador to Spain.29 In 
a letter to John Sparkman, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
McCloskey explained, 
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While there is no constitutional requirement to submit base agreements for 
Congressional approval, and the traditional United States practice has been to 
conclude such arrangements by executive agreement without such formal 
approval, the Administration believes that it is desirable to have fuller 
participation of the Legislative Branch in the conclusion of the new Spanish 
agreement, which is broader in scope than a purely base agreement. Such 
participation would provide a sound political basis for strengthening U.S. 
relations with Spain at an important juncture in that country’s history and for the 
multi-year program of military and non-military assistance which is contemplated 
by the agreement.30 
 
Kissinger and Areilza signed The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the 
United States and Spain in Madrid on January 24, 1976, and Washington confirmed the 
treaty later that year. In signing the treaty, the United States had placed the defensive 
relationship with Spain on the world’s stage and combined plans for the Atlantic Alliance 
and the U.S.-Spanish Council, which was “a bond of great significance.”31 
 The death of Franco and the beginning of the transition to democracy did not 
provide Ford and Kissinger with the same negotiating high ground that Nixon had for a 
few reasons. First, they could no longer count on Spain being friendless on the world 
stage. Many Western defensive pacts often spurned Spain because of the Franco 
dictatorship and refused full entrance until the restoration of democracy. Now, with the 
transition underway, Ford and Kissinger could not treat negotiations as a one-way street 
because Spain could begin looking for new alliances. Second, the global perception of the 
United States would suffer if it did not modify the hard power approach it used with 
Franco. Refusal to offer a legitimate treaty with Juan Carlos and Spain’s burgeoning 
democracy would redound negatively on the United. Therefore, Ford and Kissinger 
utilized more of a carrot than a stick by issuing a treaty to Spain. 
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The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation gave the United States and Spain five 
years to remain in a holding pattern with the military bases. However, when it came time 
to renegotiate the treaty, both countries had new leaders who wanted to make a stance on 
the bilateral relationship. Reagan planned to return U.S.-Spain relations to the hard power 
of the Nixon years, and Calvo-Sotelo came to be Prime Minister during a turbulent 
moment of the transition and pushed the U.S.-Spain relationship for approval of the 
Spanish public. The treaty expired on September 21, 1981, and the two sides signed an 
agreement to extend U.S. rights, duties, and obligations until May 1982. The United 
States downgraded the treaty to an executive agreement because of the perceived 
inevitability of Spain joining NATO. The Reagan administration believed Spain will have 
ascended to NATO status by that time, and “preserve in force on an interim basis United 
States rights regarding access to and use of important military facilities in Spain.”32 The 
Senate consented to ratification in November 1981, Reagan approved it in December, and 
the respective sides met in May 1982 to discuss the constitutional requirements of the 
agreement. The agreement went into effect shortly afterwards and was signed in Madrid 
on July 2, 1982. 
The Reagan administration went into the 1982 Agreement with five major 
concerns: transit rights, logistic naval support, nuclear-powered warships, tactical air 
training, and tanker support.33 The United States kept the bases and access to them, and 
Spain received $400 million in military sales, mostly from F-18s.34 Though swiftly 
constructed, the agreement negotiations in the early 1980s were intricate. The major 
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complications of these negotiations dealt with the U.S. Department of Defense and 
mistrust from the transitions. Ambassador Todman illustrated the negotiations were 
difficult because the Defense Department “did not appreciate that the world had 
changed.”35 He clarified that Washington could not accept that the Franco period was 
over, and they could no longer dictate the overall terms to be accepted. Foreign Service 
member Jack R. Binns elaborates that the Defense Department’s position was to get 
everything possible plus a little extra. While this was not the best way to approach 
negotiations, the incoming Reagan administration was “a highly charged, ideological 
administration” not looking to lose credibility.36 
On December 10, 1985, the United States and Spain issued a joint statement on 
the upcoming base negotiations. The statement specified it would maintain current 
missions and reduce the amount of U.S. forces over time with Spanish forces. In April 
1986, the Reagan administration began preparations for renegotiations with Spain over 
base rights. In an overview, Ambassador Enders discussed where Spain and the United 
States stood on base rights, and what the goals of both countries were for the new 
agreement. Enders detailed that Spain wanted to reduce U.S. military presence and look 
towards collective security elsewhere. Therefore, the United States should find an 
agreement “that at least maintains current access and operating rights, while pointing 
Spain toward gradually expanding integration in the multilateral frame.”37 Enders’ 
evidence was González’s ten-point national security plan that included the reductions of 
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U.S. forces on Spanish bases, which also worked as a way to convince the public to 
support NATO integration. As for the United States, Enders clarified that the Reagan 
administration should “to the greatest extent possible, relate our own presence to the 
defense concerns of Spain.”38 Spain had not entered NATO yet and still relied on 
defensive support from the United States. They believed in the possibility of threats from 
their south, especially Morocco who they felt uneasiness towards regarding disputes over 
the Western Sahara. Enders supposed Reagan should hint at the possibility of Morocco 
launching an attack and the United States being able to assist in the threat from the South. 
However, in a bid to not immediately sink negotiations, Enders believed an opening 
gambit could be identifying reductions at Torrejón. 
Following a meeting with Defense Minister Narcís Serra, Enders provided the 
Reagan administration with a more concrete picture of Spain’s goals for the negotiations. 
On specifics, Serra proposed no changes at Rota, but the other bases “would be available 
to the [United States] on a standby basis but no forces would be stationed [there] 
permanently.”39 Enders warned Serra that this stance would cause trouble with the 
Reagan administration and be a lose-lose situation for both sides. Serra elucidated the 
governing principle would be the bases were available to the United States “in time of 
crisis or alert, and be maintained to U.S. standards by the Spaniards for this purpose at 
their cost, but that no ‘U.S. forces’ would be stationed in there permanently.”40 The 
González government sought to end the use of F-16’s stationed in Torrejón, which was 
located just outside of Madrid and made many Spaniards uncomfortable with the 
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proximity of U.S. Cold War weapons. However, equipment that moved in and out like 
Usafe planes training in Zaragoza or Marine units on exercise in Morón would not be 
considered under this and still have usual access to the bases. 
The initial negotiations were pushed back to July 1986 to assure the United States 
that González and the PSOE would still be in control following the elections held the 
previous month. If Spain asked for U.S. reductions in the bases, U.S. Deputy Secretary of 
State John C. Whitehead explained, the U.S. representative should emphasize that the 
Reagan administration was “already planning to convert U.S. military positions at 
Torrejón … to mostly Spanish civilian slots and considering additional adjustments at 
other installations.”41 Whitehead cautioned the United States was not prepared to 
facilitate major movements or withdrawals. Further, the State Department believed the 
González government had not considered the potential consequences of U.S. reductions. 
Immediate removal from Spain could have major financial and military implications. Yet, 
the PSOE committed themselves in public to acquire U.S. reductions, and the State 
Department believed González would not “settle merely for a symbolic U.S. gesture.”42  
In a ninety-minute presentation to the Cortes on July 22, González discussed his 
plans for his second term, and briefly acknowledged the negotiations with the United 
States. He stated that the negotiations were meant to achieve a reduction of “U.S. troops 
and installations” in Spain.43 Further, González stated that bilateral relations between the 
two countries would undergo a shift to something of more equal footing, becoming “more 
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similar and more homologous to the relations that the [United States] has with other 
European countries.”44 González strengthened this claim by arguing that Spain’s future 
was with Europe. With EC entry and NATO membership, González contended that 
Spain’s “economic, social, and political institutions would have to adjust to participate 
more effectively in European affairs and to cope better with the substantial 
transformation the country will experience.”45 Gonzalez took the hard power enticements 
that Washington utilized, and applied them to Spanish hard power. This was the first time 
the United States was not in the driver’s seat for the base negotiations.  
Yet this did not stop the Reagan administration from administering its own hard 
power during negotiations. The United States, seeing the position González was in, used 
the NATO decision to their advantage. Thomas R. Carmichael was a member of the 
USIA press section of the Madrid embassy. He revealed that during negotiations, the 
United States “suddenly announced unilaterally shrinking [the] bases around 10%, 
without even giving [Spain] a chance to pressure us, nullifying the PR advantage of 
standing up to the U.S., making it clear that we were not to be pushed around, and 
underlining that base reductions were a mixed bag on economic level.”46 This was the 
Reagan administration using their hard power to hurt Spain. They used base negotiations 
and Spain’s conundrum on NATO membership to regain the advantage. 
Spain and the United States met for more negotiations towards the end of 1986. 
New Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew met with Foreign Minister Francisco 
Fernández Ordóñez to discuss the role of security and the bases. Bartholomew insisted 
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that security “is the first thing that a government owes its people,” and could not believe 
“the Spanish people would support reductions in the U.S. presence at the cost of a real 
reduction in their security.”47 Ordóñez responded that the Spanish people already 
supported U.S. reductions. On December 1 and 2, the two sides met in Madrid for official 
talks on renewing the agreement. The Spanish stood firm on U.S. reductions, especially 
the deployment of the 401st Fighter Wing at Torrejón. Bartholomew, the chief American 
negotiator, presented detailed notes on “the military costs and implications,” and 
threatened Spanish negotiators that their country’s contribution to the bilateral 
relationship “in no way entitled it to require that other [NATO] allies take on the 
additional burden of hosting the 401st.”48 Yet, the Spanish negotiators were not 
intimidated and warned of a stalemate. In a later discussion, Serra refused to back down 
on Spanish insistence that the 401st tactical wing leave Spain, much to the chagrin of 
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. The reason the United States was so insistent 
on keeping the 401st in Spain was because it was the primary force for the Mediterranean 
region and back up for Italy, Turkey, and Greece. Spain used their stance on the 401st as 
hard power. Aware that the United States would look bad to other NATO members—
particularly Greece because of other upcoming base negotiations—Spain had the upper 
hand and used this ploy in their negotiations. 
NATO 
 Spain’s desire for American assistance in entrance to NATO was both a carrot 
and a stick for the two countries. Spain’s acceptance into NATO meant they would shed 
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the defensive exile faced since World War II. The Franco regime assumed the Atlantic 
Alliance would procure Spain security outside of American help and prestige among 
other European nations. This belief continued into the transition as Juan Carlos, Suárez, 
and González addressed the entrance of NATO with American leaders. For the United 
States, this was a hard power tool they utilized throughout negotiations for the bases. The 
United States knew the popular opinion that Spain could not join NATO as long as 
Franco held power. Despite knowing this, each administration willingly used entrance 
into the Atlantic Alliance as a bargaining chip during base negotiations, capitalizing on 
the Spanish belief that NATO was integral to Westernization. 
 Throughout the Franco regime and the constitutional monarchy, many Spanish 
leaders advocated entrance into NATO. During the 1970 Agreement negotiations, 
Kissinger asked diplomat Nuño Aguirre de Cárcer about the Spanish insistence for 
membership to the Atlantic Alliance. Aguirre replied that it “would set the course of the 
evolution of the entire Spanish relationship to Europe. … Without the link to NATO, all 
roads seemed to be barred to Spain.”49 This urgency for NATO continued under Cortina 
and the negotiations for the 1975 Treaty. In a memorandum to Ford, Kissinger explains 
how the Spanish negotiating team hammered early for the “determination of Spain’s role 
in Western defense, directly with the United States and in a broader, multilateral context 
with Western Europe.”50 Much like the negotiations, Cortina made outlandish cases for 
the United States to persuade NATO members on the strides of Spanish political 
                                                   
49 Memorandum of Conversation, May 16, 1969; Spain vol 1 thru Feb. 1970 (2); box 704; Country Files – 
Europe, NSC Files; RNL. 
50 Kissinger to Ford, January 10, 1975, folder: Spain 1975 (1) WH, box 21, Country File, National Security 
Adviser: NSC Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs Staff Files, 1974-77, GRFL. See also Samuel D. Eaton, 






evolution. For instance, he offered a resolution where the United States flew prominent 
NATO members to one of the Spanish bases, “have a liaison and observers of Spain in 
NATO and NATO observers in Spain. To recognize Spain’s role.”51 Further, Cortina 
threatened to terminate American use of the bases if the United States did not strengthen 
ties with NATO. Though this was Spain attempting to use hard power for NATO by 
threatening use of the bases, the United States would not be outdone. 
The U.S. administrations during the transition often spoke with other NATO 
leaders about the possibility of accepting Spain and generally received negative reactions. 
For example, Secretary of State Rogers met with Danish Prime Minister Hilmar 
Baunsgaard during the 1970 Agreement negotiations to discuss the possibility of NATO 
liaisons and Spain. Baunsgaard said that he understood the geostrategic importance of 
Spain, but he could not support another dictator in NATO because “it was bad enough 
that Portugal and Greece were members of the organization.”52 Another meeting occurred 
during the negotiations for the 1975 Treaty. Kissinger found consensus among NATO 
members on the Spain-NATO issue as “a divisive one for the Alliance and that 
dramatically closer ties between Spain and NATO must await the passing of Franco and 
increased democratization in Spain.”53 Further, some member nations recognized Spain’s 
military contributions only through the agreements with the United States and did not 
believe entrance into NATO was necessary. Despite this, American leaders misled the 
Spanish side during negotiations to keep Spain from seeking other assistance. 
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 Spain continued to stress the importance of NATO even after signing the 1970 
Agreement. In late 1973, as the Agreement reached its expiration, the United States and 
Spain began renegotiations. Both sides traded documents for the 1974 Joint Declaration 
of Principles, and Spain’s intention to win acceptance among the Western powers and 
attain entrance to NATO. However, in the drafting of this declaration, Kissinger 
contorted the language to evade any sort of commitment to Spain and NATO. As future 
Ambassador to Spain Wells Stabler mentioned during a State Department staff meeting, 
“this goes considerably further [than previous agreements]. But it stops I think in any 
event way short of a commitment.”54 Links to NATO reappeared during negotiations for 
the treaty the next year. Once again, the United States avoided placing in the treaty the 
exclusivity of attaining NATO membership for Spain despite this being a major point 
from Areilza. The United States willfully misrepresented and dodged Spain’s opportunity 
to join the Atlantic Alliance. 
Though he did not participate in base negotiations, Carter continued the previous 
administrations’ use of NATO as a hard power inducement. Vice President Walter 
Mondale wrote that he intended to exhibit during his visit to Spain how the United States 
“will support Spain’s entry into NATO when the Spanish are ready for that step.”55 In a 
handwritten note, Carter conveyed that European nations expressed support for Spain’s 
entry to NATO after the elections confirmed that democracy and the Constitution were 
adopted.56 However, this opinion ran into complications when the new Spanish leaders 
associated NATO entrance with the U.S. use of the military bases. The Suárez 
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government linked Spanish entry into NATO with “substantial U.S. favors.”57 This 
bothered the Carter administration as the Spanish public already detested the United 
States, the bases, and now connected NATO with them. This jeopardized the hard power 
advantage the United States had over Spain. Carter retorted that the United States “will 
not purchase Spain’s NATO entry.”58  
However, the opposition parties now had leverage in domestic politics. 
Opposition parties, especially the PSOE, exploited public aversion to Spanish entry to 
NATO. In addition, Suárez’s own party divided on admission. In a memorandum to 
Carter, Aaron wrote that Suárez and the UCD were “content with the current defense set 
up, where they feel Spain has the benefit of the best of all possible worlds, since the left 
wing parties support the continuation of the bases (because they are already there).”59 
Following the 1977 elections, the Spanish Committee of Foreign Policy met, and 
González and the PSOE stood against NATO membership, which caused Suárez to 
maintain a neutralist position.60 
Entrance to NATO was the leverage the United States held over Spain during 
base negotiations. However, the Spanish transition to democracy began to break this 
hold. The Franco regime believed that the base agreements opened the door to 
legitimization, and acceptance to NATO would place Spain into the West. Despite 
knowing that other NATO members were not high on the idea, the United States 
continued using the prospect of NATO entrance as a hard power inducement. However, 
as Spain transitioned to democracy, entering NATO became attainable. The leverage 
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Washington had in promising to gain Spanish acceptance into the Atlantic Alliance 
would no longer work. 
Domestically, the political approval of NATO entry split Spain into those who 
approved—Calvo-Sotelo and the UCD—and those who objected—González and the 
PSOE. Calvo-Sotelo accelerated the process for Spanish entry into NATO because he 
feared the rising popularity of the PSOE and their anti-NATO stance. The government 
held debates in October and November 1981. In December, Calvo-Sotelo and the Cortes 
voted to enter NATO, and officially join in 1982.61 The United States prepared best-case 
and worst-case scenarios following the vote. U.S. NATO Ambassador Tap Bennett 
explained that the best case involved enough domestic support for an invitation to NATO. 
However, the worst case involved “inter-action or reluctance on the part of Spanish and 
other European socialists, and/or further internal disorder could destroy the possibility of 
a Spanish membership bid for the foreseeable future.”62 In addition, if Spain failed to 
gain entrance to NATO, the political and psychological setbacks for Spain, NATO, and 
the United States could be insurmountable. 
Almost all facets of the Spanish public had qualms with the Atlantic Alliance. In a 
poll conducted by the USIA before the vote, the majority of those informed about NATO 
opposed membership. Interestingly, entrance to the Atlantic Alliance divided the military. 
Junior military officers split 48 to 43 percent on entry, but the senior officers 
overwhelmingly favored entry, 88 to 12 percent.63 This illustrates how those from the 
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Franco era still associated NATO with the United States and the West, but the “successor 
generation” that the United States coveted did not approve. In a national survey published 
by Cambio 16, support for NATO came from those in the upper class, and the lower 
middle class housed the greatest opposition.64 As for party lines, the UCD supported 
entry, and the Basque and Catalan national parties joined the PCE in opposition to 
membership.65 The PSOE opposed this vote, and made removal from NATO a central 
part of their electoral platform.  
However, once in office in 1982, González did not immediately end the 
possibility of Spanish entrance to NATO. Instead, he flip-flopped his position and began 
supporting NATO membership. González considered it as necessary for the 
Europeanization of Spain and eventual admission to the EC. In addition, González saw 
NATO membership as an avenue to reduce American military presence in Spain. Binns 
indicated that González, “as any good politician,” believed that “by keeping Spain in 
NATO he would strengthen Spain’s European credentials, please his European allies and 
his colleagues in the EC so that they would accede to Spain’s membership and would get 
rid of at least part of his ‘bone in the throat’ over the bases.”66 For González, NATO was 
the necessary evil to achieve Europeanization. In a farewell discussion with Todman, 
González explained that he hoped for Spanish entrance into NATO, but he knew that the 
process would be difficult in gaining support from the Spanish public. González planned 
to roll out a campaign in 1984 detailing the advantages and disadvantages of joining the 
Atlantic Alliance. He drew a distinction between the Atlantic Alliance and NATO 
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because “the latter term signified full Spanish military integration,” which the public 
balked at due to the current defense pact with the United States.67 
The United States supported Spain entering NATO but knew of the unpopularity 
among the Spanish public. In a speech at the Institute of International Questions in 
Madrid, Weinberger mentioned the Cortes vote to enter NATO. He illustrated “this is 
Spain’s decision to make and we will respect your conclusion.”68 However, Weinberger 
stressed Spain should share the benefits and burdens of NATO membership. During a 
meeting with González, Secretary of State Schultz similarly stressed the importance of 
Spain joining NATO. The United States continued approaching NATO allies for their 
opinions on Spanish entry. The administration approached Italian Prime Minister Bettino 
Craxi to help convince Gonzalez on NATO membership. They even provided the Italian 
Embassy with talking points such as, “In our view, Felipe González is the only Spanish 
leader who can bring Spanish public opinion around on this issue. His course of action 
will depend on a careful weighing of the domestic and foreign policy costs and benefits 
of withdrawal vs. continued NATO membership.”69 In addition, the West German 
Embassy wrote to the United States following a meeting of Serra with ten EC 
ambassadors that the opposition to NATO was born of “anti-American emotions.”70 
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González now faced questions of how to justify entrance into the Atlantic 
Alliance after running a campaign against NATO. One path was to hold a referendum 
and put the fate of Spanish entry into the hands of the public. This mortified the United 
States for fear that the Spanish public would support NATO, but at the cost of removing 
America from the bases. The Reagan administration’s chief concern with the referendum 
was that González “avoid actions which foreclose military integration or establish a 
bases/NATO trade off.”71 Further, the administration’s strategy during the buildup to the 
vote was to avoid pressuring Spain, but make clear their views and concerns. As calls for 
the referendum intensified, the United States started questioning whether this was the 
correct path to decide on NATO. There were multiple attempts by the United States to 
influence the decision and stop the vote.72 After four years of debate, the referendum was 
set for March 12, 1986 with González campaigning for a yes vote.  
Following this announcement, Spain held Parliamentary debates on the NATO 
referendum. González argued that membership “could advance foreign policy goals, such 
as membership into the [EC] and enticing France to cooperate with the Spanish 
government in the fight against ETA.”73 González counted a powerful ally in his corner 
regarding Spanish entry to NATO. Juan Carlos was an outspoken advocate of Spanish 
entry into the Western world, and the Atlantic Alliance offered a chance to do this.74 
Further, there was a basic assumption—one held by the Spanish king—that if Spain 
entered NATO, the reliance on American military presence would be reduced.75 
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However, the opposition proved to be an obstacle during the debates. After a February 
debate, González appeared shaken, and admitted the opposition in the debate had 
swamped his efforts “to identify a consensus on security policy with its exploitation of 
the theme of socialist inconsistency in switching from opposition to support NATO.”76 
Further, the polls appeared indecisive, which meant the electorate could side with either 
party. 
The United States supported Spanish entry to NATO for decades, but now needed 
to consider the possibility of the referendum failing. A member of the National Security 
Council (NSC) wrote to National Security Advisor John Poindexter that the United States 
could not brandish either carrots or sticks, and the only course of action was to “wring 
our hands at the likely outcome.”77 Ambassador Enders believed the critical question of a 
possible failure was how to persuade González from denouncing the US-Spain 
agreement. Enders explains: 
In case of a defeat our objective should be to slow Gonzalez down and prevent a 
decision until we have had an opportunity to consult with him, and he has had an 
opportunity to explore possibilities of agreement with opposition parties on the 
action to take. Above all, we should attempt to avoid a situation in which the 
Cortes acts formally to denounce the treaty. It would be desirable but ultimately 
less important to avoid statements of withdrawal, or submission of draft 
legislation.78 
 
However, the results of the referendum alleviated U.S. fears. The vote ended with 53 
percent in favor of joining NATO, and González could now focus on Spanish entrance to 
the EC.  
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Despite using it as a hard power inducement during previous administrations, the 
United States ultimately did not achieve Spanish entrance into NATO. Instead, González 
and the PSOE reversed course from their 1982 campaign against NATO, and called for a 
referendum to let the voters of Spain decide on their future in the Atlantic Alliance. 
González placed his political standing in jeopardy by changing his position on NATO. 
Yet, he and the PSOE campaigned in 1986 that if the referendum were a success it would 
lead to Europeanization and less reliance upon the United States. González used the 
United States’ own hard power against them by turning NATO membership into a 
method to remove U.S. influence with the bases. The Spanish people spoke despite 
feeling betrayed by González’s change of heart.  
The European Community 
 Just as they believed NATO would end their military banishment to the West, 
Spanish leaders believed entrance into the EC would cease their economic ostracism. The 
Franco regime completed a preferential trade agreement with the EC in 1970; and, as the 
transition occurred, democratic leaders believed economic integration with Europe 
became more of a priority than NATO. The United States objected to Spain cooperating 
with the EC, despite some American leaders believing the contrary. The major concern 
was that acceptance into the EC would lead to improved economic standing, disrupt 
national security issues, and threaten U.S. tenure over the bases. The United States had no 
problem with Spain working with other countries in the Middle East and Latin America 
but only as an American mediator. U.S. leaders felt threatened when Spain entered trade 
agreements with Europe. This occurred in 1970 and again in 1986 with similar 





hard power response by taking the agreements to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT). 
On June 29, 1970, Spain and the EC entered into a preferential trade agreement, 
months before they signed the U.S. agreement. This caused tension between the Franco 
regime and the Nixon administration because of a complicated relationship between the 
United States and the EC. While they approved of European integration, the United 
States feared a united Europe jeopardized American military and leadership abroad.79 The 
United States dominated industrialization in Spain in the 1960s, but, as the decade wore 
on, the volume of foreign investment fell by almost 20 percent. Because of this, Spain—
especially the regions of Catalonia and Basque country—sought closer links to Europe 
than the United States.80 The preferential agreement provided a decrease of trade barriers 
between the EC and Spain over six years, but it had a limited scope because it was only a 
preferential agreement to grant Spain the title of “Mediterranean country.”81 Though the 
arrangement did not allow Spain to join the Community, it laid the groundwork for 
acceptance into Europe after Franco’s demise.  
The State Department soon became concerned that this movement toward Europe 
might endanger their hold of the bases. In a letter to Assistant Secretary of State for 
European Affairs Martin Hillenbrand, George W. Landau—Country Director for Spain 
and Portugal in the Bureau of European Affairs of the State Department—argued the 
United States “should make it quite clear that this [agreement] may be extremely 
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damaging to our forthcoming base negotiations.”82 In a separate letter to Hillenbrand, 
Landau and Abraham Katz—the Director of the Office of Regional and Political Affairs 
in the Bureau of European Affairs—disclosed how Spain clarified in discussions that the 
agreement with the EC was important. Landau and Katz detailed that Spain “has made 
clear any U.S. attempts to interfere with her agreement with [the] EC would be resented 
and may cost us dearly in base negotiations and in economic reprisals.”83 In addition, 
John Petty—Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs—described how 
detrimental U.S. interference could be not only to U.S.-Spain relations but also U.S.-E.C. 
relations. Petty revealed the United States “will be faced with a choice of a highly 
political confrontation with the EC involving withdrawal of concessions or watching the 
disintegration of the multilateral trading system.”84 Despite these concerns, Nixon took 
their grievance with the preferential trade agreement to GATT. 
 Though members of the Nixon administration opposed Spain’s integration into 
the EC, there was a dissenting voice about U.S.-E.C. relations: Kissinger. One of the key 
concepts he implemented was the idea of a unified Europe as a strategic advantage for the 
West during the Cold War. Kissinger, from his own personal history, understood 
democracy as susceptible to turmoil, promoted the “nation” as the building block of 
order, and attempted to reinforce a hierarchy of world powers.85 He explains European 
unity was preferable to a “cacophony of conflicting nationalities whose impotence would 
sooner or later cause them to abdicate a serious concern with foreign policy and thus 
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become functional, if not actual, neutralists.”86 This starkly contrasted with other 
administration officials who believed a unified Europe might endanger U.S. standing 
with Spain. Kissinger understood the geostrategic importance of Spain in providing a 
solid European defense. He believed it was important to continue a balanced relationship 
between the United States and Spain regardless of the latter’s leadership. Kissinger 
clarified the United States’ choice “was whether to ostracize and oppose the existing 
regime or, while working with it, to extend our contacts and therefore our influence for 
the post-Franco period.”87 As the United States transitioned, American policymakers 
prepared for a peaceful and moderate transition to democracy in Spain. 
Kissinger’s approval of Spain integrating into Europe carried over to the Carter 
administration under Brzezinski. The State Department and Brzezinski formulated the 
early foreign policy priorities and goals for the Carter administration. There was an 
emphasis placed on “reinvigorating the nation’s moral purpose,” and “reasserting 
American prestige through the restoration and promotion of liberal democratic values in 
an international context.”88 Particularly, the State Department addressed a pressing 
concern that the Carter administration wished to disassociate from the previous 
presidencies. They demonstrated that the United States needed to augment relations with 
the EC especially because strong economic ties to Western Europe were essential to 
containing the Soviet Union. The State Department floated the idea to improve upon 
relations with the EC to placate Western Europe. With the establishment and growth of 
the EC, frictions with the United States occurred over “economic issues, failures to 
consult, and—particularly during the Nixon-Ford Administration—a U.S. inability to 
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deal with the EEC as an entity on a basis of equality.”89 The State Department denoted 
other issues that could improve diplomacy with the EC, which included establishing 
contacts with European leaders, an approach to Eurocommunism, improve NATO, and 
discuss issues of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.90  
Though hostility towards the EC pervaded the Nixon years, the Carter 
administration approved of Spain moving closer towards Europe. From a prepared paper 
of the NSC, the enlargement of the EC to include Spain, Portugal and Greece could have 
both positive and immediate negative factors. Spanish acceptance into the EC could 
stabilize and strengthen democratic forces, but their economy was not on par with 
Western Europe, leading to a few future problems. Therefore, in order to keep Spain on 
the democratic path, the United States had “an interest in doing what [it] can to avoid a 
breakdown in negotiations between them and Europe and smoothing their way into 
Europe.”91 In June 1977, following the elections, Suárez sent a delegation to bid for 
Spanish entry into the EC. While the major political parties divided over NATO, there 
was unanimity in the decision to join the Community. By November 1977, Spain became 
the twentieth member of the Council of Europe, though not the EC, which “meant that 
the international community was serious in accepting that the political and institutional 
transformation was already so advanced.”92 A joint survey of six Western European 
nations by the EC and United States International Communications Agency (USICA, 
formerly USIA) illustrated their stance on Spanish acceptance to the EC. Over 41 percent 
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in West Germany and 63 percent in Italy approved Spain’s integration into the EC, and 
all nations polled believed Spain deserved admission over Portugal and Greece.93 There 
appeared to be positive movement on the Spain-EC issue, which led the Carter 
administration to believe Europeanization in Spain was inevitable. 
The Reagan administration had a tepid response to Spain considering EC 
membership for a couple of reasons. One was the concern over the economic impact on 
the United States, and the second dealt with diplomatic relations between Spain and Latin 
America. In a meeting with U.S. and British officials, the Reagan administration outlined 
their platform on Spain entering the EC. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Burt 
revealed that the United States believed “Spanish accession at the earliest possible date is 
important for a variety of reasons, including the impact it will have on the Spanish 
decision on NATO as well as its broad effect on Spanish democracy.”94 However, there 
was concern the Community kept delaying Spain—as well as Portugal—due to the 
economic impact of adding the two countries. France and Italy were the “major stumbling 
blocks” on reaching a consensus within the EC because they believed there would be a 
glut on olive oil and wine on the market, which would be detrimental to their own exports 
to the Community.95 The United States supported Spain entering the EC to strengthen 
Western ties and democracy, but “insisted to the Ten that EC enlargement must not be at 
the expense of U.S. economic interests.”96 On December 1984, the EC came to an 
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agreement on wine surpluses and the target date for Spain to join the Community was 
January 1986. 
González campaigned to the EC that Spain would be a potential and suitable 
mediator between Europe and Latin America. The Falklands War and other political and 
social revolutions caused Europeans to take an interest in having a Latin American 
arbiter. González pitched Spain as a delegate for relations with Latin American countries. 
In a meeting between the EC and Latin American foreign ministers, Spain’s foreign 
minister was invited to participate.97 However, the United States believed Spanish 
entrance to the EC hindered the United States’ ability to use Spain as a mediator with 
Latin America. For example, Robert E. Service described how the United States and 
Spain viewed each other as “rivals for influence” in the region.98 The González 
government believed the United States exaggerated the communist takeover, and even the 
political right in Spain disagreed with U.S. policies in the region. Again, the Reagan 
administration objected to Spain working with the EC over policies that the United States 
and Spain had been working on. 
The Reagan administration’s response to González and Latin America explains 
why the United States was afraid of Spain joining the EC. The United States historically 
used Spain as an intermediary with the Middle East and Latin America, especially during 
the transition to democracy. Specifically, Nixon focused on Spain’s relationship with 
Latin America, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East. Foreign Minister Castiella 
bragged to Nixon that Spain “can count on at least 40 votes on any issue in the UN thanks 
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to support of the Arab, Latin American, and most African countries.”99 The Nixon 
administration believed Spain played a pivotal role in working in the Mediterranean and 
the Middle East. During a conversation early in the administration, Nixon told Castiella 
that Spain must be friendly with the Mediterranean countries “for the good of the rest of 
the world.”100 Nixon reiterated this point a year later when discussing public perception 
of U.S.-Spain relations. Nixon said that opinions of the bilateral relationship were only 
about tourism and bases, but the United States did not consider Spain “to be a 
convenience but rather the anchor of the Western Mediterranean.”101 Yet, the fear of 
Soviet influence in the region drove Washington to reiterate this often. Franco’s anti-
communist stance provided the United States with an ally to contain the Soviet Union. 
Carrero Blanco argued that he was totally unconvinced that the Soviets “wanted peace in 
the Mediterranean,” and pointed to Yasser Arafat and George Habash being “fanatics and 
utterly unpredictably outbidding one another for Russian and Chinese support.”102 Spain 
continued to be important to the U.S. into the Carter administration. During the 1980 
visit, Carter and Suárez met to discuss a variety of world events such as the situations in 
the Middle East, Latin America, and Western defense. Carter wrote to Suárez after his 
return to the United States asking him that while he visited the Middle East “to pursue the 
idea we discussed last month of consulting personally on major foreign policy questions. 
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… I am sure your talks in the countries you visit will be useful in obtaining a better 
perspective on Arab attitudes to these questions.”103 
When discussing Latin America, Nixon and Franco often discussed communism 
in the Caribbean and South America. Franco said that popularity of Fidel Castro and Che 
Guevara was not as dangerous as Castroism. Essentially, the individual was not as 
dangerous as the message. This led López Bravo to point to Salvador Allende and the 
White Front in Uruguay as examples. He detailed that he was not impressed by Allende, 
whom he regarded as “a man without importance: a Socialist who lucked into power 
because of the division among his opponents.”104 With this analysis, the Nixon 
administration believed that the Spanish would be an asset in Latin America. However, 
this would be tested when Gulf Oil asked Spain to help with a settlement with Bolivian 
Gulf Oil. 
 In October 1969, the Bolivian government nationalized the Bolivian Gulf Oil 
company, a subsidiary of Gulf Oil. The United States and Gulf Oil approached Spain and 
Hispanoil to assist in a quick settlement with the Bolivian government. There was a 
conditional agreement that Hispanoil would provide technical assistance to Bolivia in 
return for a fee.105 Local Gulf Oil representative John P. Fitzpatrick spoke with López-
Bravo on December 24, 1969 to discuss the proposal of Hispanoil’s assistance in the 
Bolivian problem. López-Bravo said that he only received a letter from Ambassador Hill, 
and this was not a satisfactory as he wanted official U.S. government request. Hill 
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personally met with López-Bravo in January and he stressed that he was “unable to 
provide government to government support for Gulf proposal unless [the United States] 
makes full and direct request for [Spanish] assistance.”106 Rogers wrote a note that was 
word for word what Hill said in his meeting with López-Bravo, who then accepted the 
agreement. Yet, Gulf cut out Hispanoil “when she became too greedy.”107 Hill 
immediately went into saving face particularly because Spain was invited by Gulf, 
Bolivia, and the United States to participate in the settlement. Hill argued that Bolivia 
“must bear major onus” in this.108 
 Though the United States had a stake in Spain and integration into the West, the 
Carter administration began to see the importance of the Spanish transition to democracy 
and the impact it could have on Latin America. Specifically, Carter saw the Spanish 
transition as an example for Latin America. Spain illustrated how a nation peacefully 
transitioned from authoritarianism to a democracy and did not succumb to communism in 
doing so. For Nixon and Ford, Spain played a role in Middle East policy, but were 
included on Latin American policy talks. Initiatives for Carter took place in the 
Caribbean and Central America. In the Caribbean, the Carter administration focused on 
Castro and Cuba. Often Nixon and Ford dealt with Spanish-Cuban trade policies, 
especially concerning embargos on Cuba by the United States and the Organization of 
American States’ expulsion of Cuba. For Carter, there were questions of whether to raise 
discussions in NATO of the possibility of Western trade and credit embargo against 
Cuba. The risks were to upset the balance of Spanish-Cuban relations, especially since 
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Spain had just sunk $221 million into Cuban trade.109 This would have represented a hard 
power approach from Carter, but Vance disapproved of the suggestion.   
When discussing Central America, the Carter administration focused on Panama. 
Both Carter and Panama’s leader Omar Torrijos showed interest in the Spanish transition. 
Carter explained that he and General Torrijos debated on “if we can help King Juan 
Carlos of Spain with his upcoming election. [They have] not had much experience with 
democratic processes. We may send someone over to give him private advice on how an 
election should be conducted, how to use television, to get-out-the-vote processes, and so 
forth.”110 In addition, Juan Carlos showed appreciation to Carter and Torrijos about the 
Panama Canal Treaties. The Spanish king wrote to Carter that he wished “to express … 
the satisfaction of the Spanish government and people,” and detailed the ties of Spain to 
the American continents.111 Carter responded “in view of the historic and profound ties of 
Spain with the New World. Your encouragement on this occasion is a major contribution 
to a greater understanding among the republics of the Americas.”112 This last statement 
emphasized how the United States saw the Spanish transition as an example for Latin 
American countries to do the same. 
 Much like Carter, the Reagan administration regarded the Spanish transition to 
democracy as an important example in promoting democracies in Latin America. Both 
Spain and the United States had specific interests in Latin America’s subregions. In the 
Caribbean, Spain focused on U.S.-Cuba relations and the U.S. invasion of Grenada. Spain 
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believed that U.S. policy toward Cuba should undergo an evolution. The González 
government used Spanish history to justify this stance. They maintained that the United 
States could destabilize the Castro regime by opening cultural relations with Cuba. Spain 
argued this worked when Franco opened to European tourism.113 During his visit to the 
United States in 1982, González discussed the ongoing issues occurring in the region, 
specifically U.S. aggression. Reagan promised the United States would work towards 
peace in the area.114 Yet, within a year of this meeting, the United States invaded Grenada 
much to the chagrin of the Spanish public. In a USIA survey of 1,000 Spanish adults, 57 
percent disagreed with the invasion, 44 percent strongly disagree, and the “successor 
generation”—those 18 to 34 years old—overwhelmingly disapproved at 82 percent.115 
González made public statements against the invasion and hoped for a quick ceasefire in 
Grenada. The USIA concluded the negative opinion of Grenada was part of a larger 
skepticism of U.S. foreign policy. According to the survey, 72 percent believed that the 
Reagan administration’s policies within the last year “had done more to increase the risk 
of war than to promote peace.”116 The reheating of the Cold War worried Spaniards about 
the escalation of war, not only in Europe but also in Latin America. 
In Central America, the United States and Spain emphasized the importance of 
collaborating to reestablish democratic governments. Secretary of State George Schultz 
and Foreign Minister Fernando Morán López worked towards a collaborative policy in a 
meeting in June 1983. Schultz explained that U.S. efforts “were fundamentally aimed at 
bringing about democratic reforms and institutions, economic reform, and progress” in 
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Central America.117 Schultz gave a specific example of Nicaragua and explained it 
became disruptive due to Soviet and Cuban influence, which caused military activity in 
the region. Further, Schultz argued that economics could not deter military activity in 
Nicaragua. He emphasized a need “to find a process of democratic patterns and economic 
development, buttressed by a security shield.”118 Morán agreed and stated that Central 
America’s problems were “structural and they needed to find outside diplomatic help to 
improve the process and find a framework to alleviate the region’s stress.”119 Essentially, 
Schultz presented the use of smart power in Central America. 
In South America, Spain’s interests lay in the transition to democracy in Uruguay. 
Morán echoed Schultz’s suggestion of using smart power. He suggested the United States 
and Spain collaborate to reestablish democracy in Uruguay “through political persuasion 
and economic assistance (particularly through the IMF).”120 Further, he believed an 
example was needed “to create an imitative effect in the Southern cone region,” and 
Uruguay could provide the example needed to develop the model.121 However, the 
ongoing economic crisis caused major problems with Morán’s plan. He recommended 
that the Reagan administration, in tandem with Spain, become involved to alleviate the 
economic problems in Uruguay. The United States could “use its economic and political 
power to get IMF assistance for Uruguay and help restore middle-of-the-road 
democracy.”122 Yet, Spain believed democracy was not too far from spreading around 
South America. Morán recalled Juan Carlos’s recent visit to the continent and 
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commented that Brazil would soon become a democracy as well. If Uruguay and Brazil 
began a transition to democracy, Spain believed the entire sub region would follow suit. 
Though the United States used Spain as mediators to the Middle East and Latin 
America, the Soviet Union believed they could use the Spanish as mediators with Eastern 
Europe in the early 1970s. Foreign Minister Lopez Bravo met with his Soviet counterpart 
in Moscow prior to the 1970 E.C. agreement. This meeting not only ended a thirty-year 
diplomatic estrangement caused by Russian involvement in the Spanish Civil War, but 
also sparked discussion about Spain opening contacts with Eastern European nations. 
López-Bravo used this meeting to Europeanize Spain and “promote its more active 
participation in the process of negotiating East-West security arrangements.”123 There 
were concerns within the Nixon administration that if Spain integrated, they would be 
more willing to work with the Soviet Union. The Cold War rivalry blinded the United 
States as both Nixon and Reagan attempted to undermine the agreements signed by Spain 
and the EC. 
The United States using Spain as an arbiter in Latin America was jeopardized by 
Spain getting close to the EC. Therefore, Nixon and Reagan approached the GATT to end 
the agreements. The NSC concluded the preferential trade agreement between Spain and 
the EC violated the GATT. The United States argued against the EC reaching limited 
preferential trade agreements with non-members. NSSM 46 contended the United States 
had “considerable bilateral economic interests in Spain, being the largest supplier of 
goods to Spain ($590 million in 1968), the largest market for Spanish exports ($279 
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million in 1968) and having investments totaling $500-600 million.”124 Further, the 
Nixon administration did a preliminary examination of which American industries this 
would affect the most, and determined that the citrus industry would be greatly affected. 
In a letter to Nixon, R.J. Arbuthnot, a former president of the La Verne Fruit Exchange, 
stressed his anger over the 40 percent reduction of tariff on citrus fruits to Spain. He 
claimed “this unfair practice” would be detrimental to California and Arizona citrus 
producers as they exported almost $70 million of the fruit.125 In a written response, Staff 
Assistant to the President Noble Melencamp reassured Arbuthnot that the United States 
made their grievances heard by stating “that the U.S. exports of fresh oranges have been 
damaged by the discriminator preferences in favor of certain Mediterranean countries.”126 
A few months later, the NSC produced National Security Decision Memorandum 
(NSDM) 45. With this document, the Nixon administration protested that the Spain-E.C. 
agreement was in violation of GATT. However, after the condemnation of the agreement, 
the United States tried to preserve relations with the two entities by saying the United 
States would accept a new plan that was GATT compliant. The NSDM details that Nixon 
“would not seek compensation in return for accepting such a legal arrangement, nor 
would it seek exception of particular items from the arrangement,” and decided “there 
was no need for any decision on a fallback position at this time.”127 In a meeting between 
Arguelles and Nathaniel Samuels, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, the 
administration reiterated their stance. Arguelles said the meeting was not encouraging 
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because Spain wanted assurance of American goodwill for the EC preferential agreement, 
but Samuels’s “frank exposition of problems involved” showed the differences between 
the two sides.128 Regardless of American opposition, Spain signed the preferential trade 
agreement with the EC. 
The Nixon administration continued worrying over the future of Spain-E.C. 
relations and its effects on U.S. defensive interests in Spain. In a departing letter as 
Ambassador to Spain, Hill wrote to Nixon that opposition to Spain-E.C. relations could 
be detrimental to the United States in Spain. He revealed that the Spanish feared the 
United States would impose restrictions on Spanish imports, such as shoes, that would 
cause economic and, by proxy, political problems. Hill urged the Nixon administration to 
promote an idea that Spain “could benefit from the system at least until 1975, by which 
time their integration into the EC will have reached such a point that they could dispense 
with preferences from the U.S.”129 Hill even wrote a possible solution for the 
administration to follow: 
We could inform the Spanish that we are prepared to support Spain diplomatically 
in its forthcoming attempt to obtain a commitment from the EC on ultimate full 
integration. Assuming Spanish willingness, under our bilateral agreement, to offer 
adjustments or compensation for any case of actual damage to U.S. exports, we 
would not press our plan to invoke GATT provisions against Spain. In return, we 
would expect Spain to implement the military provisions of the Agreement of 
Friendship and Cooperation in a full cooperative spirit. We should start this 
course of action as soon as possible, because it must be linked to the forthcoming 
renegotiation of the Spain-E.C. agreement, which is to take place in the near 
future.130 
 
This letter underwent consideration by the administration and was reiterated by Secretary 
of Defense Melvin Laird. In a letter to Nixon, Laird voiced concerns that the U.S. stance 
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in the GATT Council “may result in serious restriction on the freedom of U.S. military 
operations in Spain.”131 Spain saw the EC agreement as a way to Europeanize, and López 
Bravo believed the U.S. call for Article 23 of the GATT to be “an unfriendly action.”132  
This led to divisions within departments of the Nixon administration. Treasury 
and Agriculture favored a tough stance, Commerce and Labor wanted a moderate 
position to allow for flexible negotiations, and State and Defense favored a moderate 
approach of championing Europeanization while finding avenues for American 
products.133 Kissinger approved taking a strong stand on principles, but stressed the 
importance of being reasonable in negotiations. A few months later, Kissinger and 
Secretary of the Treasury George Shultz wrote to Nixon that disrupting Spain-E.C. 
negotiations could provide increased difficulties with U.S. bases in Spain.134 This saga 
regarding Spain and the EC is illustrative of U.S.-Spain relations. While proclaiming to 
Spain that it was going to try to integrate them into the West, the United States only 
sought to keep their defensive interests secured and fought to preserve Spanish 
dependence on the United States. 
The Reagan administration took a similar stance and opposed Spanish acceptance 
to the EC for fear of its negative impact on U.S. economic interests. The administration 
believed the EC would offset the costs of enlargement “by either imposing a fats and oil 
tax or raising the duties on soybeans and products and non-grain feed ingredients.”135 The 
United States strongly opposed any attempt by the EC to pursue such measures. In April 
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1986, the Reagan administration filed a grievance with GATT over Spanish accession to 
the Community and the impact this would have on corn. The United States argued that 
U.S. exports of corn to Spain were $218 million in 1985 and Spain began applying the 
EC’s variable levy system for grains on March 1. As the principal supplier of corn to 
Spain, the Reagan administration claimed they were owed compensation because “these 
bindings have been withdrawn and replaced with the variable levy.”136 Despite pleas 
from Schultz, Secretary of Agriculture John Block, and U.S. Trade Representative Clay 
Yeutter, the EC did not compensate the United States for the higher tariffs. Reagan 
announced he had authority under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 to retaliate.137 On 
July 2, a day after an imposed deadline, the United States and the EC settled their dispute.  
This was an example of the United States turning against Spain and using hard power 
through GATT. Like the Nixon administration, the Reagan administration superficially 
supported Europeanization for Spain, but made it difficult by filing a grievance shortly 
after ascension. 
The base negotiations, entrance to NATO, and ascension to the EC all played a 
role in U.S. hard power with Spain. The presidential administrations planned to keep the 
bases no matter what the cost to Spain. They also used Spain’s desperation for NATO 
membership against them in order to enhance U.S. national security interests. Spain’s 
work with the EC nearly ended due to Washington’s attempted interference. However, 
the Spanish transition to democracy dramatically changed how the United States 
approached Madrid. Nixon and Reagan both attempted to use the Cold War to justify 
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their use of hard power. Alongside Franco’s longevity as dictator, the United States under 
Nixon was able to take advantage of Spain. Reagan attempted to do this, but Spain’s 
transition to democracy prevented him from coercing Spain in the same way. González’s 
leadership, the EC, and the NATO referendum took the hard power out of Reagan’s 
hands. In addition, Ford and Carter had to rely more on smart power. The reason for this 
was because of the global perception of the transition and new political leaders. 
The hard power of the United States in the transition to democracy nearly derailed 
U.S.-Spain relations. American exploitation of Spain during negotiations and talks with 
the EC and NATO did not go unnoticed by the Spanish public. As seen in the previous 
chapter, the Spanish public distrusted the United States because of the hard power tactics 
of Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan. The U.S. dominance over Spanish foreign policy 
bled down into the Spanish domestic perception of the United States. The base 
negotiations, coupled with the American response to 23-F, made it clear to Spaniards that 
the United States did not have their best interests at heart. Therefore, it was vital for the 
United States to build soft power in Spain to maintain smart power. The United States 
would come to rely on the United States Information Agency as well as other 















Selling “tu amigo americano”: 




The United States would not exist were it not for the Spanish exploration of the 
Americas. This is the sentiment one discovers in reading every major speech Nixon, 
Ford, Carter, and Reagan gave during state visits to and from Spain. During his trip to 
Madrid, Nixon provided examples of multiple U.S. cities and states with names of 
Spanish origin—like Bernardo de Gálvez and Galveston, Texas. He mentioned that 
Spanish explorers discovered America, and since then “Americans have been discovering 
Spain, from Washington Irving to Ernest Hemingway and the nearly million U.S. tourists 
who are expected to visit Spain this year.”1 In his state dinner remarks, Ford mentioned 
Christopher Columbus “claimed America for a Spanish king and queen,” and 500 years 
later Juan Carlos and Sofía came to the United States to affirm “the common ideals which 
make all of us citizens of the western world.”2 Carter emphasized historical ties to 
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democracy in the shared history between Spain and the United States. He stressed that the 
two countries “share a strong interest in democratic evolution and respect for human 
rights in other parts of the world,” displaying Spanish counseling of American work in 
Latin America, the Middle East, and parts of Africa.3 Reagan explained that his home 
state of California was “a wonderful example of Spain’s lasting cultural gift. Catholic 
missions still stand in testimony to this magnificent cultural and spiritual contribution to 
the world. Spanish architecture is everywhere.”4 
 The focus of these pandering remarks on the historical ties between the United 
States and Spain are obvious for a few reasons. First, by showing the shared history, the 
administrations attempted to counterbalance the narrative that the United States propped 
up the Franco regime. The saga between the United States and Spain provided abundant 
examples for the USIA to accentuate in the distribution of the speeches. This allowed the 
administrations to quiet dissenting voices in Spain who argued that the base agreements 
kept Franco and his authoritarian regime in place. This leads to the second motive of 
historical ties to distract from U.S. hard power. Often the presidents gave the speeches 
during or after negotiations for the base agreements or treaties. These examples showed 
how Spain impacted the United States, and the United States intended to return the favor 
to Spain through the agreement—a quid pro quo. Third, the speeches were a method of 
building soft power. The administrations sought to shape soft power through the 
importance of Spain to the United States. While they gave these speeches in the presence 
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of Spanish dignitaries and the press, the real audience the presidents had in mind was the 
Spanish public.5 
Public diplomacy is one of the most versatile weapons within smart power. A 
country’s culture may be appealing to another nation, and public diplomacy transmits this 
culture. Relying on the USIA, each of the presidential administrations utilized public 
diplomacy during the transition to democracy in Spain. The USIA concentrated on 
science and technology, democracy, human rights, and labor and economic rights in their 
public diplomacy with Spain. Official state visits were the crux of U.S. soft power to 
Spain before and after Franco’s death. However, the USIA was careful not to upset the 
status quo during the Franco era. Therefore, U.S. public diplomacy in Spain did not 
emphasize democracy until the dictator died. Once the transition began, the USIA 
focused on illustrating how democracy worked, what a democratic leader looked like, and 
historical ties between the United States and Spain. The promotion of human and 
economic rights became vital to the USIA as an instrument of building soft power in 
Spain as it became vital to foreign policy.  
However, there is a danger that public diplomacy can make soft power 
unattractive. If a country’s culture is unappealing, the public diplomacy used will repulse 
and hinder soft power.6 According to Nye, public diplomacy is “an instrument that 
governments use to mobilize … resources to communicate with and attract the publics of 
other countries, rather than merely their governments.”7 The USIA was the agency within 
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the State Department tasked with producing communications for foreign publics. 
Nicholas J. Cull defines public diplomacy as consisting of five core components: 
listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy, and international 
broadcasting.8 These five factors produce soft power. The United States relied on the 
USIA to promote the image of America as well as historical connections to build soft 
power in Spain during the transition to democracy. 
One other observation from the presidents’ speeches is that each took a different 
approach to how to connect to Spain. Nixon described Spanish foundations in the United 
States, Ford discussed discovery, Carter portrayed democracy, and Reagan depicted the 
settlement of California. Each president took a different approach to the same solution—
sell the Spanish public on the importance of Spain to the United States. The task of the 
USIA was to take these different approaches with each administration and create a 
cohesive public diplomacy. Nixon placed importance on preserving defensive benefits 
and projecting the image of a superior United States reaching out to assist Spain. Ford 
utilized the transition to democracy to promote Juan Carlos as the champion of 
democracy. Carter believed the transition to democracy was the example needed to 
promote human rights and unions. Reagan broadened Carter’s economic rights by 
emphasizing consumer protections and the importance of exchanges. These different 
tactics provided the USIA with a variety of programs to perform in Spain to promote the 
United States and democracy. 
Nixon and Ford 
Initially, the Nixon administration was hesitant to promote democracy in Spain 
because of the Franco regime. This reluctance stemmed from U.S. officials’ desire “to 
                                                   





avoid an eventual confrontation with the Spanish dictatorship.”9 The administration did 
not want to agitate Franco and jeopardize the bilateral relationship. Though Franco 
named Juan Carlos as his successor, this did not mean that democracy was the next step 
for Spain. Further, the United States faced contempt from the Spanish public because 
they associated U.S. military bases in Spain with propping up the Franco regime. Stephen 
C. Bosworth, an economic officer at the United States Information Service (USIS) post in 
Madrid, explained the Spanish public, along with other European nations, were “very 
suspicious of the United States because they saw us as providing legitimacy for his 
continued rule.”10 Therefore, the early public diplomacy of the Nixon administration 
focused on maintaining security interests. These included the official visits of Nixon to 
Madrid and Juan Carlos and Sofía to the United States, the importance of science and the 
Apollo program, and the preparation for the American Bicentennial. 
In October 1970, Nixon wrapped up an event filled year with a visit to Madrid. 
Early in the year Spain signed the Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation and initiated 
reform efforts for their educational system. The administration intended the visit to 
promote the goodwill between the two countries, enhance Spain as a Western nation, and 
tie Spain to the Arab world.11 Nixon had private meetings planned with Franco, Juan 
Carlos and Sofía, and Carrero Blanco. Though opposed to promoting Spanish democracy, 
U.S. officials emphasized building a rapport with Franco’s successors. In a memo 
detailing the personalities involved, the State Department appeared most interested in 
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developing good relations with the prince, princess, and the vice president as opposed to 
Franco. In a memo to Kissinger, Juan Carlos is described as “pro-American”—though 
referred to as King Juan III—and a “stabilizing force during the transition, and so it will 
be important for you to develop a warm relationship with him.”12 The State Department 
illustrated the importance of Carrero Blanco as the future head of government, and 
underscored his importance in the successful conclusion of the base agreement. 
The news coverage of Nixon’s visit presented a range of responses. In a letter to 
the president, Alan Brown—a Navy officer in Spain—detailed how the Embassy and the 
Spanish government covered the trip. Brown praised the efforts of the Spanish for the 
coverage on various media outlets, including the television news. He described the 
programs as “beautifully handled,” and greatly enjoyed the reference to Eisenhower 
calling Nixon “his boy.” The news commentator then said: “And with all respect to the 
President of the United States, I might say: Mr. President, you are our boy too. Welcome 
to you and Mrs. Nixon, and may God give you both many years of happiness.”13 Though 
some appeared happy with the Spanish coverage, others were livid with the American 
treatment. Tony Janak, a Columbia Records engineer, voiced his outrage in a letter to 
Nixon’s Personal Secretary Rose Mary Woods. In the letter, Janak expressed outrage 
over the American media and Nixon’s visit to Spain. He explained that CBS “used about 
90 minutes to demean Spain [and] Franco,” NBC showed only eight minutes of Nixon’s 
visit and relied on commentaries from David Brinkley and Sandy Vanocur, and ABC did 
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not carry the satellite reports.14 Janak continued to rail against Brinkley and Vanocur by 
saying it was “sad to hear the commentators talk as if they were working for a foreign 
information agency.”15 Though the media reaction to Nixon’s visit was a mixed bag, the 
visit of the Spanish prince and princess to America appeared to show the early popularity 
of the couple. 
Juan Carlos and Sofía visited the United States in 1971. The Spanish royalty 
visited the Naval Academy in Annapolis, Quantico, Southern California, Texas, and 
Florida, met with administration and government officials in D.C., and witnessed the 
launch of Apollo XIV. The Spanish Embassy gave a dinner in honor of Juan Carlos and 
Sofía with guests that included prominent politicians, businessmen, academics, and the 
press. Roger Ailes suggested Joan King, a television reporter from Houston who had 
interviewed Juan Carlos before, be invited because she is “very popular generally in the 
Southwest” and knows Juan Carlos personally.16 Following the Spanish royalty’s return 
to Madrid, Ambassador Robert Hill detailed the Spanish reaction to Juan Carlos and 
Sofía’s visit. Hill explained that Spaniards appreciated the reception the prince and 
princess received in the United States, adding that “even my barber gave me a warm 
abrazo which, as you know, is almost unheard of in Spain.”17 Hill elaborated that the trip 
to the United States boosted the political image of Juan Carlos in Spain. The visit gave 
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“his image a much more serious dimension and caused most Spaniards to feel pride in 
him through the high level attentions which he received.”18 
The visits of Nixon to Madrid and Juan Carlos and Sofía to the United States are 
important to the USIA’s mission with Spain as well as representative of the Nixon 
administration’s approach to Spain. These stopovers offered publicity and an example to 
show the world of the two countries’ rapport. The Nixon visit displayed that the United 
States planned to continue working with Spain even after Franco as evidenced in 
meetings with Juan Carlos and Carrero Blanco. The visit of Juan Carlos and Sofía to the 
United States held advantages for both countries. It provided the USIA with a way to 
covertly promote the emerging democratic leaders of Spain and offered Spain a global 
stage to show off their future leader. Yet, while the two visits are ways to establish public 
diplomacy, they also exhibited that the United States intended to continue their Cold War 
defense prerogatives in the Mediterranean. The Nixon visit came on the heels of the base 
agreement, and the Spanish royal visit suggested the status quo would continue after 
Franco. 
The public diplomacy efforts of the Nixon administration included promotion of 
the Apollo space program and astronaut goodwill tours. The Apollo space program gave 
the USIA an opportunity to promote science education and space abroad. Cull argues that 
the high point of USIA during the Nixon administration was the July 1969 coverage of 
Apollo XI. He highlights that the Voice of America offered live coverage in four 
languages, broadcast to an estimated 800 million, created a European Apollo News 
Center operated with National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and 






prepared 125 exhibits around the world.19 The USIA estimated that over half the world’s 
population interacted with the Apollo XI landing via the radio, television, or news 
articles. Television viewership was an unprecedented audience around 500 million people 
worldwide.20 The USIA believed the landing of Apollo XI boosted the global standing of 
the United States, and it became important for the United States to continue leveraging 
this new public image. Avenues to accomplish this involved airing television specials of 
subsequent Apollo missions and sending the astronauts on a goodwill tour.  
The USIA targeted Spain for space public diplomacy because of a variety of 
factors. One of these dealt with the relationship between NASA and Spain. There was an 
extensive NASA establishment in Spain, and NASA sought an extension of its 
arrangement in Spain through 1984.21 For example, NASA and the Instituto Nacional de 
Técnica Aeroespacial “has also been directed toward sounding rocket studies of the upper 
atmosphere and ionosphere,” and Spanish scientists at the Nuclear Energy Board 
“received a lunar surface sample for detailed studies.”22 Often, Nixon and Franco would 
exchange friendly messages after each successful Apollo mission. In a suggested line for 
the toast during his Madrid visit, Nixon would have said: “The importance of our 
scientific cooperation is exemplified by the Spanish space tracking facilities. Manned by 
both U.S. and Spanish engineers, the facilities have made a great contribution to the 
Apollo flights, whose achievements we consider as being shared by all mankind.”23 In 
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regards to exhibits, Spain held a National Space Week Seminar in 1968 at the School of 
Industrial Engineering of the University of Barcelona. USIA provided exhibition hall 
materials such as an Apollo capsule and numerous Gemini photographs.24 In addition, a 
68-gram moon rock attracted 41,000 spectators in Madrid and Barcelona. Though foot 
traffic was sparse initially, a word-of-mouth campaign brought 21,000 to Madrid, and 
“lavish press coverage” contributed to 20,000 visiting the rock at the Atarazanas Reales 
de Barcelona.25 
A second factor for space public diplomacy in Spain was the interest of Juan 
Carlos and Sofía in NASA. They were avid supporters of the government organization, 
and, during their visit to the United States, a visit to Cape Kennedy. In a letter to a State 
Department official, Vice Admiral James Calvert doted on Juan Carlos and Sofía, 
especially for their interest in science and space exploration. Calvert wrote that Juan 
Carlos seemed knowledgeable about the American space program, but Sofía impressed 
him the most. He detailed how she was “an absolute dynamo of information about the 
American nuclear submarine program, the American space program, the world energy 
problem, and the need for greater interest in engineering and technology within the 
Spanish educational tradition.”26 The future king and queen’s interest in science and 
technology helped both tailor public diplomacy and the Nixon administration in 
connecting with the leadership of post-Franco Spain.  
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To reach the broadest audience, the USIA utilized television to distribute 
information about the Apollo space program. On numerous occasions throughout the 
year, USIS Madrid played documentaries about space or science on TVE, which was a 
service of the state-owned media Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española (RTVE). 
For example, USIS Madrid placed fifteen shows on TVE in December 1970, including 
several Science Reports and Apollo XIV training programs.27 Spain continued to be a 
place in which the American space program received positive coverage. USIS continued 
to air the takeoffs, such as in August 1971 when TVE picked up both blast off and 
landing of Apollo XV. The USIS post relayed that the press “proved lavish, both in news 
coverage and in editorial praise of the latest U.S. space success.”28 The next month, Dr. 
Charles A. Berry, the Director of Life Sciences for NASA, held a press conference 
sponsored by USIS Madrid, and two-dozen media members attended it.29  
A second method the USIA used with Spain was the astronaut goodwill tours. The 
Nixon administration received several requests from embassies, ambassadors, and other 
foreign service workers for official visits to their respective countries. As Teasel Muir-
Harmony explains, the astronauts served as Nixon’s “personal representatives,” 
especially the Apollo XI crew that toured over twenty countries.30 Spain was no different. 
The Nixon administration produced an initial tour outline in August 1969 that left Madrid 
off. However, Peter Flannigan wrote to Dr. Thomas O. Paine, administrator of NASA, to 
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add Madrid as a stop.31 Though motorcades were not normal in Madrid, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs said “they will assist fulling in working out something of this kind.”32 
Walter Cunningham from Apollo VII also made a stopover. Cunningham visited the U.S. 
Consulates in Barcelona and Madrid in December 1971 to inaugurate the IX Salon de la 
Infancia y de la Juventud in Barcelona. Further, Cunningham appeared on television and 
provided the Ministry of Tourism with a memento from one of the Apollo missions.33 
Space public diplomacy and astronaut goodwill tours were vital portions of the 
USIA’s goals both globally and in Spain. The success of the Apollo program and 
subsequent goodwill tours gave the USIA a much-needed contrast and distraction from 
the Vietnam War. By broadcasting to the world and sending astronauts to visit foreign 
dignitaries, the USIA flaunted the superiority of the United States in the space race 
against the Soviet Union. In Spain, space public diplomacy and astronaut tours had a dual 
endgame. It presented the USIA with a way to build a rapport with the Spanish public. 
The Nixon administration faced an uphill battle with the Spaniards who detested the U.S. 
relationship with Franco as well as American Cold War aggression. Juan Carlos and 
Sofía’s support for space programs at home and abroad excited the USIA with 
possibilities. Further, the success of Apollo and the astronauts gave the USIA a way to 
promote science and education to the Spanish public. Through a variety of mediums, 
including museum exhibits, television, and public visits from astronauts.  
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The death of Franco initiated a change in power relations for Ford, it also forced 
the USIA to change their approach. Once the transition began in 1975, the Ford 
administration maintained a similar approach to public diplomacy in Spain as Nixon—
continue cordial relations with Franco to guard security interests. However, Ford initiated 
a change in public diplomacy due to the death of the dictator. While attempting to protect 
the military bases, U.S. public diplomacy was “mobilized to approach the protagonists of 
the democratic reforms in Spain, as it had previously tried” during the Franco regime.34 
Such an initiative had a renewed chance of success in the wake of Franco’s death. The 
USIA put forward two major efforts for Spain: the first official trip of Juan Carlos abroad 
as monarch and Spanish involvement with the Bicentennial. First, the United States 
looked to overhaul the image of Spain abroad by inviting Juan Carlos and Sofía on their 
first official trip as King and Queen of Spain. Even though Juan Carlos visited the United 
States in 1971 to much praise, there were still questions of whether he was capable of 
leading Spain into the post-Franco era.  
 While the first months of the transition were precarious, Juan Carlos and Ford 
continued to cultivate and broaden U.S.-Spanish relations. To mitigate global skepticism 
about the political skills of the King of Spain, the Spanish and United States governments 
discussed a possible approach to calm these conjectures by bringing the new leader to 
Washington. This would be Juan Carlos’s first official trip abroad as monarch, and he 
would be meeting with Spain’s greatest ally on their soil. The purpose for the United 
States in this visit was “to demonstrate our full support for the King and, by extension, 
                                                   





the democratic evolution to which he is committed.”35 Juan Carlos wanted the visit “to 
strengthen his position at home through the prestige of being received in Washington as 
an important leader,” which would be the first time a Spanish foreign leader visited the 
United States.36 Therefore, the outing provided excellent public diplomacy opportunities 
for both Spain and the United States. 
Second, the U.S. Bicentennial was an important objective of the USIA during the 
Ford administration. In the early 1970s, the United States faced a few challenges because 
of events like the Vietnam War and Watergate. The USIA viewed the Bicentennial as “an 
opportunity to ‘re-boot’ the international image of America, reminding the world of the 
fundamental values of the republic.”37 Education played a role during the Bicentennial as 
well. As Cull explains, the Bicentennial “energized” the American Studies programs 
around the globe, from Helsinki to Tehran to Indonesia.38 In Spain, cultural centers 
throughout the country emphasized the study of the United States. Specifically, in 1976, 
the Spanish Association of Anglo-North American Studies (AEDEAN) was established, 
and its founders connected with English philology studies.39 Another important aspect of 
the American Bicentennial was the visits of foreign leaders. During the Bicentennial, 
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several foreign heads of state traveled to present gifts or tour the country including the 
king and queen of Spain.40  
For Spain, the arrival of Juan Carlos and Sofía demonstrated the importance of 
Spain in American history, but it also demonstrated to the world that the United States 
supported the new leaders of Spain. Upon their arrival on June 1, 1976, Juan Carlos and 
Sofía attended several Washington galas and Bicentennial events in Washington and New 
York City. On their first night in Washington, the Ford administration invited the Spanish 
monarchs to a white tie dinner at the White House where Juan Carlos and Sofía requested 
the attendance of such guests as Mario Andretti, Jack Nicklaus, Charles Bronson, Raquel 
Welch, and Neil Armstrong. Ford delivered a toast to the monarch at the Spanish 
embassy that summed up the importance of Juan Carlos’s visit. In his speech, Ford 
emphasized the relevance of Spain to American history, but he stressed the importance of 
Spain now to Western and trans-Atlantic defense. Ford observed how Juan Carlos hoped 
the “visit would contribute to reinforcing the bonds of friendship between us for the good 
of our two countries and all those who aspire to attain the ideals of faith, freedom, and 
justice.”41  
In addition, Juan Carlos addressed a joint session of Congress where he spoke in 
perfect English and emphasized the importance of the United States to Spain. Juan Carlos 
began by discussing the Bicentennial, and the Spanish history of the United States. He 
discussed how “the Spanish pioneers of the 16th century, who in less than 50 years 
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explored in their fragile primitive ships all the Rio Grande to Cape Breton.”42 Juan Carlos 
then turned to the importance of democracy, not just in the United States but in Spain as 
well. He explained that the Spanish monarchy “will insure, under the principles of 
democracy, that social peace and political stability are maintained in Spain,” and that the 
Crown “protects the whole people and each and every one of its citizens, guaranteeing 
through the laws and by the exercise of civil liberties the rule of justice.”43 In addition, 
Juan Carlos even hinted that Spain intended to integrate into Europe. With the 
discussions in the White House and the speech to Congress, Juan Carlos showed his 
diplomatic abilities and embodied the transition in Spanish policies. 
During the remaining days of their official visit, the Spanish monarchs had 
several other dedications and events to attend in both Washington and New York for the 
Bicentennial. Over seventeen art exhibits underscored the importance of Spanish-
American heritage and relations throughout the country. Juan Carlos and Sofía 
inaugurated the Christopher Columbus exhibit at the Smithsonian and the Santa María de 
Atocha exhibit at the National Geographic Society in Washington, dedicated statues of 
Don Quijote and Bernardo de Gálvez in Washington, visited the new Casa de España in 
New York, and planned “to lay a wreath at the monument to Spanish martyrs of the 
American Revolutionary War in Brooklyn.”44 Spanish Ambassador Jaime Alba explained 
the statue of de Galvez was “a gift-project of the Government of Spain in recognition of 
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the Bicentennial celebrations.”45 There were other Bicentennial events throughout the 
year Juan Carlos and Sofía did not participate in, which highlighted the importance of 
Spain to U.S. history. For example, Ohio celebrated the Day of the Two Toledos, several 
Columbus Day celebrations throughout the country, and Hispanic Heritage Week during 
September 12-19, 1976. 
Following the departure of the Spanish monarchs, the United States seemed to 
reach a consensus on the success of the visit. Ford wrote Juan Carlos to thank him for his 
gifts, his participation in the Bicentennial events, and to emphasize “the important role 
Spain has played in the development of our country.”46 The American public seemed 
enthralled with the young king. An editorial in the New York Times saw Juan Carlos’s 
visit to the United States as an indication of “his readiness to assume in full the role 
assigned to him by [Areilza] as the ‘motor of change’ that will bring democracy to 
Spain.”47 Journalist C.L. Sulzberger explained how for “the first time in four decades it 
was demonstrated that the head of Spain could travel freely. And, seizing the occasion, 
Juan Carlos pledged himself to a goal of democracy, civil liberties and a multiparty 
system.”48 Juan Carlos’s visit had great impact in Spain as well. As historian Angel Viñas 
explains, the “American slap on the back helped to leave behind as quickly as possible 
the footprint of the Franco years.”49 Yet, some were still skeptical, such as Vermont 
Royster at the Wall Street Journal. He explains that Juan Carlos and Sofía’s visit “has a 
fairy-tale quality about it—the coming to life of the handsome young king and his 
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beautiful queen—that makes you wonder if you are tricked by an illusion which will 
suddenly vanish in a puff of smoke.”50 
The importance of Juan Carlos in the Spanish transition to democracy and his role 
in marshaling U.S.-Spain relations during this turbulent period cannot be 
overemphasized. He was a groundbreaker, not a figurehead in the transition. This 
contrasts with other countries within the Third Wave of Democracy. The Carnation 
Revolution saw a military coup in Lisbon overthrow the Estado Novo to begin a process 
towards democratization. Greece underwent a transition after the fall of the military junta 
following student uprisings and a failed coup d’état of Cyprus. For Spain, the death of 
Franco could have led to similar uprisings, but the perseverance of Juan Carlos led the 
country towards constitutional monarchy. For the United States, Juan Carlos represented 
the path towards democracy for other nations coming through the Third Wave. Therefore, 
the USIA and the Ford administration found it vital to promote Juan Carlos and provide 
an example of how a transition to democracy should occur in a peaceful manner. 
Carter and Reagan 
Public diplomacy during the Carter administration built upon the themes of Ford’s 
promotion of democracy, but also emphasized human rights and labor unions. The 
USIA—which underwent a name change to the ICA—continued work on the 
Bicentennial, which carried over from Ford. According to the ICA, over 100 
governments allocated $100 million to commemorate the Bicentennial of the American 
Revolution.51 Spain was no different as they planned to observe anniversaries in the 
1980s for their role in the American Revolution. California had blueprints for a few 
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events to celebrate the state’s Bicentennial and wanted Juan Carlos and Sofía to be major 
figures in the celebrations. In a letter to Carter, Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley detailed 
that the city planned events beginning on September 4, 1980 and intended to 
commemorate historic and cultural ties to Spain and Mexico. Bradley asked if Carter 
would “consider extending a formal invitation to Their Majesties to visit the United 
States and the City of Los Angeles sometime during this period.”52 Further, the cities of 
Santa Barbara and Monterey planned Bicentennial events in the hopes of enticing Juan 
Carlos and Sofía. Paul Mills, the director of the Santa Barbara Museum of Art, wrote to 
Carter that the museum planned a major international exhibit in conjunction with the 
Prado Museum. The exhibition, “The Age of Carlos III in Spain and New Spain” used a 
series of grants under the cultural provisions of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 
between Spain and the United States.53  
However, the dominant theme within the Carter administration’s public 
diplomacy dealt with human rights, most obviously with human rights rhetoric. Carter 
used the ICA to promote human rights through his speeches at his inauguration, at the 
United Nations (UN), and at the Organization of American States (OAS).54 However, the 
definition and promotion of human rights were not consistent throughout Carter’s tenure. 
As Barbara Keys highlights, nothing underscores “the novelty of human rights in 
American foreign policy firmament more than the Carter administration’s profound 
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confusion over what human rights promotion meant in practice.”55 This can be seen 
through the State Department and ICA struggle over the definition of human rights. 
The State Department believed in specific objectives for human rights. It should 
promote civil and political liberties; support basic needs like food, health care, and 
education; endorse international humanitarian programs; and publicize to other nations 
the U.S. stance on human rights.56  The ICA in contrast argued that human rights should 
“reflect historic American concerns,” as well as economic and social issues.57 One reason 
for this stance was that Western Europeans increasingly viewed human rights as “an 
essential component of being culturally ‘European.’”58 In addition, the ICA intended to 
encompass research from NGOs that advocate for human rights, like Amnesty 
International. Though the two agencies had different approaches to human rights, the 
Carter administration sought to come to terms for a singular, interdepartmental definition 
of human rights in August 1977. From an inter-agency document, a three-part definition 
of human rights occurred, 
First, the right to be free from governmental violations of the integrity of the 
person: such violations include torture; cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment 
and punishment; arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; denial of fair public trial; and 
invasion of the home (‘the first group’). Second, economic and social rights: the 
right to be free from government action or inaction which either obstructs an 
individual’s efforts to fulfill his vital needs for food, shelter, health care, and 
education or fails adequately to support the individual in meeting basic needs 
(‘the second group’). Third, civil and political liberties: these include freedom of 
thought, of religion, of assembly, of speech, of the press; freedom of movement 
both within and outside one’s own country; and freedom to take part in 
government (‘the third group’).59 
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The role of the ICA became to promote human rights rhetoric though radio, print, and 
television as opposed to developing policy. As Keys illustrates, Carter and Brzezinski 
“compromised the social points of the public diplomacy component of human rights 
promotion, with the [ICA] playing a small supporting role in disseminating these 
statements and interpreting them for foreign publics.”60 The ICA did not participate as 
much in the creation on the human rights rhetoric as simply becoming a vessel for 
Carter’s messages.  
This contrasts with Nixon and Ford who relied on USIA to produce public 
diplomacy and not just be the messenger. This is best seen in their approaches to Spain. 
For Nixon, the USIA provided the administration with their programming for space 
public diplomacy as well as disseminating information during official state visits. For 
Ford, the USIA offered several Bicentennial events that depicted the importance of Spain 
to the United States. Yet, for Carter, the now ICA became a loudspeaker. The ICA would 
disseminate speeches in Spain that detailed Carter’s foreign policy or whenever Spain’s 
transition to democracy helped his human rights rhetoric. It would not be until later in the 
administration that the ICA began pushing initiatives with economic rights. However, the 
diminishing role of the ICA did not stop the agency from providing the administration 
ideas.  
In late 1977, the new director of the ICA, John Reinhardt, suggested Carter give a 
ten- to fifteen-minute speech to commemorate Human Rights Week in December 1977. 
Reinhardt suggested a deliberative speech on human rights because he was aware of the 
criticism the president faced due to U.S. discrepancies such as “that we are not thoughtful 
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enough, that we’ve been inconsistent, that we back off from the tough choices.”61 
Brzezinski approved the ICA drafting a speech for Carter. In the speech, there are 
connections to U.S. history—especially the American Revolution—and to democracy. 
Nods to the Spanish transition occurred in the democracy portion. The speech highlights 
that democracy appeared doomed in the world, but “there is a perceptible swing of the 
pendulum” back towards democracy among several countries led by Spain.62 Carter gave 
a televised speech regarding Human Rights Day and Human Rights Week, but it did not 
happen until 1978 from the East Room. 
The draft of the televised Human Rights Day speech illustrates the integral part of 
the Spanish transition to democracy to Carter’s human rights rhetoric. Carter often used 
the Spanish transition to democracy as a parallel to American style of democracy. He 
referenced the Spanish transition often in his major speeches on human rights. For 
example, in his most famous speech on human rights at Notre Dame, Carter spoke of 
democratic methods and the importance of democracy promotion in U.S. foreign policy. 
He explained, 
I believe we can have a foreign policy that is democratic, that is based on 
fundamental values, and that uses power and influence, which we have, for 
humane purposes. We can also have a foreign policy that the American people 
both support and, for a change, know about and understand. I have a quiet 
confidence in our own political system. Because we know that democracy works, 
we can reject the arguments of those rulers who deny human rights to their 
people. We are confident that democracy’s example will be compelling, and so 
we seek to bring that example closer to those from whom in the past few years we 
have been separated and who are not yet convinced about the advantages of our 
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kind of life. We are confident that the democratic methods are the most effective, 
and so we are not tempted to employ improper tactics here at home or abroad.63 
 
Spain received mention in this speech with this emphasis on praising democracy abroad 
and human rights. Carter said that the recent global successes in democracy, like Spain, 
“show that our confidence in this system is not misplaced.”64 The president believed that 
support for dictatorships was against American idealism, and human rights and 
democracy demanded a belief in change and diversity internationally.65  
Another example of promoting Spanish democracy was advocating Spain as the 
next location for the meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE). This organization started its operations after the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, and 
the Carter administration promoted it whenever they could. Mondale spoke highly of the 
CSCE at an address at NATO headquarters. He described that both “seeking the full 
implementation of the Helsinki agreement and searching for further ways to improve 
security and cooperation in Europe are vital.”66 Further, Carter made statements allying 
Spain with the CSCE. He explained the United States supported Spanish efforts to 
strengthen democratic institutions and wanted to work closely with Europe at the 
CSCE.67 In addition, the CSCE pursued a new city to hold the next meeting. Spain 
desired to be the location and submitted Madrid to be the select city. The CSCE meeting 
appeared to give “a certain fillip to the new political system in Spain.”68 
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  One major initiative the Carter administration pushed alongside human rights 
was economic rights in Spain. This included labor and the promotion of unions. After the 
legalization of unions and the right to strike in 1976, the United States increased 
information and educational activities to develop and spread democratic unions. In 
January 1978, Brzezinski approached Reinhardt to expand these endeavors. Reinhardt 
discussed activities in progress such as: leader grants for the General Union of Workers 
representatives, seminars in Barcelona and Madrid on arbitration, ICA grants of $35,000, 
cooperation with AFL-CIO to recruit Spanish-speaking specialists to visit Spain, 
encouragement of youths in labor, Spanish language copies of “A Brief History of the 
American Labor Movement,” and ICA films on labor sent to Spanish unions.69 Further, 
Reinhardt discussed ICA’s plans beyond 1979 including: increase of labor leader grants, 
more direct union-to-union contact, seminars led by Spanish-speaking American labor 
specialists, youth exchanges for young labor leaders, Labor ministry seminars organized 
and financed by the International Labor Affairs Bureau, and more translations of labor 
documents.70 Reinhardt provided an in-depth analysis of the budget for ICA’s Spanish 
labor initiatives later that month. Union-to-union contacts, leader grants, and youth 
exchanges received the most funding. However, he pointed to university exchanges in 
this memo as a possible inconvenience. The existing exchange programs like Fulbright 
and the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation provided many opportunities, but it was 
“unwise to press Spanish representatives of essentially academic programs to move into 
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the labor education field.”71 The Madrid Embassy often had luncheons where it would 
invite labor leaders from both countries, specifically socialists. Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State for European Affairs Robert E. Barbour describes these labor leaders 
and socialists as “these wild bearded people who didn’t wear neckties,” but the luncheons 
were the two sides “just pushing and helping, trying to show that the United States was 
not hostile” towards labor or the PSOE.72  
In a memo to Brzezinski a year later, Reinhardt provided a follow-up to the ICA’s 
assistance on Spanish labor. The AFL-CIO sent representatives to several unions 
including steelworkers, carpenters, municipal employees, and factory workers, and 
Spanish unions sent Socialist, Basque, and other political affiliations to the United States. 
Several labor specialists and academics travelled to Spain for educational programs and 
to lead seminars.73 The United States gave twelve leader grants to labor leaders, and 
Spain received six young American labor leaders. In addition, the ICA post in Madrid 
published a Spanish version of the U.S. Department of Labor’s “U.S. Labor Bulletin” and 
several booklets about North American labor movements.74 Reinhardt argued the most 
successful element of ICA’s labor efforts was a series of seminars sponsored by 
American and Spanish Departments of Labor, which included seminars on “trade unions, 
management, government and academia.”75  
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The emphasis on labor practices represents the United States attempting to draw 
parallels between the Spanish and American practices under a democracy. However, this 
was a longstanding initiative of the USIA dating back to the early Cold War. The 
policymakers of these early administrations associated capitalism with the United States 
as a combatant to the Soviet Union and communism. The Carter administration 
repurposed this initiative to fit the recently legalized unions in Spain. One reason for this 
program dealt with the administration’s definition of human rights, which lists economic 
rights as one aspect of the three-part definition. Another reason for this dealt with the 
fears that the Socialist and Communist parties of Spain may associate themselves more 
with the Soviet Union. Further, the early Cold War initiatives of the USIA promoted 
labor leaders to show the harmony of American domestic support for unions. The ICA 
again recycled by promoting leader grants and exchanges between Spanish and American 
labor leaders.  
 Along with human rights rhetoric and labor, the Carter administration used an 
official state visit in 1980 to promote American style democracy in Spain and signify 
Spain’s importance both culturally and defensively to the United States. The NSC 
emphasized Carter’s trip to Italy, Spain, and Portugal was important to public perception 
of the President’s leadership, especially during the ongoing crisis in Iran. Particularly 
with Spain, the United States “could point up the practical results of the President’s 
human rights campaign, identifying him personally with the democratic experiments 
under way” in Spain.76 Therefore, the United States attempted to promote Juan Carlos 
and the newest democracy in Europe, and simultaneously recover the image of Carter 
                                                   






abroad. Brzezinski and Barbour floated the idea of giving the Spanish king the Medal of 
Freedom. Barbour argued the person that most embodied the transition was Juan 
Carlos—only vaguely hinting at the work of Suárez—and that “singling him out would 
be recognized in Spain … as a tribute to what the entire country has accomplished since 
Franco’s death.”77 While the Medal of Freedom idea never materialized, it indicated a 
path the Carter administration sought to connect the Spanish transition to the United 
States. However, a toast the president made in Madrid made this connection more 
relevant. 
 Carter’s speech drew a variety of correlations between the democracy of the 
United States and the Spanish transition. Carter spent much of the speech equating Spain 
to America, but he also discussed Spain’s logical step toward Europeanization with entry 
into the EC. Carter emphasized how Spain “created a vigorous, thriving democracy, with 
respect for human rights, individual liberties, and freedom of expression.”78 These 
attributes were how the Carter administration perceived their foreign policy on the world 
stage. In addition, the president underscored the importance of the Spanish transition on 
the Third World. Spain “is a source of hope and inspiration to democrats everywhere. 
Spain’s experience holds lessons about resolution, moderation, and self-control.”79 Much 
to the relief of the Carter administration, the Spanish government tied their human rights 
crusade to the United States. In an ICA translation of the Spanish government’s 
announcement of Carter’s visit, Spain emphasized the importance Carter placed on Spain 
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being the home of the CSCE meeting. Both leaders hoped the Madrid conference “would 
permit the creation of a climate favorable to dialogue and cooperation, that it would favor 
the reestablishment of mutual confidence and make it possible to advance on the road 
toward détente and peace.”80 
 U.S. public diplomacy saw a resurgence during the Reagan administration. One of 
the issues faced by the ICA during the Reagan years was hostility toward U.S. nuclear 
power. Western European countries, already apprehensive of Reagan, saw the reheating 
of the Cold War as a problem. In a telegram to all consular posts, Secretary of State 
Alexander Haig made it clear that USIS posts, media reactions, and surveys showed that 
the United States faced an uphill battle with Western Europe. He recounted that the 
United States should “elevate policy persuasion and public affairs to a high priority at all 
European posts, particularly in NATO member countries.”81 Haig highlighted five policy 
priorities: East-West relations, TNF, Western defense, the Middle East, and Central 
America. Haig argued that Europeans “clearly recognized that the U.S. has changed and 
that we are determined to restore our strength and to resist Soviet expansionism.”82 To 
emphasize this change, ICA invited twenty-three journalists from fifteen NATO countries 
to visit the United States from April 21-27, 1981. One of these journalists was Andrés 
Garrigo from La Vanguardia. The ICA explained that some of the European journalists 
were “especially impressed by what they saw as strong support among the American 
public for government foreign policy and a popular recovery from the ‘humiliation’ of 
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Vietnam.”83 Garrigo believed there was “a warm and united purpose to revitalize 
America.”84 
In 1983, the USIA—now with the returned moniker—promoted initiatives to 
better transatlantic relations, including Spain. Charles Z. Wick, the new head of the 
USIA, reported that many countries of Western Europe “remained strongly negative” 
about for those bases that held missiles.85 But what worked in America’s favor was that 
Europeans preferred Reagan’s proposal for arms reduction over the Soviet Union’s 
proposal to limit missiles.86 One method Wick used was the distribution of news through 
television and radio. The two major competitors for international broadcasts, VISNEWS 
and UPITN, agreed to broadcast news programs as well as features through “TV Satellite 
File.” As Wick explained, VISNEWS services 275 networks in 80 countries, which 
expanded the reach of the United States and saved them $3,500 in satellite costs.87 The 
relationship with UPI allowed the United States to become involved with broadcasts of 
Nuestras Noticias. UPI and Agencia EFE formed an all-Spanish language radio news 
network. The Spanish government threw full support behind Nuestras Noticias and 
cooperated with the United States to “serve the growing Hispanic-American community” 
in the country.88 Another initiative that Wick’s USIA promoted was Project Democracy. 
Led by the USIA, the program launched “an aggressive worldwide effort to strengthen 
the political, intellectual and social infrastructures that make democracies function 
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worldwide.”89 During a December 1982 meeting on Project Democracy, a discussion 
occurred as to whether to open a “center for democracy or for democratic studies” in 
Europe with the possible location being Spain.90   
 The Reagan administration used methods like previous administrations used such 
as promoting official state visits and economic rights. Much like the Nixon and Ford 
public diplomacy, the USIA under Reagan promoted trips from prominent Spanish 
figures. In 1981, there were visits from Suárez and Juan Carlos and Sofía, which placed 
more emphasis on the latter. In February 1981, after the events of 23-F, Director of 
Western European Affairs on the NSC James Rentschler recommended that Reagan and 
Bush go to a dinner in honor Suárez that was put together by Spanish ambassador José 
Lladó. Rentschler explained that this was a venue to “further signal our support for 
Spanish democracy” and would make a positive reflection on U.S.-Spain relations.91 
Reagan could not attend the event, but Bush did. The vice president received talking 
points from Rentschler that detailed 23-F, U.S.-Spanish relations, and congratulations to 
Suárez. In addition, the talking points pointed toward Spanish democracy by detailing 
how the Reagan administration “want all Spaniards to know that the preservation of their 
democracy not only is fully supported by the United States, but it is our number one 
concern in Spain.”92 
 In October 1981, the Reagan administration hosted Juan Carlos and Sofía in the 
White House. To prepare for their arrival, the administration attempted to drum up 
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interest in Spain. The magazines ABC and La Vanguardia planned to publish an 
interview with Reagan two days prior to the Spanish royal visit. Ambassador Todman 
wrote that this was an excellent opportunity for the administration to interact with the 
Spanish public. Todman explains that it will “contribute significantly to [the] 
accomplishment of most important U.S. policy objectives vis-à-vis Spain by reiterating 
U.S. support for consolidation of Spanish democracy.”93 In the prepared question and 
answers, Reagan emphasized how he and Juan Carlos “share a devotion to representative 
democracy and the security of the West,” and how they attach “great importance to the 
evolution of democratic institutions in Spain.”94  
 Once Juan Carlos and Sofía arrived, they were feted with a White House dinner. 
The State Department produced a guest list for the event that included such names as Joe 
Biden, Tip O’Neill, Henry Kissinger, John David Lodge, Juan Linz, Mr. and Mrs. David 
Rockefeller, and representatives from Ford, GE, GM, Gulf Oil, IBM, Westinghouse, 
Boeing, and Dupont.95 During the dinner, Reagan gave an address that emphasized 
democracy, the importance of Spain to the United States, and the history of Spain. In the 
research for possible themes in the speech, the administration detailed the regional 
differences in Spain as “a ‘balkanized’ series of semi-autonomous regions,” and argued 
that the arrival of Guernica was “proof that Spanish democracy is on the road to 
stability.”96 However, one portion of the research was starred and worked into the speech. 
This dealt with the history of El Cid, a folk hero in Spain, and comparisons to Juan 
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Carlos. This included comparisons to the exile of El Cid and the king’s father, Don Juan, 
and that both El Cid and Juan Carlos were “born in a good hour.” The administration 
pointed to a needed illusion to El Cid and being born in a good hour to demonstrate “faith 
in what the King is doing as well as a good grasp of Spanish culture. The Cid is 
universally acclaimed in Spain, a folk hero we can cite without any drawback 
whatsoever.”97 Though the American public may have drawn a connection to El Cid 
through the 1961 film starring Reagan’s friend, Charlton Heston.  
While their previous official visit under Ford provided positive press in Spain, 
Juan Carlos and Sofía’s trip to the Reagan White House caused a controversy in Spain. 
Though the intention of the state visit was to bring about support for Spanish democracy, 
much of the discussion between Juan Carlos and Reagan dealt with NATO, EC 
membership, and Spanish military. However, the White House issued a statement that 
Juan Carlos expressed “his personal commitment to NATO, thereby interfering with the 
political process.”98 Foreign Minister José Pedro Pérez Llorca had to put out the fire by 
clarifying the king was just reiterating the Spanish stance, but the Spanish press blamed 
the Reagan administration for its “‘steamroller tactics.’”99 The Reagan administration did 
not assist the USIA in trying to build public diplomacy due to their diplomatic efforts in 
Spain. This is especially true with the Spanish public’s reaction to Haig’s comments on 
23-F, Reagan’s meddling in Central America, and American insistence on Spanish 
NATO entry taking away from domestic issues.  
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 The next Spanish state visit would not occur until 1983 when Prime Minister 
González traveled to the United States. In a background briefing, a senior administration 
official detailed González’s visit to the White House. This official expressed an overall 
theme of a strong bilateral relationship between the United States and Spain. The official 
pointed that what was remarkable about U.S.-Spanish relations was “we have sustained 
that relationship through the period of transition from the Franco period to 
democracy.”100 In addition, the official discussed two keys to González’s visit. First, the 
visit was meant to show that the Reagan administration could “get along very well with a 
young, democratically-elected, Socialist leader” after years of Franco. Second, the visit 
was meant as “almost a celebration of the fact that Spain has become a fully participating, 
democratic country.”101 
 When dealing with economic rights, the Reagan administration chose to focus on 
consumer protections. According to a USIA research memo, the Spanish public believed 
that economic rights rather than political rights “when government leaders talk about 
human rights.”102 Whereas the Carter administration’s public diplomacy promoted labor 
rights and labor unions, the USIA under Reagan promoted consumer affairs. In 1983, 
Virginia Knauer, the Director of the Office of Consumer Affairs under Reagan, went on a 
speaking tour of Europe to discuss consumer protections. On October 17, 1983, Knauer 
gave an address in Madrid where she detailed the history of U.S. consumer protections 
and emphasized Reagan’s outlook on consumerism and consumer protections. Though 
the speech was about these issues, there are a few references to the importance of 
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democracy in her speech. Knauer discussed three distinct characteristics of U.S. trade 
policies: “diversity of tastes, freedom of expression, and a desire for our improving 
standard of living.”103 Knauer continues by emphasizing the importance of freedom of 
speech to democracy. She demonstrates the importance of vocal Americans demanding 
quality in their goods leads to an “improvement of products or services in the 
marketplace because sellers who don’t respond to consumer complaints will not be in 
business long.”104 Knauer’s visit to Madrid left an impression on her, which she details in 
a letter to a member of the Confederacion Espanola de Organizaciones Empresariales. 
She disclosed how the Spanish were looking toward change and reform for consumers. 
Knauer detailed “the sense of purpose I found in all segments of Spanish society … [was] 
to improve the protections of Spanish consumers by legislation or updated 
regulations.”105 
The United States had a lively program at the USIS posts in Spain during the 
Reagan administration. For two years, the United States built a state-of-the-art cultural 
center in downtown Madrid, around the corner from Parliament. McKinney Russell, a 
USIA worker at the Madrid embassy, revealed that the cultural center was “a major 
source of information about legislation, about legislative procedures, about judicial 
activities in this country.”106 Coupled with the expansion of the USIA at home, cultural 
offices in Spain expanded as well with offices in Barcelona, Seville, and Bilbao. Russell 
explains that the Madrid office believed it was important to increase the number of 
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International Visitors program as the expansion in Spain continued. The argument was 
that the exchange program was vital as they underwent the critical years of transitioning 
to democracy. Russell argues that the exchanges during the early 1980s “was one of the 
really important contributory elements to the anchoring of democracy in Spain.”107  
Visual arts played an indispensable role in the USIS posts in Spain. Another 
USIA initiative that affected Spain was the development of WORLDNET. This was a 
program to use satellite television to broadcast programs for the USIA. Thomas R. 
Carmichael, a member of the USIA press section of the Madrid Embassy, explains that he 
would take talking points “to the speakers in Washington for the program, and made sure 
they knew what media people were going to be in the audience.”108 In addition, the 
exchanging of exhibitions and participation in expositions produced exchanges between 
the USIA and Spain. Some of these were paid for by the money from the base agreement. 
For example, the Guggenheim Museum in New York received a Joan Miró exhibition, 
the Spanish National Ballet toured the United States, and American artists could travel 
around Spain and participate in an artist in residence program.109 Further, Spain 
expressed interest in participating in the Louisiana World Exposition in 1984. The fair’s 
value was discussed in a meeting between Juan Carlos and Reagan. The Louisiana World 
Exposition could provide “a projection of Spanish cultural presence, as a tourist market 
developer, and as a means of promoting its products.”110 
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 Recalling the central thesis of the presidential speeches, the United States would 
not exist without the Spanish discovery of the Americas. The public diplomacy initiatives 
of the USIA illustrate that the United States wanted to return the favor by counselling 
Spain through the transition to democracy. However, the hard power decisions of 
Washington made it difficult to persuade the Spanish public of this intention. To counter 
this, the United States needed to utilize soft power. The USIA became the government 
organization tasked with developing this soft power and do so through public diplomacy. 
The goal of the USIA during the transition was to make the United States appealing and 
promote democracy. The organization had to configure a different strategy for each 
presidential administration. For Nixon, the USIA promoted the success of the Apollo 
program and scientific education in Spain. Under Ford, the U.S. Bicentennial played a 
key role in promoting Juan Carlos as the King of Spanish democracy. The USIA 
underwent changes with Carter and struggled to find a cohesive definition to promote 
human rights. Yet, the administration utilized the promotion of labor unions to promote 
economic rights. The Reagan years saw a similar approach with protection of consumer 
rights. 
While the administrations utilized different approaches, they each faced common 
resistance—the Spanish people. The USIA had to fight an uphill battle as the Spanish 
public as they were hostile in their views of Americans. Spanish citizens blamed the 
United States for propping up Franco, taking advantage of Spanish military and economic 
weakness to take military bases, imperialistic policies in Latin America, and causing a 
bipolar world through their naked aggression during the Cold War. The goal of the USIA 





Spain with the United States. As the democratic bastions of the Cold War, the United 
States believed this was how they could connect with Spain—a growing and emerging 
democracy on the world’s stage. Yet, the public diplomacy efforts of the USIA made 
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John Brademas, the President of New York University (NYU), approached a 
lectern in Elmer Holmes Bobst Library on a cold December 7, 1983. Through the funding 
of Milton Petrie, Brademas dedicated a professorship in honor of the Spanish king—the 
King Juan Carlos I Chair in Spanish Culture and Civilization. Juan Carlos and Queen 
Sofía were in attendance alongside the Spanish Minister of Education José María 
Maravall and the Spanish Minister of Culture Javier Solana. Brademas discussed the 
importance and expansion of Spanish studies at NYU during the last few years as well as 
the establishment of Catalan Studies in collaboration with the University of Barcelona. 
The prior month Brademas visited Spain to accept a fellowship named in honor of Andres 
Segovia, which sent students to NYU for the study of Spanish culture and the 
instrumentation of the classical guitar. Next, Juan Carlos spoke of how NYU’s emphasis 
on Spanish culture would continue to promote “the values which we should work for 
most in the world today: togetherness, affection, and respect among different cultures.”1 
                                                   





Brademas gifted Juan Carlos with a 1522 map of the New World as a symbol of the “ties 
of history and culture that unite our two countries.”2 While the two men spoke of the 
interconnectivity between the United States and Spain, they failed to mention the most 
common pathway for culture to transfer: educational exchanges.  
Brademas’s speech highlighted the significance of education in the history of 
U.S.-Spain relations, particularly the involvement of Juan Carlos. In his concluding 
remarks, Brademas applauded the role of Juan Carlos during the transition to democracy 
and as a leader of U.S.-Spain relations: 
But there is yet one final reason we wish today to honor his majesty and it is to 
express to him the admiration and respect of the American people for the wise and 
courageous leadership he has given to his people as Spain plays a more important 
and visible part in the family of free and democratic nations. It requires no 
elaboration here to say that at a critical movement in the life of New Spain, it was 
the brave and farsighted stance of His Majesty, King Juan Carlos I, that protected 
the institutions of the New Spanish Democracy.3  
 
While this makes obvious nods to 23-F and the importance of Juan Carlos as a steady 
figure of the turbulent political changes, Brademas is also mentioning the importance of 
the Spanish royal in supporting education in Spain. The NYU president lauded Juan 
Carlos for his ability to speak “eloquently of the indispensable role of education and 
culture in building a world of peace and freedom.”4 The Franco regime did little for 
education, but by the 1970s a reform law and the transition to democracy sparked a 
revolution in education and educational exchanges. 
Education gave a chance for the United States to build soft power in Spain during 
both the Franco regime and the ensuing democratic governments. As Nye described, 
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academic exchanges “played a significant role in enhancing American soft power.”5 This 
included educational exchanges developed and implemented by both a governmental 
organization and a nongovernmental organization. The Fulbright program supported 
hundreds of American and Spanish students as they studied abroad and returned home. 
The United States believed the American and Spanish students would discuss their 
experience with their fellow citizens and take their respective ideals abroad. The Ford 
Foundation (FF) played just as vital a role in the development of soft power in Spain as 
well. The NGO subsidized educational exchanges, but the importance of the FF dealt 
with the development of the 1970 General Law of Education. This reform effort provided 
Spain with an American style education system to help the “successor generation” with 
easier access to education. The reform law “is a Spanish-oriented copy of the U.S. 
educational system,” so much so that critics “state that it is too close a copy and not based 
enough on Spanish heritage.”6 
Though both Fulbright and the FF assisted in the Spanish educational reform, 
both organizations had distinctive goals in Spain. In the late 1960s, the FF recognized the 
importance of Spain and believed if the education system underwent transformation, the 
Western nations would open to Spain. By the 1980s, the FF approved projects for 
conferences and books that examined Spain’s role in the world, security options, and 
issues of self-determination. Simultaneously, the Fulbright program stressed a few 
educational initiatives in Spain. This included initially focusing on English teaching, 
educational development, business, and a variety of sciences. The belief that a constant 
exchange of students would help the reform and development of the new Spanish 
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education system. This included sending American professors to Spain, receiving Spanish 
educators in the United States, and Spain hosting several postdoctoral fellows and junior 
lecturers.   
Spanish Education Prior to 1970 
 Education in Spain during the Franco dictatorship was not ideal. The regime used 
education as a propaganda tool to indoctrinate Spanish youths. However, as the 1960s 
approached, the regime “appeared indifferent” to the state of education and placed it in 
the hands of the Catholic Church.7 Despite the inattentiveness, the FF believed expansion 
of education would help Spain on the international stage. During the late 1960s, the FF 
began noticing the backwardness of Spain in three academic areas—social sciences, 
business, and the arts. Ruben E. Reina, Associate Professor at the University of 
Pennsylvania, worked with the FF to create a triangular exchange of cultural 
anthropology students between the United States, Spain, and South America. Reina used 
travel funds from the FF to observe Spain, Argentina, Bogota, and Guatemala. In his 
work in these areas, Reina noticed the few anthropologists in Spain received their training 
abroad, and the catedrático (professor) in Spain was quite uniformed in the social 
sciences. He argued this lack of emphasis on social sciences made Spain “culturally very 
different” from Latin America, and the Spanish students “cannot be handled with the 
same policies and techniques.”8  
Another FF approved study in the late 1960s examined Spain’s need for business 
education. Spain was at the tail end of the “Spanish Miracle,” an economic boom that 
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began in the 1950s and lasted until Franco’s death. This led to rapid industrialization that 
allowed Spain to recover economically. William C. Fredrick and Chadwick J. Haberstroh 
received funding to research management education in Spain. Frederick and Haberstroh 
described prior business schools in Spain focused on lower-level commercial training, but 
a recent impetus focused on formal management education. The authors noted similarities 
and differences between Spain and the United States, but these should not be the only 
criteria for gauging the success of the programs. Instead, a “more important test of 
adequacy of Spanish management education institutions is whether they are workable for 
Spaniards, in Spain.”9 Frederick and Haberstroh applauded the emerging management 
education movement in the face of mistrust and hostility toward upper professional 
management in Spanish society and the educational system. They argued the Spanish 
education system was elitist and restricted, and that Spanish professors belong to “a 
tradition of privilege, part-time teaching, non-research, and rigid authoritarianism;” and 
that Spanish students cannot give the requisite study devotion due to Spain’s 
“inflexibility ministerial and academic bureaucracy that discourages educational 
reform.”10 Fredrick and Haberstroh point to the backwardness of the Spanish educational 
system through management education. 
Another example of an FF study in Spain was the International Survey on the 
Promotion of the Arts with reports written by Ruby D’Arschot. These four reports on 
Spain focus on the role of music, theater, plastic arts, and cinematography. D’Arschot 
argued that the regionalism in Spain is best seen in music, and it would be a “serious 
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mistake to limit one’s idea of Spanish cultural life to that of Madrid.”11 Yet, the Spanish 
government found methods of hurting other arts in Spain due to censorship. D’Arschot 
explained that this, coupled with a lack of professionalism, caused theater to struggle 
throughout Spain. But the Spanish government funded the school of cinematography to 
“stimulate technical and artistic progress” among films in Spain.12 Though they received 
little support from the Franco regime, D’Arschot argued four Schools of Fine Arts 
fostered a renaissance in the plastic arts—art forms that are molded such as sculptures or 
ceramics. 
The FF studies underscored the poor conditions of the educational system in 
Spain under Franco. Issues such as funding, professionalism, elitism, and meddling from 
the regime illustrate the inadequacies of education in Spain prior to the 1970s. The 
disparity is especially shocking since the subjects of social sciences, business, and art 
were aspects covered under the nonmilitary aspects (NMAs) of the base agreements. 
Another shock is that Spain—a country that prided itself on cultural heritage and the 
greatness of its artists—received such a negative review on art education from 
D’Arschot. The Ford Foundation played a critical role in exposing the weaknesses of 
education in Francoist Spain. 
Yet, the decisionmakers of the Fulbright program—in conjunction with the FF—
believed the current dire straits of education in Spain offered an opportunity to promote 
and expand American Studies. The origins of American Studies programs in Spain are 
traced to the FF. In December 1960, the foundation announced a $2.5 million grant over 
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five years for programs in European universities.13 By the 1970s, the FF began cutting 
funding to support other projects. As Harold Howe II wrote, the FF limited the financing 
to Spain during the education reform due to financial, substantive, and program 
priorities.14 Once the FF began losing interest in American Studies in Spain, the Fulbright 
Program stepped in. This included sending junior lecturers in American Studies to teach 
courses on the United States and working with the Institute of North American Studies in 
Barcelona.15 The USIA also provided support for American Studies, especially around 
the time of the Bicentennial.  
Using American Studies as a window into Spain, the Fulbright Program focused 
on the teaching of English to build goodwill for the United States. American Studies 
programs by the late 1960s began to stagnate in Western Europe and there were questions 
over the funding of the exchanges. However, American Studies maintained its progress in 
Spain. One reason for this was that the nonmilitary agreements in the early 1970s 
provided the funds for educational exchanges, and Spain also increased financial 
contributions.16 The program’s basic objective in 1969 was to stimulate English teaching, 
American Studies and the social sciences as well as to continue “constructive evolution 
on the political and economic side.”17 Fulbright worked with the FF as the latter began to 
cut funding for teaching English in Spain. During the 1969-70 school year, Fulbright and 
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FF co-sponsored three English teacher seminars. Fulbright continued their work on 
English teaching after the Spanish educational reform. However, by the 1971-1972 
school year, the importance of English as a Foreign Language transitioned to an emphasis 
of American Studies. Spanish universities became more interested in hosting lecturers 
whose backgrounds were in American Studies. Specifically, Spain wanted scholars who 
focused on American literature who had been used for teaching English as a second 
language. 
As the FF pointed to issues with the Spanish educational system, the Fulbright 
program concerned itself with promoting the goals of U.S. soft power. The FF knew of 
the deficiencies in Spanish education and believed they could help Spain in the 1960s. 
During this time, the FF provided funding for American Studies programs. However, the 
research provided by those funded by the FF made it obvious they must consider funding 
education overall not just one subject. Meanwhile, the Fulbright program hoped to 
continue their success of American Studies in Spain by continuing the program. Fulbright 
took advantage of the now empty sphere of influence for American Studies with the FF 
cutting resources in Spain to reassign the funding to other priorities. American Studies 
was a way for the United States to gain the “hearts and minds” of the Spanish public. 
Even when the programs failed to gain attendance, the Fulbright program continued 
moving forward by merging English as a Foreign Language into American Studies. This 
is illustrative of an NGO providing evidence to a problem, but the GO continuing the 
march forward with their own soft power goals. 





While the FF and Fulbright program had distinct goals in Spain, both 
organizations played roles in the creation and implementation of the 1970 General Law 
of Education (Ley General de Educación) in Spain. This was the most ambitious reform 
during the Franco regime and the first major education reform since 1857.18 Reforms 
began following the February 1969 publication of Libro Blanco (White Book). It 
provided an examination of the education system and pointed to several problems. These 
included: “an obsolete education system which could not serve the needs of modern 
society; the existence of a gap between the contents of the different stages of education; 
high failure rates; exams being the only means of evaluating students; a direct link 
between students’ socio-economic circumstances and the level of education they 
achieved; and the existence of two parallel education systems—one private, which 
provided education to the upper classes, and one public, which accommodated the lower 
classes.”19 The General Law of Education followed the Libro Blanco in August 1970 and 
sought to normalize education in Spain from elementary schools through graduate school. 
The Fulbright program supported the development of the reform and modeling the 
Spanish education system after the United States. Members of the Nixon administration 
stressed their support of the reform in Spain. They argued it was an exceptional 
opportunity to identify the United States with the most “dynamic liberal and constructive 
initiative yet taken” by the Franco regime, and active U.S. participation in educational 
reform would “associate the U.S. with those Spaniards who offer positive hope for post-
Franco period.”20 Spain asked for U.S. assistance as well. Spanish Foreign Minister 
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López-Bravo spoke with a U.S. official about sending “a team of experts to Madrid to 
look at education and scientific projects” as well as train U.S. and Spanish professors.21 
As Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla explains, the United States gained Spanish 
public support for their championing of education reform. They gained this through 
directly or indirectly helping in major foreign support and “providing financing, training, 
experts, and material for its application.”22 
Ultimately, the United States tried to attach support for the General Law of 
Education through the 1970 base agreement. The bilateral agreement provided around $3 
million to invest in science and education. The funding from the agreement could 
influence the education reform by establishing new institutions for training science 
teachers. Specifically, Nixon knew this could benefit “both the educational system and 
the future technical base of Spanish science and technology.”23 The administration 
believed close cooperation on atomic energy could help the rapidly industrializing Spain 
as well as maintenance for the current U.S. power reactor, the two under construction, 
and the six planned.24 Again, the United States placed defensive interests into the 
forefront using the Spanish reforms and transition as ways to help themselves. Further, 
the United States mediated between their own governmental organizations and other 
international organizations such as the World Bank, UNESCO, and the FF. As Tamar 
                                                   
21 “U.S.-Spanish Base Negotiations,” April 16, 1970; Spain vol 2 Mar 1970-Jul 1970; box 705; Country 
Files – Europe, NSC Files; RNL. 
22 Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, “Estados Unidos, ¿soporte del fraquismo o germen de la 
democracia?,” 296-7. 
23 Briefing Book for Madrid Visit, October 2, 1970; Visit of Richard Nixon Briefing Book Spain; box 468; 






Groves and Mariano González Delgado explain, international actors like UNESCO 
assisted in importing U.S. experimental pedagogy to Spain.25 
While the United States government supported the educational reforms through 
the NMAs of the base agreements, the FF provided a representative to help in the drafting 
and implementation of the reforms. The role of Peter Fraenkel in the General Law of 
Education cannot be underestimated in its importance to the transition to democracy. 
Fraenkel helped Spain integrate a new educational system just as the country began 
transitioning from authoritarianism to constitutional monarchy. He was also a natural 
choice for the FF because of his history of observing education in Spain. Fraenkel visited 
the country in 1968 for a month to witness the Spanish educational system in Madrid, 
Barcelona, San Sebastian, Pamplona, and Bilbao. One major problem Fraenkel witnessed 
was the access to education. He explained that for secondary education only 24 percent of 
men and 18 percent of women were enrolled, and in higher education the percentage was 
5 percent of men and 1 percent of women.26 Fraenkel used a specific example of 
Bilbao—what he referred to as the “Pittsburgh of Spain”—which only had two public 
high schools with enrollments of approximately 3,000 each for a city of roughly 370,000 
and more than 500,000 in the greater metropolitan area.27 One purpose of his journey to 
Spain was to speak for the FF’s events in Spain and discover possible partnerships 
between schools and universities with the Foundation. Some of the suggestions included 
collaboration in planning new universities, fellowship programs for young Spaniards, 
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short-term study abroad funds, and a special program for applied social sciences. 
Fraenkel was adamant that the FF work in Spain. He wrote in a report: 
Spain is at the end of an era. This era began thirty years ago. No one knows how 
long the end of the old era may last—nor what the nature of the new era will be 
when it begins. But the period of transition from the old era into the new one is 
underway. Thus, the present is for Spain a time of introspection and analysis, of 
planning and preparation for the future. It is a most uncertain time for all 
Spaniards—but it is a time also of restlessness and great expectations, particularly 
for youth. It is an unusually propitious time for the Foundation to systematically 
study Spain — and perhaps also cautiously to begin to expand our hitherto so 
modest investments in that country.28 
 
Fraenkel concluded that though Spain was about to undergo a difficult transition, the FF 
should be as involved in the country as much as possible.  
 Fraenkel continued to monitor the educational reform in Spain and work as a 
liaison with the Foundation. He detailed how the reform was set forth in the Libro 
Blanco. Yet, Fraenkel worried that Spain may end up pushing a full reform effort without 
assistance from anyone including the United States. Fraenkel met with members of the 
State Department who voiced concern that “they can see no way of special U.S. 
Government assistance to Spanish education except by tying such assistance in some way 
as a form of ‘payment’ for the right to use the bases.”29 There was some discussion of 
sending appropriations of the Fulbright program in Spain to the reform effort. Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson stressed that the money Spain hoped for 
“was not available” at the magnitude proposed.30 Fraenkel stressed the importance of the 
FF helping Spain in the reform effort through staff advancement and three other specific 
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developments. He proposed a collaboration with the Institutes of Educational Science, a 
FF collaboration with the Faculty of Economics at the new Autonomous University of 
Madrid, or providing the service of Professor Severo Ochoa, a Spanish physician and co-
winner of the 1959 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine.31 Yet, Fraenkel did highlight 
the risks of the FF working in Spain. He described Spanish society, particularly the 
private sector, as divided sharply over those who supported and those who opposed the 
reform. As Tamar Groves and Cecilia Milito Barone explain, this pattern is representative 
of Spanish social divisions over modernizing the nation itself. Those who supported the 
reform believed the “democratic education” would legitimize Spain on a national and 
international stage, but those who opposed said the reform’s “egalitarian tone” believed it 
would destabilize the regime.32   
 The Spanish Ministry of Education stressed with urgency the creation of an 
Institute of Educational Sciences in all universities. Education Minister José Luis Villar 
Palasí wrote to Fraenkel that these institutes would improve teaching methods and “meet 
the needs of training teachers and readapting them to the present requirements.”33 
Further, they would carry out the necessary research to promote continuous 
modernization in teaching methods. Fraenkel worked with Lawrence A. Cremin, a 
professor at the Teachers College Columbia University, to identify nine American 
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universities to send Spaniards to learn educational theory and practice. These included 
Columbia, Harvard, Chicago, Cornell, Stanford, Johns Hopkins, Cal-Berkley, and 
Princeton.34 In April 1970, the FF approved a $400,000 grant for the Institute of 
International Education and support of educational modernization and reform in Spain. A 
large portion of this funding was used in support of fellowships for Spanish educators to 
study abroad, but other funding included a small number of short-term consultants for 
specific assignments in Spain.35 
 The 1970 General Law of Education represented a massive step toward the 
aperturismo. The law and the Basic General Education sought to provide equal 
opportunities for elementary education. Further, the coordination of curriculum, 
providing teachers with new pedagogy, and the formation of teacher working groups 
showed that Spain was, for the first time under Franco, forward-looking instead of 
backward. Spanish teachers “had a great deal of freedom to choose their teaching 
techniques.”36 The U.S. had an opportunity to help shepherd in a modernized Spain to the 
world. While the FF did so with Fraenkel, the U.S. government instead chose to focus on 
helping themselves defensively. Fraenkel worked with educators and government official 
to build ties and prepare educational exchanges for Spanish teachers. Yet, the Nixon 
administration chose to attach U.S. funding to these exchanges if Spain signed the bases 
agreement. 
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The Ford Foundation After 1970 
Over the next four years, Fraenkel sporadically returned to Spain to evaluate the 
progress of educational reform efforts. Some of the achievements that Fraenkel 
highlighted in 1971 include the decentralization of the public-school system, citizen 
participation in education, and institute the new Basic General Education.37 Yet, he 
pointed to immediate and practical problems with the reform that included teacher 
assignments and financing. The Spanish Civil Service consisted of distinctive Cuerpos, 
which Fraenkel explains is “a Spanish word having many of the connotations of the 
English ‘corps.’”38 To teach the new Basic General Education grades, the Spanish Civil 
Service created a new Cuerpo. Members of the older education Cuerpos demanded 
automatic membership to the new group. Debates over who would teach the upper four 
grades of the new eight-year schools and over qualifications for teaching certain subjects 
slowed progress of the reform efforts. So did labor unrest. Since strikes were still illegal 
in Spain, teachers had sporadic “absences” and “stoppages” along with public protests 
and slowdowns during the winter and spring of 1970 and 1971.39 The factors that 
triggered these strikes dealt with who qualified to teach which grades and delays in their 
salaries.40 The Ministry of Education’s extraordinary difficulties in obtaining financing 
and disbursing funds further slowed reforms. Fraenkel defended the leaders of the reform 
by saying the system they were working within was “a labyrinthic maze of procedures in 
support of procedures, controls upon controls, and approvals of approvals.”41 While the 
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reform law represented a push towards aperturismo, the Franco regime did not try to 
support it. 
Other problems that Fraenkel highlighted in 1971 included a reshuffling of the 
Ministry of Education, infighting on educational plans, and poor classrooms and 
textbooks. Fraenkel continued to monitor the educational reform efforts in Spain, and the 
Ministry of Education continued to request his presence. In 1972, Fraenkel hosted a 
visiting professor of economic history, Craufurd Goodwin, who witnessed the evolving 
education scene of Spain. They visited a few universities, including the Autonomous 
University of Madrid. However, the visit to the Madrid campus was poorly timed as 
violence broke out the day of their visit. The Guardia Civil arrested the student 
government leader, and students protested by breaking windows on campus.42 Despite the 
campus protest, Goodwin applauded the social scientists at the university. Goodwin 
explained they received information “about the complexities of policy-oriented research 
when the problems under examination (e.g. our favorites of ethnic tensions, migration, 
and regional government).”43 
In June 1974, the FF gave the Indiana University Foundation $149,000 for 
Fraenkel to leave his position at the university to become a consultant for the Ministry in 
hopes of improving education funding in Spain. One of the major difficulties was how to 
spend the NMAs from the 1970 Agreement. Upon returning to Spain, Frankel oversaw 
the selection and training of staff as well as developed a strategy for the NMA aspects of 
the agreement. The Ministry of Education received only $3 million of the possible $9 
million available from the agreement. At the end of his time there, Fraenkel reported the 
                                                   







“serious dissatisfaction” from the Ministry of Education, USIS posts, and others over 
how the money had been spent.44 Fraenkel pointed to complaints regarding “lack of 
publicity, alleged personal favoritism, the absence of coordination between the [NMA] 
program and the objectives of the Ministry, and in general concerning alleged 
ineffectiveness and inefficiency of organization and management.”45 While the tumult 
occurred in implementing the funds, chaos occurred outside. Fraenkel explained the 
Minister became “absorbed by attempting to maintain ‘law and order’ and the physical 
safety of teachers and students” as calls for better implementation of reform grew.46 
Despite the chaos surrounding his time there, Fraenkel worked out a program with the 
minister. The groundwork included a national training program for young university 
teaching personnel in business administration. Those selected from Spanish Faculties of 
Economics, of Law, and of Political Science were chosen to be sent to the United States 
to learn methods and return to Spain to implement them. 
Fraenkel returned to Spain in 1976 as the Spanish transition began in earnest. He 
visited Madrid, Barcelona, Salamanca, and Sevilla to discuss the FF’s new funding 
program, the Southern European Fellowship program. During his trip, Fraenkel met with 
several social scientists who welcomed the new fellowship “with enthusiasm and with 
genuine interest wherever [he] presented it,” despite the cloud of uncertainty at the time. 
47 While meeting with the various departments in Spain, Fraenkel pointed to three facts 
that affected the number of Spanish candidates. First, the new Treaty of Friendship 
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signed between the United States and Spain offered $7 million for five years for 
educational, cultural, and scientific exchanges. Second, the politics and uncertainty of the 
political future of Spain deterred some applicants. Fraenkel explained that it was 
“difficult to forecast the effect, encouraging or discouraging” on the interest and 
readiness of an applicant to leave Spain for six months to a year.48 Finally, Spain 
announced a sharp increase in the number of oposiciones that summer, which are exams a 
person must pass to become a Spanish public worker such as a public school teacher, 
police officer, etc.49 This meant that those who were non-tenured and interested in joining 
the workforce could not abruptly leave Spain for a short period. 
In the 1980s, the FF became interested in funding conferences and academic 
writings on the Spanish transition to democracy and the importance of Spain to the world. 
Freedom House, an NGO that advocates democracy, received a grant to hold a 
conference in Madrid on “Freedom, Dissent and the Western Alliance.” The conference 
explored the future of the Helsinki Accords and discussed the emerging dissent figures.50 
In addition, the Instituto de Cuestiones Internacionales (INCI) received two separate 
grants. The first was partial support for a conference on Spanish security options, and the 
second was a matching grant for possible work on Spain’s defensive relationship with 
Latin America. The FF staff wrote that the INCI tried to do in a short time what was 
never done under the Franco regime: “to establish a center of independent discussion on 
Spain’s foreign policy, international relations, and security problems.”51 In 1983, 
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Georgetown University received funding for partial support of a symposium on political 
security in Spain, which discussed Spain’s integration into the European Community, 
NATO, and diplomacy with Central America.52 In 1986, Procedural Aspects of 
International Law Institute received support for a research project on autonomy, 
sovereignty, and self-determination. The project, which turned into an 850-page 
manuscript, used Spain as a representation of a Western developed country and the 
Basque country as a case study for separatist movements.53 
The FF role in Spain after the 1970 General Education Law is slight, but one 
cannot discount the importance the NGO played. Fraenkel’s role in the development and 
implementation of the reform provides a transitional dimension to the Spanish domestic 
reform. The 1970 law established an egalitarian approach to education, something that 
did not exist under the Franco dictatorship. Even after the early problems of 
implementation, Fraenkel and the FF remained interested in Spanish educational 
development. This continued into the 1980s when Spain and the transition became a 
major topic on the global stage. The transition to democracy Western security played an 
integral role in academic research and the FF willingly funded these ventures. 
Fulbright After 1970 
Though the FF remained interested in the implementation of the General Law of 
Education, the Fulbright program continued to push the initiatives to develop U.S. soft 
power. After the General Education Law passed, American Studies programs began 
adding more faculty members through exchanges. In 1971-1972, Spanish and American 
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universities increasingly showed interest in exchanging faculty members. The University 
of Seville and the University of North Carolina signed an agreement, and the 
Autonomous University of Madrid began negotiations with Indiana University and the 
University of Wisconsin for exchanges.54 Several Spanish universities across the various 
regions of the country established Chairs in American Studies. By 1976, the largest parts 
of appropriations and considerable amounts of time went to developing chairs in 
American Studies. The University of Salamanca established an Anglo-American Studies 
Association, and the University of Seville hosted an International Conference on 
American Civilization in collaboration with the American Studies Association of the 
United States.55 Due to the growing popularity of these programs, Fulbright began to 
reevaluate whether to house American Studies in English departments or make them 
stand-alone departments. 
The General Law of Education prompted a change in the Fulbright program. 
Instead of focusing on teaching English, the emphasis would be placed on educational 
development to fit the projected need of compulsory education. This included sending 
U.S. professors who could “prepare teachers at the primary, secondary, and university 
levels” in fields like mathematics, physics, economics, sociology, and public 
administration.56 Fulbright simultaneously outlined an objective to prepare Spanish 
specialists in the United States and send a bilingual American specialist to aid the 
Spanish Institutes of Educational Sciences. By 1975, Fulbright reported that former 
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Spanish grantees returned to Spain to establish themselves successfully within the 
academic community.57 The program began focusing on applied sciences concurrently 
with educational development. This dealt with support of technological progress in Spain, 
specifically urbanization and construction, infrastructure, agriculture, and forestry.58 The 
reason for the new stress on applied sciences dealt with an increase of Spanish students 
into technical schools of engineering because of educational reform. The United States 
believed that emphasizing applied sciences was to increase knowledge in Spain on 
American science and send Spanish students to the United States “who will eventually 
return to Spain as U.S. trained specialists to teach and continue their research at Spanish 
universities.”59 
Another method Fulbright used during the 1970s was sending Short-Term 
American Grantees (STAG) and American Specialists (AMSPEC) for thematic programs. 
The STAGs and AMSPECs voyaged abroad to examine and instruct on specific subjects 
chosen that year by USIS posts. For example, in 1975, USIS Madrid requested an 
AMSPEC in university management to visit for a co-sponsored event with the Ministry 
of Education’s Institute for Educational Research (INCIE). The ten-day seminar work 
shopped new practices of university management.60 Another instance in 1975 dealt with 
USIS Madrid plans to hold a program on security issues of détente and East-West 
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relations on international trade. They requested at least one STAG and a government 
spokesman with suggestions such as the father of containment George Kennan and future 
National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski.61 During the 1975-76 school year, USIS 
Madrid appeared clairvoyant as they decided on programs with themes of democracy and 
NATO. Both these played vital roles in projecting the United States to Spain, especially 
as this was the school year that Franco died, and the transition began. The post aimed 
“The Federalist Experience in American History” for April 1976, and proposed a 
security, deterrence, and NATO seminar for February and March of that same year.62  
The late 1970s brought change to the Fulbright program and stagnation. In April 
1978, the USIA and the State Department’s Bureau of Cultural and Educational Affairs 
(CU) merged to form the United States International Communication Agency (ICA).63 
The Fulbright program, which had been housed at CU, was now under the umbrella of 
ICA and the exchange programs became part of the information program.64 ICA 
alongside Jimmy Carter worked to strengthen cultural exchanges especially with the 
“successor generation.” This was the young adult demographic in Western Europe that 
had no personal experience in World War II or the Marshall Plan. The exchange 
programs of ICA allowed the United States to interact with youths “with ways of thinking 
and decision-making that took a close transatlantic relationship for granted.”65 The focus 
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from Carter was to strengthen exchange programs under USICA, but the funding for the 
Fulbright program reached lows under his administration. 
In addition to the ICA, the late 1970s saw a steady decline in funding for 
educational exchanges. The United States contributions began declining during the 1974-
75 school year from $617,000 to $183,429; and, by 1978, U.S. contributions strained to 
reach $180,000.66 Spain, like some other European governments, increased their financial 
contributions to Fulbright exchanges.67 The largest contribution made by Spain was in 
1976 with $132,302, the same year the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation went into 
effect. These budgetary limitations greatly affected the number of participants from both 
countries. The total number of participants in the 1980-1981 school year was nine—four 
Americans and five Spaniards.68 
Despite the cut in funding, the Fulbright program had a few new initiatives 
planned for Spain to develop soft power. Labor, the university community, and media 
became new focuses during the 1977-1978 academic year. These choices are interesting 
as these subjects were either legalized or underwent dramatic shifts from the Franco era. 
The United States planned to send labor leaders who were “of signal importance” to 
Spain, which included young trade union leaders, labor lawyers, and labor journalists.69 
The reason labor was given priority was because of the legalization of trade unions. 
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Second and third priority were political decisionmakers and top economists, specifically 
anyone who dealt in important U.S.-Spain interests like energy, food policy, trade 
negotiations, environment, and consumer issues.70 There was also interest in journalism 
as the transition to democracy allowed more freedom of the press. USIS Madrid believed 
the trend of liberalizing and editorializing the news would turn the media into the 
“opinion molders and makers.”71 Therefore, journalist tours of the United States became 
vital to plans for 1978. This included up to three journalists per trip that focused on 
public opinion polls and military affairs. USIS Madrid identified prime interests of 
Spanish journalists would be the “1978 House and Senate elections, the general trend in 
American politics and society, and the U.S./Spain/NATO/EEC relationships.”72 Further, 
these journalists would incorporate regional areas such as the Basques and Catalans. 
By the 1980s, the Fulbright program in Spain underwent dramatic changes by 
involving the private sector to new program initiatives. Edward C. McBride became the 
cultural attaché at the Madrid embassy in the late 1980s. He described how Felipe 
González wanted an expansion of the Fulbright program, and the United States happily 
obliged. The base agreement provided funds for educational exchanges, especially for 
Fulbright, but the United States opened funding opportunities from the private sector. 
McBride believed this “would be my most significant accomplishment in Spain.”73 When 
he entered the program it was funded with $2.5 million, but the budget exceeded $10 
million when he left.74 McBride and the embassy approached a number of private 
companies to provide funds, such as IBM, Ford, and Merrill Lynch. These companies 










sponsored copious scholarships and branded them as well such as the Fulbright-IBM 
scholarship or Fulbright-Ford scholarship. McBride explained the terms were exclusive 
with the companies: 
The agreement we struck with the companies in exchange for their contribution 
was unique, and they had no say so on the selection or the discipline or anything. 
They were very generous about it. But what we did agree was the candidates who 
went off on these grants, when they came back from Spain, the IBM or whoever 
the sponsor was, had the first crack at employing that individual, and if they 
wanted to offer him a job, that was fine. He had no obligation to take it, but they 
had the first right of refusal so to speak.75 
 
Similarly, Spain brought private companies into the fold for Fulbright funding. In March 
1979, the Bank of Bilbao’s Board of Directors approved the funding of a new grant 
program for Spanish graduate students to study in the United States.76  
While they sought new methods of funding, the Fulbright program also 
considered new and different subjects for educational exchanges including Spanish 
Studies, Environmental Studies, student counselling, and a return to science and 
technology. Due to an increase in demands for U.S. graduate students, Fulbright initiated 
a new project on Spanish Studies where students used funding for research on doctoral 
dissertations and performing arts. Further, there was increasing interest among Spanish 
students to travel to the United States to learn about the U.S. educational system for 
comparison to the Spanish educational reforms. This spurred Fulbright to begin a student 
counseling program for Spanish exchange students to study at the undergraduate and 
graduate level. In addition, the contributions from the Bank of Bilbao brought specialized 
programs. Subjects that had been under the Applied Sciences—ecology, urban 
development, energy sources, and transportation—moved to Environmental Studies 
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thanks to the donations of the Bank of Bilbao.77 Yet, the major initiative of funding from 
both the Fulbright and from the bases agreement in the 1980s dealt with science and 
technology. By 1984, the program explained that the greatest number of grantees 
concentrated on science or technology fields, which included agrarian science, public 
health, chemistry, telecommunications, earth science, engineering, life sciences, 
mathematics, and physics.78 In addition, over sixty U.S. universities operated a summer 
or full-year program in Spain with the Spanish scientific community working closely 
with the United States for research projects.79 
 Like the Fulbright program using the base agreement for funds, the United States 
and Spain continued their work on science and technology cooperation that the 
agreements established. A prominent figure in the development of science and 
technology in U.S.-Spain relations was Francis M. Kinnelly. He served as the science and 
technology attaché in the Economic Section of the Madrid embassy from 1981 to 1985. 
During this period, the program saw funding rise from $4 million annually to $7 million, 
which Kinnelly explains was “a very heady sum.”80 The lead institutions in the 
development of science and technology were the State Department and the Foreign 
Ministry. Kinnelly worked with Fidel López Álvarez and Antonio de Oyarzábal, the latter 
becoming the Spanish ambassador to the United States in 1996. The Spanish took the 
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initiative and created proposals for joint research sent to American researchers.81 
However, Americans often joined the initiatives because they offered them research 
opportunities outside of the United States.  
Kinnelly details a few projects between the United States and Spain. One project 
Kinnelly highlights dealt with solar technology. In Almería, Spain built a solar tower that 
reflected rays onto solar panels.82 While Americans could do similar research in 
California, Kinnelly argues that the Plataforma Solar de Almería provided U.S. scientists 
an opportunity to develop and test new technology. Another project Fulbright funded 
dealt with marine biology. Ken Tenore from Georgia Tech headed one research project. 
A team of Spanish and American scientists researched the Spanish rías, long inlets on the 
Galician coast. Kinnelly explained, “There were very strong upwelling of water on the 
Atlantic shelf outside the rías that brought in water very rich in nutrients. As a result, 
there is a tremendous production of mussels and other fisheries inside these rías.”83 This 
study produced a number of academic papers and began a boom of marine biology in 
Spain. Kinnelly details how the United States brought young Spanish scientists to 
American universities to earn doctorates in marine biology and then return to Spain.  
Yet, the major project between the United States and Spain dealt with nuclear 
energy and weapons. Spain had over eight major power reactors under operation and six 
under construction by beginning of the Reagan administration. However, the construction 
of a plant in Bilbao caused a halt in nuclear power plants in Spain. ETA attacked or 
assassinated directors of the project, set fires, and sent threats, which forced those in 
charge to halt plans for other reactors. In addition, General Electric and Westinghouse 








worked with Spanish counterparts to build a plant to produce nuclear fuel for reactors. 
However, the United States discovered that the Spanish military considered using the 
manufactured fuel for nuclear powered submarines that would protect the Canary Islands. 
This controversial decision gave the United States the ability to sell the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty, which Spain had not signed. As Kinnelly explains, 
When we finally found this out, we were able to explain to the Spanish military 
that if they joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the treaty permitted 
countries to develop nuclear technology for defensive nonweapons purposes. 
They would be free to build a nuclear powered submarine, but they would have to 
do this on their own, without outside help. Under the treaty, they couldn’t put 
nuclear missiles on these subs, but they had no plans to do that in any case. We 
also had experts explain to them that the technology involved at this fuel 
fabrication plant just wouldn’t work. So, finally, they decided to join the 
Nonproliferation Treaty. And they eventually gave up on the idea of building 
nuclear subs.84 
 
While these scientific projects worked with transnational companies, there was some 
resistance within Spain on cooperation with the United States on science and technology. 
Kinnelly explains that Spanish laboratories were making links to northern Europe, and 
many of the labs at universities were resistant of the United States. The universities “were 
very insular still … [and] it was rather difficult to get them to move out of their shells, 
even when there were so many opportunities to work with American scientists.”85 
 Education in Spain played a pivotal role in the aperturismo and the Spanish 
transition to democracy. It helped invite modernity into Spanish society. The 1970 
General Law of Education helped spark equitable access to education for these outside 
the upper classes in Spain. This further spread democratic ideals to the regions of Spain, 
and the United States capitalized on this by using educational exchanges for soft power. 
Both the GO and NGO played a role in the development and implementation of the 







General Law. Yet, it was Fraenkel and the FF who provided the most help to the Ministry 
of Education during the reform efforts. The Fulbright program and U.S. government 
remained interested in the development of American Studies programs to put in 
classrooms for all Spanish citizens. 
 However, as the transition began, the FF became less involved in educational 
exchanges in Spain and more involved with Spain’s place in academia. The use of 
Spain’s transition to democracy as an example for academics allowed the country to 
become a major talking point. Yet, the FF rarely gave money to those studying in Spain, 
instead focusing on conferences and publications. This allowed the Fulbright program to 
be the lone organization in exchanges with Spain. Despite inconsistences with funding, 
Fulbright allowed the United States to develop soft power by integrating specific subjects 
into exchanges. These subjects often occurred during key moments of the transition, such 
as the focus on journalism as Spain gained freedom of the press. 
 As Brademas said in his speech at NYU, the role of education and culture are 
pivotal to the development of peace and understanding. The United States and Spain 
understood this during the transition to democracy. The FF and Fulbright worked 
together to produce U.S. soft power in Spain. The FF played a key role in the growth of 
education reform. Further, during the early years of the transition, the FF provided money 
for educational exchanges. Fulbright continually worked with the Spanish Ministry of 
Education to provide exchanges between the two countries. The FF and Fulbright 
illustrate how a GO and NGO can work together towards the same end, despite differing 














D is for Democracy: 




At 1:14 AM on February 24, 1981, King Juan Carlos I of Spain sat at a desk to 
speak to the Spanish people via a live television broadcast. In the previous hours, the 
Spanish military held the government hostage in an attempted coup d’état, which the 
leaders claimed to be doing at the express orders of the king. Those within Spain watched 
as Lieutenant-Colonel Antonio Tejero led Guardia Civil officers into Congress to disrupt 
the confirmation of new Prime Minister Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo. Throughout these 
eighteen hours, Spaniards watched replays of the coup and news updates as the military 
continued to hold the government hostage. However, Juan Carlos did not approve of this 
coup and went on television to denounce it. He stoically griped a piece of paper, dressed 
in his military uniform, and sat in front of the Spanish coat of arms. Juan Carlos looked 
directly into the camera and explained the situation to his country. He concluded by 
stating, “The Crown cannot tolerate, in any degree, the actions that interferes with the 
constitution approved by the Spanish people.” In one and a half minutes, the King united 





The broadcast of 23-F illustrates how important the medium of television was to 
solidifying Spanish democracy. Public television broadcast the parliamentary session of 
Calvo-Sotelo’s confirmation, and replayed the coup several times throughout the night. 
The danger of broadcasting the coup was sending a message that democracy was in peril. 
As historian H. Rosi Song illustrates, the role of public television “was to firmly establish 
the narrative of the political transition being engineered by the political elite.”1 With the 
political actors of the transition taken hostage, doubts may have been sewed among the 
public regarding the transition. This makes Juan Carlos’s declaration such an important 
aspect of 23-F failure. Juan Carlos, the symbol of the new Spanish democracy, went on 
television and proclaimed that the generals were not acting in his name. His message 
played to millions of Spaniards in the late hours of the night, and it “encouraged many 
key institutions that had hitherto remained silent … to issue statements in support of 
democracy.”2  
Television is an interesting medium and technology to utilize when analyzing the 
soft power of a nation. The wide availability of television sets in certain countries allows 
for a broader dissemination of information. Spain was no different. Though newspapers 
and radios were major forms of communication that the public used, televisions became a 
growing interest to Spaniards and the availability grew throughout the 1970s and 1980s. 
The USIA used television as a method to engage directly with the Spanish public through 
news programs and documentaries regarding current political developments in the United 
States. During the latter years of the Franco regime, USIS Madrid worked with state-run 
TVE to broadcast American specials and news programs. In addition, television was a 
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critical aspect of the Spanish transition to democracy. Television liberalized as Spain did. 
TVE moved from state-run TV to channels for cultural programing and the creation of 
channels for autonomous regions as the transition continued  
The wider availability of televisions occurred in Spain as the educational reforms 
of the 1970s happened. This led Spanish producers to consider the development of 
children’s educational television. The use of educational programming for children gave 
the United States a new venue to promote American soft power. However, the most 
famous example of international children’s programming was not through USIA but 
through an NGO. CTW had success with other nations in creating co-productions of 
educational programming. With Spain, CTW mirrored their approach with Latin America 
with the creation of Barrio Sésamo. However, cultural differences between Spanish and 
American producers nearly brought the show down before the airing of the pilot. Yet, 
CTW learned from their issues in the first season of Barrio Sésamo with other programs 
and the second season.  
USIA and Television in Spain 
The advent of television provided the USIA with a new channel to dispense 
public diplomacy. Burnett Anderson, a Public Affairs Officer (PAO) at USIS Madrid, 
produced a study in which he explored the history of television in Spain, what programs 
TVE airs, and who is the audience for Spanish television. Though initially autonomous, 
state television took control in October 1962. Anderson explained that TVE aired 
“approximately 70 hours per week with an additional 6 hours per week dedicated to 
educational television.”3 The programs that TVE aired underwent a double scrutiny of 
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censorship. First, “advisory commissions” inspected the programs, and then underwent 
“content evaluation.”4 Around 30 percent of the programs aired were of foreign origin 
with over three-fourths of programming from the United States. However, Spain 
predominately received foreign news from Eurovision. TVE expanded to a second 
channel—UHF— which broadcast cultural programs like concerts and plays. To fit this 
plan and the call for more production, TVE looked to expand out of the studios at the 
Prado del Rey into larger, separate facilities. 
 In 1969, USIA contracted the Instituto de la Opinion Publica in Madrid to study 
the media habits of targeted groups. These groups included university professors, 
secondary school teachers, university students, businesspersons, media leaders, and 
political leaders. The study group compiled a sample of 1,205 people from Madrid, 
Cataluña, Bilbao, and Andalucía. The questions for the study included what domestic 
and/or foreign newspapers and magazines were read, how often and at what times did the 
participants watch television, and how often and what radio programs did the participants 
listen to.5 In June 1970, the USIA received the completed survey, which produced some 
surprising results. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) was the most listened to 
foreign radio, and Radio Moscow had more listenership than the Voice of America. 
Thirty-three percent claimed “never to listen to radio,” 21 percent claimed to listen every 
day, 19 percent listened to FM stations, and less than one percent listened to shortwave 
radios.6 A small portion of those surveyed read foreign newspapers and magazines with 
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the French titles of Le Monde and Paris Match being the most read.7 Fifty-eight percent 
of the sample claimed to receive their information on world events from the press and 
only 19 percent from television.8  
While radio and newspapers appeared to control how the Spanish populace saw 
their media, television had the widest audience. According to the survey, 83 percent 
watch television at least once a week.9 Viewership cut across occupational and age 
categories, but university students and professors claimed they never watched 
television.10 The prevailing viewership came during “primetime”—9:30 P.M. to 
midnight. Most commonly, news programs aired during this time slot. Besides the news 
other productions viewed included those dealing with international issues and 
presentations of classical and popular music, but the least popular were quiz shows.11 Old 
movies, such as The Benny Goodman Story and various films of Clark Gable and Marilyn 
Monroe films, were broadcast during primetime as well to great popularity.12 In the most 
striking aspect of the survey, most of the media information from the U.S. Embassy was 
only received by political and media leaders as opposed to students and university 
professors. What the results of the survey showed to the USIA was that they were not 
breaking Europe’s hold of the press and radio. However, television may provide an 
opening. Students claimed to receive much of their news from television. This survey 
provided the United States with the knowledge that to reach the younger demographic 
they needed to provide news programs, documentaries, and cultural programs to sway the 
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television audience. The USIA utilized soft power to provide the Spanish audience with 
the American news, politics, and entertainment. 
This survey gave the USIA some problems to consider in their approach to Spain. 
One was the viewership of the Apollo XI mission. Often the USIA provided films that 
dealt with the Apollo program, but some included television programs. Though Spain 
received a plethora of space public diplomacy, only 36 percent saw a documentary on the 
Apollo XI mission, and of those only 7 percent saw it at a theater. However, of those who 
saw films related to the Apollo mission, 26 percent saw it on television.13 Even though 
Juan Carlos and Sofía promoted space and science, the small viewership numbers depicts 
a Spanish public not as captivated by space travel as the Spanish royals were. Another 
issue was the foot traffic at American sites in Spain. According to those surveyed, 82 
percent never visited Casa Americana, 93 percent never visited the North American 
Institute in Barcelona, and, of those who were leaders, only 13 percent received their 
news from the American Embassy. Finally, the survey also produced one glaring issue. 
The questionnaire asked if there was a difference or harmony between the United States 
and Spain. Only 21 percent felt cohesion between the United States and Spain, 31 percent 
believed differences existed, and the perceptions of these differences increased with 
youths.14 Though the issues existed, this sample group provided the USIA with the 
knowledge of the wide television audience in the Spanish regions. 
 In a document from the next year, Albert Harkness, Jr., a PAO at USIS Madrid, 
produced a report for USIA on the use of television and radio in Spain in 1971. This 
report showed dramatic changes in just a single year of Spanish television. Harkness 
                                                   






provided a breakdown of the program categories played by TVE. News and coverage of 
public events were 30 percent of programs, music and entertainment were 33 percent, 
educational and cultural programs were 32 percent, and political content was 5 percent.15 
A significant detail in the report discussed the growth of Spanish television sets. 
Harkness explains that Spanish television was “experiencing growing pains” as the total 
number of television sets grew from 2,500,000 to 4,000,000 in just two years.16 This 
expansion of television sets in Spain provided TVE with a much wider viewing audience, 
and, in theory, amplification of USIS Madrid’s content. However, TVE held final control 
over material shown to the country, and this is evident with the fallout of the Burgos trial. 
Harkness revealed that TVE provided their domestic audience a full account of the trial 
proceedings but only gave the Spanish government’s point of view. This clashed with the 
foreign news portrayal of the trial, which illustrated the tough stance of the Franco 
regime. The commutation of the sentences gave foreign publics a “happy note, but left 
many questions in the minds of Spanish listeners unanswered regarding their image in the 
rest of the world.”17 Further, Harkness contends that the coverage of the Burgos trial 
hindered the prestige of some foreign media, especially the BBC because Spaniards now 
believed it was no longer objective. 
 USIS Madrid provided several television programs and films to TVE to broadcast 
because of the newly expanded viewership and the fallout of the Burgos trial coverage. 
These programs provided the United States with soft power. Nye argues that a country’s 
soft power rests on three resources—its culture, its political values, and its foreign 
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policies.18 These three coalesced into the television programs and films given to TVE. As 
historian Pablo León-Aguinaga explains, the USIS’s workload was twofold: “it had to act 
as intermediary between the public-service entity and American private broadcasters in 
the purchase of broadcasting rights and provide informative material for TVE news, 
mainly through the provisions of the USIA ‘Washington Correspondent’ format and 
documentaries on specific subjects.”19 Further, the United States was aware that the 
younger generation of Spain—part of the “successor generation” in Western Europe—
was watching the United States. In a memorandum to the State Department and USIA, 
USIS Madrid explained that this generation did not witness World War II and could not 
see the United States’ ability “to solve its own internal domestic problems and divisions. 
What we do at home to put our own house in order will be closely watched [in Spain].”20 
With this dual assignment, USIS Madrid utilized soft power by showing programs that 
emphasized U.S.-Spanish cultural harmony, providing media that explored the issue of 
race in the United States, and began showing Spaniards how the American democratic 
process worked. 
The United States considered how to disprove the Spanish belief that the United 
States and Spain had fundamental differences that previous media surveys illustrated. 
USIS Madrid sent material to TVE to “project a simpática image of the United States in 
Spain.”21 One example was a television program that featured Ambassador Robert Hill 
being honored at the ranch of Spain’s number one bullfighter, Manuel Benitez “El 
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Cordobes.” Another attempt to improve the image of the United States was the airing of 
“Black Revolution.” This two-part documentary explored the Civil Rights Movement in 
the United States. TVE co-produced and aired “Black Revolution” during the primetime 
slot. The production claimed to be a “generally objective and sympathetic” view, and 
hoped to “engender an improved understanding in Spain of the complexity of this 
topic.”22 Further, it could help boost the United States over the BBC, which still faced 
issues of objectivity from the Burgos trial. “Black Revolution” provided a positive 
experience between USIS Madrid and TVE and led to the consideration of airing two 
additional specials on the United States. The first discussed ecology and the issues of air 
pollution, and the second was about the upcoming 1972 primary elections. The second 
special is of interest because it gave the United States an avenue to illustrate how 
American style democracy worked.  
Following the death of Franco and as the transition began, television censorship 
slowly evolved with the rise of regional television. During the debates on the Moncloa 
Pacts in 1977, the Socialists and Communists insisted on RTVE becoming objective and 
ending state run television. Spain passed the Statute of Radio and Television in 1980 as 
another expansion of television ownership occurred. The law “established norms to 
ensure a plurality of political influence over the national network, … to order state 
guarantees that broadcasting be treated as an essential public service, to protect open and 
free expression, and to suggest that the autonomous regional communities of Spain might 
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have new broadcast channels operating in their zones.”23 Soon after this, Spanish regions 
began their own television services. The Basque began airing Euskal Telebista (ETB) in 
1983, Catalonia began TV-3 in 1983, and Galicia and Valencia shortly afterwards.24 
Further, the Third Channel Law passed in 1984 that denationalized television in Spain.  
All these laws and the attempted coup occurred as Spain witnessed a growth in 
household television sets and satellites. In research done by the USIA, the Spanish 
population in 1982 was 37.75 million, and over 10.5 million television sets were part of 
households.25 This is part of a larger pattern in Western Europe from 1975 to 1982. The 
number of television sets in 1975 in Western Europe was over 103,000,000, and by 1982 
that number grew to just over 149,000,000. This was a growth of 1.4 percent in eight 
years.26 Further research from the USIA showed that more Spaniards named television 
than any other mass media and academic studies “as their ‘most useful’ source of 
information on the United States.”27 The opportunity for new regional channels and wider 
availability of television sets expanded the use of USIA newscasts. One new venture was 
WORLDNET, which sent its own programs and newscasts that “offered a visual 
equivalent of [Voice of America]” for those with satellite dishes.28 The USIA sent two 
four-men teams to Europe to survey Embassy sites—one of which included Madrid—to 
decide whether they were structurally prepared for a TVRO (television receive-only) 
                                                   
23 Richard Maxwell “Spatial Eruptions, Global Grids: Regionalist TV in Spain and Dialectics of Identity 
Politics” in Refiguring Spain: Cinema, Media, Representation ed. Marsha Kinder (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1997), 261-2. 
24 Hooper, 313. 
25 “Trends in Worldwide Availability of Television Sets,” February 1, 1984; Television Studies, 1983-
1990; box 118; Subject Files 1953-2000; RG 306; NARA. 
26 Ibid. 
27 “Spanish Public Critical of Wide Range of U.S. Policies,” January 23, 1986; Spain-1986 (7); box RAC 4; 
Peter Sommer Files; White House Staff and Office Files; NSC Staff and Offices; RRL. 
28 Nicholas Cull, “Film as Public Diplomacy: The USIA’s Cold War at Twenty-Four Frames per Second,” 





dish.29 On June 2, 1983, the USIA began a three-month trial of a television news program 
for European audiences, the TV Satellite File. USIA Director Wick explained that a 
major objective of TV Satellite File was “to bring the highest levels of our 
Administration to foreign TV audiences through our programming.”30 This emphasis on 
news programs placed a reduced priority on other USIA programs. 
One of the major programs that saw a deficit of coverage was educational 
programing. Recall, León-Aguinaga’s assertion of USIS Madrid’s twofold purpose. The 
second objective of the USIS’s workload was selling private broadcasters. A specific 
example of a private company that worked with TVE to produce a co-production would 
be CTW. One producer of a children’s program in the 1980s explains that public 
television offered a chance for children’s television programs in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. However, she explains that while public television existed in Spain there was few 
educational programs, and “nobody in Spain is campaigning for education on TV.”31 This 
is significant because children’s programs offer a path for soft power. CTW helped 
produce a Spanish Sesame Street to fulfill the growing need for educational television in 
Spain. The soft power of children’s television is like educational exchanges in that both 
use American ideas and values that the United States can reinforce through pedagogy. 
Though CTW’s co-productions lend themselves to soft power goals, the background of 
productions leads to questions of whether the show is soft power or cultural imperialism. 
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In the case of Spain, CTW’s control of content, production notes, and cultural 
misunderstanding nearly damaged U.S. soft power.   
CTW and Barrio Sésamo 
Educational television in Spain prior to CTW and the creation of Barrio Sésamo 
was minimal. In January 1968, before the educational reform passed, TVE inaugurated a 
long-discussed idea of creating programming aimed at children and limited it to one hour 
per day on Monday through Saturday. PAO Anderson explained that TVE’s plan for 
educational programs was an “ambitious plan” to provide “a complete elementary 
education to those who cannot attend regular schools, or adults who missed the 
opportunity when they were children.”32 The long-range plans were to provide “standard 
secondary education leading to an official high school certificate.”33 This was an 
largescale plan to push education in Spain, but this would be taken up with the 
educational reform efforts to come later. Yet, the need for educational television series 
forced TVE to expand their studio facilities at the Prado del Rey. New separate studios 
began construction in the late 1960s for educational programs, but all productions had to 
halt until the building additions finished. Similarly, the emphasis on elementary 
audiences waited until the end of the Franco regime with CTW co-production. 
In early 1975, TVE approached CTW to request the rights for the broadcast of 
Sesame Street. Prior to this in the late 1960s, CTW and Jim Henson changed the 
production and reputation of educational television. Children’s programs should be the 
perfect balance of education and entertainment. Henson had previous experience working 
with the U.S. government. In 1961, the U.S. Department of Agriculture hosted a 
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weeklong U.S. Food Fair in Hamburg, Germany, and contacted Henson about performing 
one of his popular puppet acts. Henson and Jerry Juhl tested out new puppets—one of 
which became the Swedish Chef—and received rave reviews. The next year USIA sent 
Henson back to Germany, but this time to Berlin for Green Week.34 Later, Joan Ganz 
Cooney approached Henson about joining CTW to produce new programing that would 
be both educational and entertaining to children. Prior educational television had “stone-
faced educators either staring directly into the camera lecturing, or writing on a 
blackboard,” and CTW envisioned “a fun, fast-paced kids’ show with content steeped in 
the latest pedagogies and education research.”35 Henson agreed to work with CTW as 
long as he maintained ownership of the characters.36 This would be the model going 
forward for CTW when working with other creative teams. 
By the early 1970s, CTW began co-productions with other nations to create local 
versions of Sesame Street. As Charlotte F. Cole points out, most co-productions began “at 
(or near) junctions of revolutionary shift” within a country.37 Spain was no different as 
talks began the same year as Franco’s death. When CTW first entered a deal with a 
foreign nation, they provided dubbed versions of Sesame Street. If these proved popular, 
CTW signed a co-production deal with said nation. The initial proposal from RTVE was 
to broadcast eighteen minutes a day of original material for preschoolers, and use three to 
seven minutes of “Open Sesame” material, which is dubbed over original Sesame Street 
episodes.38 However, the proposal from RTVE was technically a co-production, which 
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CTW avoided early in negotiations with foreign broadcasters. Director of the 
International Division of CTW Lutrelle Horne explains that the proposal from RTVE 
“would be virtually impossible to maintain quality control because we would not be 
dealing with a CTW production, but something else.”39 CTW and TVE agreed following 
negotiations to air thirteen and a half minute programs, but CTW appeared to be 
apprehensive of their new partner. TVE paid 1,900 pesetas per minute and planned to air 
the program in Castilian Spanish in October 1975 on Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays, 
and Thursdays at 7:15 P.M.40 This aired during what is considered primetime for 
children’s programming just before primetime for adults.41 
 By September 1975, CTW and TVE began advertising the broadcast of ¡Abrete 
Sésamo!, the name designated for Spain’s version of “Open Sesame.” The press release 
described ¡Abrete Sésamo! as consisting of “puppet sketches, live action films, and 
animated cartoons which make for a fast moving, entertaining and educationally balanced 
format culturally applicable to Spain.”42 In addition, the press release emphasized that the 
program contained universal educational material, “including introduction to cognitive 
subjects such as relational concepts, recognizing geometric forms, letter and number 
identification and a wide range of affect topics under the heading of emotions and self-
identification. They also include subjects such as environment, the family and the home, 
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cooperation, social attitudes and social roles and functions.”43 This press release brings to 
the forefront an interesting issue regarding CTW co-productions. Though the company 
claims to provide other countries with topics that can easily cross cultures, foreign 
viewers often interpret the subjects of the show as American perspectives. The foreign 
audience is aware the show is made in the United States and thus cannot extract the 
shows from America. As Heather Hendershot explains, CTW’s perspective of their co-
productions is that “the bickering Ernie and Bert have no American qualities; their 
middle-class American clothing, apartment, and furniture are all neutral.”44 However, 
these distinctive American qualities come through to the television audience. This 
illustrates that though they were unaware, CTW provided the United States with soft 
power in Spain. The press responses to ¡Ábrete Sésamo! provide evidence for this. 
 The reaction to ¡Ábrete Sésamo! was predominately positive, but there were some 
within Spain who could not disassociate the show from the United States. CTW collected 
several reviews from newspapers and magazines throughout the many regions of Spain.45 
The positive reviews of the show emphasized the success Sesame Street had in the United 
States and the history of the program. According to a review in Ya, one of the most 
popular newspapers in Spain, ¡Ábrete Sésamo! was “a result of profound investigation of 
psychological characteristics of kids under 7 and their reactions in front of TV. From its 
beginning, [Sesame Street] has been considered revolutionary.”46 In addition, the 
magazine Garbo praised the show for using language directly for children, and applauded 
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the U.S. government for funding the non-profit organization that produced the original 
show.47 While the show received praise, there was an internal debate over whether or not 
the show was culturally imperialistic. An article in El Pueblo explains that at one time 
Spain dreaded “the adaptations of these programs to the mentality of our country. It was 
feared that they could exercise certain colonizing influences on the young. At the 
moment, it seems, these doubts have been superseded.”48 In contrast, the women’s’ 
magazine, Diez Minutos, stressed the concern that the United States was covertly using 
the show to infiltrate Spanish culture. The article explains that “it is evident that [the 
show] offers a formidable instrument of cultural and ideological penetration from North 
America into other countries, attacking the weakest side: the children.”49 These reviews 
from the Spanish media are evidence that foreign audiences cannot detach the United 
States from Sesame Street. While there was debate over the impact of ¡Ábrete Sésamo!, 
the success of the show brought TVE and CTW to begin negotiations of a co-production. 
 After the debut and success of ¡Ábrete Sésamo! in late 1975, CTW and TVE 
entered negotiations for a co-production of original programs to air by 1977. In the 
negotiations, CTW suggested the production of sixty-five episodes at twenty-five minutes 
in length, and 50 percent of the material came from CTW. The supplied material from 
CTW consisted of Muppets, live action, and animated segments. The other 50 percent 
produced by TVE would consist of Spanish produced studio segments and live action 
films. In addition, CTW provided production and research expertise to help TVE in their 
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productions and use of Sesame Street materials. CTW persuaded TVE that the 
“combination of the Sesame Street material, the research and production consultation, 
and the co-production process makes for a no risk high quality production.”50 Some of 
the suggested topics for the Spanish-produced live action films included how to make 
food (from bread to cheese), taking public transportation (subway, bus, train), agriculture 
(growing flowers, berry picking, farming), playing with toys (doll houses, model planes), 
outdoor activities (riding bikes, hikes, picnics, fishing, swimming), and occupations 
(factories, fireman, mailman, garbage man, grocer, pilot, carpenter, mechanic).51  
CTW stressed the close cooperation between the two sides on the production. In a 
letter to TVE, CTW executives argued that this collaboration “will also help to validate 
the impact and effectiveness of the programs through formative and (possibly) 
summative research.”52 In addition, CTW provided an outline for the development and 
production timeframe for 1977, as well as the layout of the pilot. From January-February, 
TVE and CTW would form the curriculum for Spain, do formative research, plan 
productions, and design the pilot. From March to May, preproduction would occur, the 
pilot shot, and receive reviews by CTW and TVE. From June-September, preproduction 
would happen for the series, and by mid-September, the series would go into production 
and editing. By October 1977, the first episodes would be ready to broadcast.53 The co-
production took on a new name, Barrio Sésamo, and by 1977, Spain had their version of 
Sesame Street. However, the early development of Barrio Sésamo had issues as TVE 
                                                   
50 “A Proposal to Television Espanola for the Production of a New Series in Cooperation with The 
Children’s Television Workshop,” July 12, 1976; Spain: Abrete Sesamo/Barrio Sesamo-Correspondence, 
1976-1979; box 369; International Series, Individual Country Files, 1970-1985; CTW archives, UMDL.  
51 Ibid. 
52 “TVE-CTW Co-Production Activities,” December 1976; Abrete Sesamo/Bario Sesamo - 







struggled to distance the show from American ideas and concepts, and how to present 
Spanish culture without the specter of backlash from CTW. 
 In 1977, the early production of Barrio Sésamo proved a growing rift between 
TVE and CTW. Before discussing the rift, it is important to understand how CTW 
defined what a co-production was. A co-production consisted of four stages: 
First, the country puts together a research team, which is sent to New York City to 
be trained in conducting formative research (child-testing methods such as the 
distractor). Summative research is generally too expensive to be undertaken by 
coproducers. Second, the country goes into preproduction, making some pilot 
half-hour shows to test for appeal and comprehension. During the third stage, 
coproducers respond to test results from the second stage, and in the fourth stage 
they complete all their live-action and animated sequences. Typically, the country 
makes three hours of original animation and three hours of live-action footage per 
season of 130 half-hour shows.54 
 
However, there soon became an issue with the co-production. Horne traveled to Spain to 
contact TVE about preproduction where he discovered problems including the effect of 
political turmoil, numerous personnel changes at TVE, and the unionization of TVE’s 
technical and creative staffs.55 The major issue that Horne highlighted was the inability of 
the research staff and production staff to work as a team. Researchers wrote the scripts 
because of a strike at TVE, which caused inconsistencies with the balance of education 
and entertainment. This led to other problems such as suspending script writing until the 
strike ended. In addition, the creative team appeared to discard the curriculum goals 
required by CTW. Instead of having a distinct curriculum coordinator, the head writer of 
the show held that position. Horne discussed how there “were no plans to assign weight 
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to the various curriculum goals.”56 Instead, Barrio Sésamo writers placed more of an 
emphasis on Spanish social concerns as opposed to the American influenced curriculum 
from Sesame Street. This is a prime example of the clash between CTW and TVE. Co-
productions create a small portion of their own material, but most programs “are 
composed of pieces culled from the ‘neutral’ library of U.S.-produced material.”57 
Though CTW wanted to enforce the American educational and entertainment objectives 
of Sesame Street, TVE intended to provide a nationalized show dealing with Spanish 
social and cultural issues. 
 TVE attempted to integrate Spain into Barrio Sésamo through the characters. 
During pre-production, TVE requested that CTW provide two new puppets made 
specifically for Barrio Sésamo. The first was a main character like Big Bird, “la gallina 
caponata” or simply Caponata, and Perezgil, a green snail with glasses. The director, 
Enrique Nicanor González, designed the puppets, and CTW provided the puppets strictly 
for the TVE production. In addition, the production team designed the human characters 
to represent different Spanish regions. For example, José, who ran a fish store, was from 
“‘Andauuz’ (south of Spain) [from Andalucía, or “andaluz”] and speaks with their 
particular accent.”58 Carmen was a 17 to 20 year old intended to represent the Spanish 
“type of woman that is emerging between the young people.”59 Manolo, a mechanic, was 
described as a “typical Madrid-type,” and “realistic … practical. Flirts with girls. He 
mends what the children bring to him broken.”60 These human characters coupled with 
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the two newly created puppets allowed the producers to integrate a Spanish identity into 
the show, which “was a clear objective of the early productions.”61 Though they did not 
embrace the American scholarly objectives initially, TVE set forth educational goals for 
Barrio Sésamo that represented the Spanish educational system and the new Spain. These 
included “creativity, Spanish culture, freedom of body, spontaneity, health and hygiene, 
career awareness, the natural environment, sight words, [and] the life process.”62 
 The characters and educational goals set forth by TVE illustrate how the company 
planned to inject Spain into the American formula. Caponata and Perezgil represented 
Spanish Muppets specifically for Barrio Sésamo. The characters of José, Carmen, and 
Manolo each represent an important aspect of the ongoing transition and the trajectory of 
the democracy. José, though from just one region of Spain, was the embodiment of the 
multitude of regions of Spain and to show that the culture of Spain was multifaceted and 
not just centered in Madrid. Carmen provided the audience with a young woman to 
follow as feminism and gender equality played a role in the democratic transition. As the 
transition continued women in Spain entered the workforce in rising numbers, divorce 
was legalized which ended discrimination of married women economically and bans on 
contraceptives and abortions were lifted. Manolo was the caretaker of the children’s 
problems, much as Madrid intended to do for Spaniards during the transition. The 
educational goals additionally prove that TVE intended a nationalized broadcast by 
focusing on Spanish issues.  
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Production of the pilot commenced in late September 1978 once all pre-
production issues resolved. However, tension continued between TVE and CTW over 
three issues. One of the problems was the hierarchy of TVE. The political situation of 
Spain saw several changes occur to the major decision makers in the television division. 
Though some had years of experience, many were new to their current positions, or some 
received their jobs through nepotism. For example, Marino Peña, the Director of 
Children’s Programs, was the brother-in-law of the Minister of the Interior, and had no 
interest in children’s programming or co-productions with the United States. A second 
issue was the Spanish crew. Blanca Álvarez was the show’s original producer, but she 
resigned, and José Manuel Fernández took over the show. Nicanor stayed on as director 
and made it clear that he did not care about the educational goals. He believed the 
technical aspects were more important. Nicanor explained, “I respect research, although I 
do not trust them.”63 Producer Lois Fortune highlighted the lack of enthusiasm among the 
crew and posited that the reason was threefold: “the general work pace in Spain is 
considered to be slower and less pressurized,” the difficulties of labor unions, and crew 
members idled awaiting orders from the director.64 The third issue was the scripts, which 
according to Fortune misunderstood the mix of education and entertainment. Instead of 
warm characters to support the children, the characters had “anger, hostility, and conflict” 
with the kids, and “rather than providing a resolution to the conflict, the conflicts became 
the resolution.”65 Another script discussed how one can become frustrated while working 
on a task, and showed the actor abandoning the task without solving the problem. Álvarez 
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provided a rationale by explaining “well, that is the way life is; children do get yelled at; 
life is ironic.”66  
Cultural differences continued to be a clash between CTW and TVE during the 
pilot production. CTW expressed concern over one of the sets TVE designed for the 
pilot—a tavern. TVE explained that a tavern “is a typical after work hang-out/get 
together for adults and children in Spain.”67 CTW dismissed the producer’s claim this 
was a Spanish cultural norm, and forced the producer to read an article on alcoholism and 
change the tavern to a café. Another issue was the use of art on the show. TVE intended 
to highlight Spain’s rich history of artists, but CTW objected to the paintings chosen. 
Often, CTW disapproved of the choices because it consisted of subject matter deemed too 
sophisticated or inappropriate for young children such as death, nudity, and faith. Fortune 
complained that the paintings/sculptures on the show “seemed more dependent upon the 
greatness of the artist/painting than the appropriateness for children.”68 For example, the 
pilot showed children reacting to Francisco Goya’s La maja desnuda, a portrait of a nude 
woman that hangs in the Prado. CTW believed the children in the film “are at the age 
when nudity is embarrassing,” and because the children giggle throughout the segment it 
makes it difficult for the audience to develop “an appreciation of the human body.”69 One 
more issue with the Barrio Sésamo production was the use of negative modelling. This 
concept argues that children learn through imitating others and are liable to imitate both 
good and bad behaviors. CTW research discussed three reasons for focusing on positive 
modelling: 
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[I]t can be dangerous to try to show children activities that we wish them to avoid. 
It is far safer to avoid portraying negative behaviors on television and concentrate 
on creating strong, attractive images of positive alternative behaviors. … Another 
danger of showing children negative behaviors is that the portrayal may give them 
ideas they had not previously considered (e.g., playing with matches, name-
calling). … In addition, it is important to note that even the benefit of modelling a 
positive behavior can be erased if the message is not kept carefully consistent.70 
 
For Barrio Sésamo, CTW alluded to a few potential scenes of negative modelling. One 
example included children “playing doctor” intercut with an examination of a child by an 
actual doctor. However, the beginning featured the make-believe patient being “carried to 
the park bench by the other children (potentially a dangerous act) and the patient is 
wailing dramatically.”71 CTW considered the scene potentially damaging to children. The 
fear was they could forever associate the frightening screams with doctor visits, and 
children may try to lift/carry other children, which would lead to potential injuries. 
 Though the pilot for Barrio Sésamo received generally positive reviews within 
CTW, there were still issues of whether the children would comprehend certain segments. 
One piece was about the birth of an Andalusian colt. While the birth, walking, and 
feeding of the colt received positive reviews for showing all aspects of natural 
environments, there was fear it would raise more questions than answers. CTW explained 
that “the mounting scene at the beginning is probably not sufficient explanation of 
conception, and it is doubtful that it will be connected to the birth scene.”72 In addition, 
CTW producers continued to believe the segment with La maja desnuda presents “more 
mockery than appreciation.”73 After production finished on the pilot, Fernandez detailed 
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that the production team hoped to shoot new episodes for three to four months and 
broadcast Barrio Sésamo by October 1979 with three episodes per week. 
Following the disagreements over the pilot production, CTW insisted on hosting a 
seminar on the production process for Barrio Sésamo. Cast and crew examined how other 
co-productions work with CTW at this seminar, and it provided a venue to voice their 
concerns. For the writers, their major recommendation was a change to the writing style. 
The process of writing the episodes included writers composing isolated segments, and a 
show coordinator mixing the segments together, which caused issues of continuity and 
pacing. CTW explained having writers’ design shows prior can solve this and writers 
should be familiar with all insert material, “both CTW’s and that produced by Barrio 
Sésamo.”74 In addition, the seminar included an explanation for the reduction of the 
curriculum. The suggestions for the curriculum discussed “to begin slowly with the 
difficult, delicate, and controversial topics; to assess the CTW material in light of a 
specific curriculum and to produce in Spain the curriculum segments not covered by the 
CTW curriculum; a smaller curriculum is more workable and will be more likely to be 
successfully managed by the writers, etc.”75 
The qualms that CTW had with Barrio Sésamo’s pilot production illustrate key 
cultural misunderstandings of Americans on Spanish society. The tavern set, La maja 
desnuda, and the birth of the cold show CTW using American naivete and projecting it 
towards a Spanish audience. The objection of having the set be a tavern ignores the bars 
in Spain—especially tapas bars—serve more than just alcohol and are a major social 
gathering site for Spaniards of all ages. The use of Goya’s La maja desnuda was another 
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objection by CTW for fear that Spanish children would not be emotionally mature 
enough to understand the piece. Yet, the U.S. NGO did not consider that Goya is one of 
Spain’s greatest artists, and that the creators of the program wanted to establish a sense of 
pride among youths in Spanish arts, regardless of the subject matter. The Spanish 
transition began doing away with censorship after a government decree by Suárez in 
1977, which meant that TVE could choose whatever painting it wanted. Finally, CTW 
objected to parts of the segment of the Andalusian colt’s birth. What CTW failed to 
understand was that the Andalusian horse is the breed most associated with Spain. While 
providing the view with a lesson on the life cycle, the segment also provided children 
with an understanding of the horse to the Spanish nation. 
 Though the original run of Barrio Sésamo appeared to be a critical favorite, the 
behind the scenes drama between TVE and CTW was too much. TVE cancelled the first 
run of the show in 1981 due to issues with the director, Nicanor. The general director of 
RTVE, José María Calviño, appointed Nicanor to the head of the new second channel of 
TVE as he underwent audit by the company. The director and fellow screenwriter, 
Dolores Salvador Maldonado, registered their names for one of the puppets created for 
Barrio Sésamo, which violated the agreement with CTW. The audit affirmed that the 
designs of Caponata the hen and Perezgil the snail were “the definitive designs … [and] 
work of” CTW.76 Nicanor and Salvador used TVE expenses to pay for the registration, 
and in 1979 ceded their rights to TVE for “35% of the income” for the commercialization 
of the dolls.77 The series was cancelled by RTVE, the characters of Caponata and 
Perezgil removed from further television appearance, and Sesame Street sketches only 
                                                   







appeared sporadically. Barrio Sésamo reappeared in 1982 after TVE and CTW settled 
their dispute. It featured new puppets by CTW and Spanish characters, which are the ones 
most associated with the show.  
 While Barrio Sésamo was put on hold in 1980, CTW and TVE worked together to 
prepare another educational television program—3-2-1 Contacto. Based on the U.S. 
version of 3-2-1 Contact, the program aimed to provide older children with scientific 
education. According to a course prepared by CTW for a Spanish workshop, the 
objectives of the show were “to entertain all Spanish children between 10 and 14 years 
old; bringing them close to the world of science and technology as one of the 
fundamental components of our culture; that, at a fundamentally intuitive level, they 
include certain basic phenomena related to science and technology, their mechanisms and 
reasons.”78 The show occurred contemporaneously with the United States emphasis in 
science and technology exchange programs. The new Spain wanted to emphasize science 
and technology as well. The show aired from 1982 to 1983 as seventy-eight half-hour 
programs with a Spanish cast and crew responsible for half the production. TVE aired 
three programs a week for twenty-six weeks. The writers relied on a group of advisors 
that consisted of an engineer, a scientist, and a specialist in child development. Program 
Director Maria Gustafson explained that the scientific advisor for “studio activities” and a 
chemistry specialist developed the studio segments, and the child development specialist 
“made sure the program’s content and language were not pitched too high for children’s 
                                                   
78 José Saras Bescos, “3-2-1 Contacto: Curso Para Presentadores,” January 1981; Spain: 3-2-1 Contacto-






understanding.”79 The producers of 3-2-1 Contacto had a much better understanding with 
CTW, but also this helped with development of Spanish identity.  
The relationship between CTW and TVE on 3-2-1 Contacto was cordial and did 
not propose as many problems as Barrio Sésamo’s first season. Instead, there was very 
little changed from the U.S. version. Gustafson explained that RTVE chose to adopt the 
educational goals of the U.S. series with minimal changes for Spanish teens. The focus 
was on “the joys and satisfaction of scientific explorations, ways of thinking in science 
and about social issues involving science and technology, and cooperative human 
endeavor and career exploration in science and technology.”80 When asked how the show 
changed to suit Spanish children, Gustafson only highlighted the reduced episodes and 
changing some topics from the U.S. version. One interesting example was the change 
from the quintessential American sport—baseball—to another well-known American 
sport—basketball. The producers revised a show about baseball because “children in 
Spain aren’t familiar with the game,” but instead made a segment on basketball because it 
“is a well-known sport.”81 When asked why the producers decided to just reuse CTW’s 
programs, Gustafson reveals that they wanted to provide more studio experiments so 
viewers could imitate it at home.  
Television played an important aspect of the Spanish transition to democracy and 
U.S. soft power in Spain. Television provided USIA with a new method for soft power. 
The United States could use television to allow for direct access to a foreign audience 
while at the same time getting as wide of coverage as possible. Though newspapers and 
radio still proved popular among Spaniards for news, the United States could not be the 
                                                   







major factor for foreign news in those mediums. Therefore, the move to television 
provided the United States with an avenue to provide soft power. The news programs, 
documentaries, and entertainment allowed for the United States to interact with a wider 
audience beyond those who strictly used the press and radio. Similarly, Spain used 
television as a venue to establish a national identity. The liberalization of public and 
regional television stations, the response to 23-F, and the Spanish arguments presented to 
CTW show that Spaniards looked to television to form a national identity. 
CTW’s work on Barrio Sésamo illustrates that NGOs can have an impact in the 
development of soft power, but also demonstrates that they can endanger these goals as 
well. CTW provided TVE with an educational program that came with a rich history and 
an opportunity to enhance the ongoing educational reform. However, CTW’s lack of 
cultural understanding of the situation in Spain nearly derailed the show before airing the 
first season. Further, the Spanish crew looked to promote Spanish culture and society in 
the curriculum, but CTW insisted on the showing following the process laid out by 
previous co-productions. This lack of understanding and unwillingness to change caused 
a rift between CTW and TVE that nearly ended the partnership before the children 
watched the show. Once the show aired and proved popular, CTW became more than 















“A nightmare of noise without movement”1: 




The 1966-67 academic year in Spain witnessed a growth in student unrest and 
resistance performed by Spanish and American students. Spanish students demonstrated 
as part of the Democratic Student Syndicate in Barcelona, engaged in clashes with police 
in Madrid, and participated in other protest activities occurred in Bilbao, Valencia, and 
Seville.2 Students protested U.S. support of Franco, U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and 
civil rights issues in Spain and abroad. On May 4, 1967, Spain expelled three American 
students—Karen Winn, Roberta Alexander, and Carol Watanabe—to the border between 
Spain and France. Spanish authorities became aware of a letter published in the Paris 
New York Herald Tribune-Washington Post where the students “criticized Spanish police 
handling of student demonstrators, pointed out alleged inaccuracies in Spanish press 
coverage of demonstrations, and took a stand in favor of student activists.”3  
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Further, the Spanish press, particularly the paper of the Falange Arriba, accused 
the American students of various other issues. Alexander faced allegations of speaking at 
an illegal student meeting about her struggles in the United States as an African 
American and likened the Vietnam War to the Spanish Civil War. At the same meeting, 
Winn led a march of several hundred students where U.S. flags were burned. Watanabe 
met charges as “part of a group attempting to demonstrate in defiance of Spanish 
government orders.”4 In a report assessing the academic year, U.S. Ambassador Angier 
Biddle Duke believed these protests from Spanish and American students were a “phase,” 
but they jeopardized American standing and goals in Spain.5 This disregard of student 
demonstrations for political rights is the essence of how the United States approached 
human rights in Spain. The fears of losing U.S. interests, more so defensive than cultural, 
took precedent over pushing the Franco regime and newly democratic Spain towards 
human rights. 
The Spanish transition to democracy coincided with a rise in concerns over global 
human rights in the 1970s. This ascent made it difficult for the United States in 
approaching Spain. Diplomacy with Franco caused some outrage within the United 
States, particularly among human rights NGOs. The presidents who monitored the 
political evolution in Spain often heard from organizations like Amnesty International 
(AI) regarding the human rights abuses of the Franco regime and early transition years. 
Yet, they often ignored this research in favor of keeping control of the military bases. 
Specifically, the Nixon and Ford administrations pursued loopholes in Congressional acts 
to find ways to maintain control of military bases in Spain. 
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Examining the United States and the Spanish transition to democracy provides a 
way to consider how human rights as well as NGOs impact U.S. soft power. Joseph Nye 
explains that human rights “can be a powerful source of attraction,” but the nation using 
human rights as soft power must adhere to the political values it proclaims.6 Further, the 
topic of human rights illustrates the importance of NGOs in foreign policy and power 
relations. Nye claims that nonprofit institutions “can complicate and obstruct government 
efforts,” but can assist in the development of soft power if the United States incorporates 
the NGOs objectives.7 For example, the Carter administration attempted to implement 
ideas from NGOs into their human rights rhetoric, but did not enforce any sanctions in 
Spain even after evidence of human rights abuses. Human rights are a helpful paradigm 
to apply how each presidential administration offered a different power relation to Spain, 
and to investigate how government organizations and NGOs competed through soft 
power. For example, the Reagan administration did not force human rights in discussions 
with Spain, but Amnesty International USA helped build soft power through writing 
campaigns to Spanish government officials. 
Nixon and the Franco Regime 
The Nixon presidency witnessed protest movements and calls for national and 
supranational action in human rights. Nixon and Kissinger placed national security 
interests over human rights even as the 1970s progressed and calls for civil liberties 
grew.8 This is best illustrated in their similar demands from Greece and Spain. In the case 
of Greece, the United States chose to maintain the relationship with the NATO ally 
despite being under military rule. The Nixon administration prioritized defensive strength 
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with the military junta, and then underwent a process to “slowly prod” Greece into a 
return to democracy. This contrasted with some members of Congress who proposed 
suspending aid to Greece to imply that democracy and human rights were as important to 
the United States and defense.9 The Nixonian approach to Greece similarly plays out with 
Spain. The administration absolved the Franco regime of human rights abuses to guard 
their rights to the bases. 
The mistreatment of human rights issues brought to the attention of the United 
States included capital punishment, political prisoners, and torture. The first major human 
rights case that occurred during the Nixon administration was the Burgos Trial. This trial 
was a single spoke in a larger wheel of Spanish, especially Basque, citizens who were 
tried for political offenses. During a December 1970 trial, sixteen members of the Basque 
nationalist group ETA faced accusations of murdering three people. The accusations 
against ETA were not new; however, the length of the Burgos trial stood out as being the 
longest ever held during the Franco dictatorship.10 Paul Preston describes the 
“clumsiness” of how the Spanish courts that conducted the legal proceeding turned it 
“into a trial of the regime itself both by the ETA defendants and by the world’s press.”11 
The sixteen members of ETA received death sentences, which sparked outrage both at 
home and abroad. 
 In Spain, the reaction to the Burgos trial split the societal and political 
atmospheres. First, those who lived in the Basque region believed the Franco regime used 
the trial to intimidate the region. Carlos Iglesias Selgas, the Inspector General of the 
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Spanish Syndical Organization, expressed to an American labor officer at the U.S. 
embassy that “except for the Basque provinces where the issue of Basque separatism is a 
highly emotionally charged one” he did not anticipate actions on a national level.12 
Second, there was concern over the role of the Spanish Armed Forces in the trial. In a 
conversation with an American embassy official, the Director General of the Bank of 
Spain Angel Madroñero described how the Spanish Armed Forces were forced to give 
death sentences because they “believed that they are being used by the Government and 
that the civilian authorities will try to win public favor at the expense of the military by 
commuting the death sentences.”13 This is further confirmed in an NSC memorandum 
that details the Spanish domestic scene: 
The military, who are responsible for law and order in the country, were disturbed 
because the trial was in a military court, and in view of the military's 
responsibility for domestic security, they were compelled to issue death sentences 
against those Basques implicated in the murder of a policeman. At the same time, 
they realized that if Franco commuted the sentences, the image of the military 
would suffer. They pressed for execution in order that their civilian colleagues in 
the Government who had to approve the death sentences should share in the 
blame.14 
 
Finally, there were those who had faith the Franco regime would show clemency. Ex-
Foreign Minister Alberto Martín Artaio illustrated that the trials manifested support for 
the Franco Government and “shown the world that Spaniards supported their 
leadership.”15 
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While there was a plurality of opinions in Spain, the global response to the 
Burgos trial was unanimous shock and anger. Thirteen governments, Pope Paul VI, and 
Spanish bishops argued for the commutation of the sentences.16 Though foreign opinion 
was against the sentencing, some within Spain did not appreciate the foreign outrage. 
Madroñero claimed the foreign press coverage of the trials had been “disgraceful” 
because they romanticized ETA and did not cover them as a terrorist organization.17 Yet, 
the outcry from within and outside of Spain was too much. The Franco regime reduced 
the sentences from death to imprisonment. There were two reasons Franco granted 
clemency: both the cabinet and Council of the Realm opposed the executions and the 
exhortation from foreign leaders for clemency.18 This campaign over human rights in 
Spain made an impact over the next decade. As Stanley Payne explains the Burgos trial 
placed the Basques and ETA in the global eye, “and the general outpouring of 
international sympathy and appeals on their behalf—all had a profound effect.”19 
However, one country remained silent throughout the ordeal: the United States.  
While the Franco regime received pleas for commutation of the death sentences in 
the Burgos trial, the United States remained silent. In a letter to Secretary of State 
William P. Rogers, both Ambassador Hill and Assistant Secretary of State Hillenbrand 
strongly recommended the United States not respond to the sentencing as it would not 
alleviate American standing nor the defendants, and it would endanger the ongoing 
negotiations for the bases. Hill highlights two problems with condemning the sentencing. 
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First, the Spanish domestic situation was too delicate because the nation split between 
those who endorsed executions and those who advocated for clemency. There were not 
only divisions within the Spanish public, but within the government as well. Carrero 
Blanco and the military led those in favor of executions, and those in favor of clemency 
were with Foreign Minister López-Bravo and Spanish civilians. Hill explained that 
López-Bravo’s attempt to make closer contact with the West would “go down the drain if 
the death sentences are carried out.”20 Second, if the United States remained silent on the 
issue, it faced criticism at home “as practically the only major free world country which 
has not made a statement.”21 Hill advised the administration to avoid making any 
decision on the trial. Once again, the priority of the Spanish bases played a key decision 
in U.S.-Spain relations. 
Nixon considered abandoning his silence on the Burgos trial when he received 
word that Edward Kennedy had reached out to Franco. Deputy National Security Advisor 
Alexander Haig wrote to Nixon explaining that Hill received information that Kennedy 
cabled Franco to urge clemency for those involved in the Burgos trial. Further, Kennedy 
later cabled a congratulations after the decision of leniency “with the view toward 
releasing the exchange both in Spain and in the U.S. for political benefit.”22 When asked 
whether the Nixon administration should step in with an announcement of their own, Hill 
continued his stance that it would be a disaster for both the United States and Spain. The 
ambassador further clarified that “whatever temporary benefit Kennedy may appear to 
acquire from his public antics, the long term good achieved by [Nixon] handing of the 
                                                   
20 Martin Hillenbrand to William Rogers, undated; POL 12 - Burgos Trial Spain 1970-1971; box 11; 
Records Relating to Spain, 1963-1976; RG 59; NARA. 
21 Ibid. 
22 To Nixon from Haig, December 30, 1970; Spain Vol 3 Aug 1970-31 Dec 1971 (2); box 705; Country 





matter will undoubtedly prevail.”23 Even domestic politics would not change the Nixon 
administration’s mind that security interests remained first in U.S.-Spain bilateral 
relations. 
The choice to remain neutral on the Burgos trail did not affect U.S.-Spain 
diplomacy, but it did show that the United States placed American security over human 
rights. In a conversation shortly after the commutation of the sentences, Nixon expressed 
pleasure to Juan Carlos and Spanish Ambassador Jaime Arguelles of the trial outcome. 
Nixon noticed that Juan Carlos appeared “somewhat nervous about discussing the trials” 
and relied on Arguelles to respond.24 Nixon explained that “the wisdom of the Burgos 
decision” was correct and “considerable pressure had been brought to bear on him to 
speak out,” but refused to do so because it was “an internal matter.”25 Juan Carlos and 
Arguelles thanked Nixon for his decision and attitude, and explained they were not 
nervous about the nationalist separatists but the terrorists in the region. The aftermath of 
the Burgos trial put a damper on the apertura. In a report before he left his post, 
Ambassador Hill wrote about the fallout of the Burgos trial. He explained that the events 
caused the Franco regime to “harden its attitude toward political liberalization” with 
rejection of political parties, silencing dissenting press, and political appointments from 
the bunker.26 The Franco regime tightened its grip over Spain while the United States 
abided by silence on human rights. 
While the Burgos trial represented a major human rights issue, AI produced a 
wealth of reports that highlighted the problem of political prisoners in Spain. As historian 
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Tom Buchanan explains, AI owed much of its development “to long-term concern over 
the human rights abuses of the Franco regime.”27 In the Annual Report for 1971-1972, AI 
groups around Spain worked with over 350 prisoners that included communists, 
socialists, Basque nationalists, and conscientious objectors. In addition, the Franco 
government imprisoned unionists, students, journalists, priests, lawyers, and teachers who 
criticized the regime’s views of unions, strikes, the new education laws, or protests.28 In 
another publicized report, AI supplied a historical precedent for political imprisonment in 
Spain. According to this report, at the entrance of almost all Spanish prisons is a quote 
attributed to Franco: “I can affirm without fear of error that anyone who has visited the 
prisons of other countries and compared them with ours will not have found institutions 
as equitable, Christian or humane as those established by our movement.”29 Though AI 
included in its public discourse the violations of Spanish political prisoners, the Nixon 
administration was not inclined to include human rights in U.S.-Spain relations.  
AI was not the only NGO to question human rights in U.S.-Spain relations. The 
U.S. section of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) 
condemned the United States’ use of Wargames maneuvers in Spain. In 1969, the State 
Department confirmed that U.S. forces conducted maneuvers to practice suppressing a 
rebellion against the Franco regime. This was the second time in two years the exercises 
occurred, and they focused “not at defending against an outside attack but at repelling 
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internal insurrection.”30 This illustrated that the United States was willing to keep an 
authoritarian dictator in place because it meant they could control those in charge of 
negotiating the rights to the bases. The WILPF condemned the U.S. government—
particularly the State Department—for their role in the Wargames maneuvers during the 
annual meeting in Atlanta that year. They resolved that the organization was “deeply 
concerned,” and these actions “shows that establishment of U.S. military bases within a 
foreign nation … leads to military action within that nation.”31 In addition, the WILPF 
pointed to the ethical hypocrisy of the United States in Spain, and the summation of 
Nixonian human rights policy: “Not only is it morally indefensible for the United States 
to give aid to this or any other dictatorial regime; it is also another disquieting example of 
the United States military determination of our government’s foreign policy.”32 The 
response to the Burgos trial and ignoring of NGO reports and claims illustrated security 
and the bases took precedent. 
The Nixon administration’s choice to remain neutral on the Burgos trial shows 
that the United States planned to place security interests over human rights. The argument 
used by the administration was that if Washington called for clemency for those in the 
trial that it would anger Franco and jeopardize base negotiations. Yet, this would have 
made no difference as one of the factors given for clemency was the pressure from 
foreign governments. The Nixon administration could have easily joined this group in 
calling for removal of the death penalty. Though the country was split, the United States 
could have gained soft power with the Spanish public by promoting human rights. 
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Instead, the Nixon administration ignored the situation and those NGOs who provided 
evidence of discrepancies under the Franco regime. 
Ford and the Transition to Democracy 
Though the Burgos trial was the major human rights issue of the Nixon 
presidency, the Ford administration began to see the impact of human rights and human 
rights organizations on foreign policy. The United States faced great pressure to address 
human rights abuses in Spain. As Counselor for Political Affairs David E. Simcox 
explains, the United States “had pretty much refrained from questioning Franco’s 
behavior internally,” and both domestic and foreign calls were made for the Ford 
administration to tackle these concerns.33 One of the first examples of this is a report of 
Donald Fraser’s Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements in 1974. 
This report “urged that the United States make the promotion of human rights a major 
foreign policy goal and recommended a variety of actions to promote that goal.”34 The 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, an amendment of the original 1961 act, solidified this 
with an added segment. Section 502B required the president to advise Congress if they 
reached a security deal with a group accused of human rights abuses. This was the first-
time human rights could cost the United States control over the Spanish bases. However, 
the Ford administration echoed Nixon’s approach to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. 
In a departmental memorandum from March 1975, the State Department quoted 
human rights NGOs as in possession of research on various human rights violations in 
Spain. For example, AI presented charges that “Spain violates the rights of assembly, 
expression and association, rights recognized internationally in such documents as 
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Articles 19 and 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”35 In addition, the 
memorandum concentrates on allegations of torture used in police departments. One 
accusation included how “persons convicted of ‘political’ offenses are subjected to 
discriminatory and abusive treatment in prison, including arbitrary enforcement of prison 
regulations to increase their degradation and demoralization, and depriving political 
prisoners of most of their rights to remission and conditional liberty.”36  
The State Department memorandum argued that some may perceive AI’s research 
as damning, but the wording of Section 502B offered a loophole for the Ford 
administration. This is like the Nixon administration’s use of a loophole for Section 
620(m). According to the State Department, 502B “provides only that the Congress be 
advised of those extraordinary circumstances in the Spanish case, it is open to the 
Executive Branch, without reaching a determination of the characterization to be applied 
to the human rights performance of the Spanish government, to advise Congress of those 
circumstances which would necessitate the assistance even if the government of Spain 
were deemed to fall within the terms of Section 502B.”37 The extraordinary 
circumstances that necessitated security assistance was the retention of the military bases 
and the fallout of terminating base rights. This loophole illustrates—just as the Burgos 
trial did—that control of the bases took precedent. 
The Ford administration applied the loophole of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1974 in making their conclusion on human rights in Spain. If the United States were to 
remove themselves from Spain, it would endanger the possible advancement of human 
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rights in the country and be detrimental to keeping defensive interests. After discussing 
the technicality, the administration began outlining how they planned to endorse human 
rights during the transition to democracy. The United States made it clear that they 
supported Spain and believed that democracy would usher an advancement of human 
rights. In addition, the administration made the argument that the non-military assistance 
they provided from the 1970 agreement contributed “to the strengthening [of] academic 
and scientific ties between the two countries and thus fosters greater awareness and, 
perhaps, interest in human rights within influential sectors of Spanish society.”38 
However, an event a few months later tested the United States’ sudden commitment to 
advancing human rights in Spain. 
In late August 1975, the Franco government passed a new anti-terrorist law. The 
first three articles of the law detailed how those suspected of terrorism faced trial in 
military tribunals, and if found guilty faced the death penalty. Amnesty International 
USA (AIUSA) performed assiduous research of the anti-terrorism law and found copious 
issues with it. Frances González of the U.S. Committee for a Democratic Spain provided 
AIUSA with a translation and summary of the anti-terrorism law. According to Article 10 
of the law, any person “in opposition to the regime and who voices that opposition comes 
under this law,” and that no patriotic citizen “should feel threatened by this law and 
declares that the restriction of the Spanish people’s constitutional rights is a small 
sacrifice for tranquility and security.”39 Another article in the law, Article 18, defines 
how the Franco regime tried to control activities of lawyers defending political prisoners 
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by having a court appointed third defense lawyer. Other aspects of the anti-terrorism law 
detail the inimical restrictions on mass media, public officials, and authorities who voiced 
opposition to the Franco cabinet, which González suggests “demonstrates the regime’s 
fear of disagreement within the ranks of the public authority itself.”40 While there were 
many facets of this law, its use in the following weeks would cause a human rights crisis. 
In September, several trials provoked an application of the new anti-terrorism 
law. Members of ETA and the Revolutionary Antifascist Patriotic Front (FRAP)41 faced 
military tribunals for their accused crimes. For example, one of the trials centered around 
five members of FRAP who faced accusations of murdering a policeman in Madrid. The 
five were Manuel Blanco Chivetes, José Humberto Baena Alonso, Fernando Sierra 
Marco, Pablo Mayoral Rueda, and Vladimir Fernández Tovar. AIUSA quickly put 
together an “urgent action” campaign for the five, which sent telegrams to foreign 
governments to stop abuses.42 A sample telegram meant for Franco and the U.S. State 
Department included: 
Believing capital punishment violates right to life and right not to be subjected to 
inhuman punishment, we request on humanitarian grounds that death sentences 
not be passed in the military court trial of Manuel Blanco Chivetes, Jose 
Humberto Baena Alonso, Fernando Sierra Marco, Pablo Mayoral Rueda, 
Vladimir Fernandex (sic.) Tovar.43 
 
The five FRAP members faced conviction on September 17 under the anti-terrorism law, 
which meant they could be executed within hours of the death penalty pronouncement. A 
week later, these five—along with other convicted FRAP and ETA members—faced 
Franco and the Council of Ministers. They commuted the death sentences of six but 
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confirmed the death penalty for five, including Jose Humberto Baena Alonso, and the 
executions followed the next day. Outrage occurred around the world. Mexico cut 
communications with the Franco government. However, the strongest response came 
from Europe when twelve European governments removed their ambassadors, and the 
EEC suspended their negotiations with Spain for a trade treaty. This was the first time 
“both the governments of Western Europe and the European institutions agreed 
unanimously to express their rejection of Franco’s policy and they used all mechanisms 
in order to make it effective.” 44 In foreseeable fashion, the United States remained silent 
on the anti-terrorism law and executions in order to maintain the status quo with Spain. 
Yet, this would soon fall out of practice on November 20, 1975. 
 Franco became ill and died shortly after the ETA and FRAP executions, which 
plunged Spain and the United States into uncertainty about the post-Franco era. The Ford 
administration appreciated the restoration of the monarchy in Spain with Juan Carlos. 
There were hopes that Juan Carlos would be a champion of democracy and, by proxy, 
human rights. This optimism heightened following a pardon decree for certain prisoners. 
According to the pronouncement, most criminals received a minimum reduction of their 
sentence by no less than three years, and those with sentences under three years were 
voided.45 However, the requisites for a pardon contained quite a few caveats. For 
example, those crimes “that come within the purview of the Anti-Terrorism Law 
including propaganda or membership in proscribed groups” did not receive a pardon.46 
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This included ETA and FRAP members as well as other separatist groups such as 
communists and anarchists. Juan Carlos bestowed patents of nobility to Franco’s wife 
and daughter alongside the pardon decree. Even when making strides, the Franco legacy 
handicapped the progress that the Spanish king made in human rights. 
The apprehension of the American public was high when Juan Carlos ascended to 
the throne in Spain. This is especially evident in the creation of the American committees 
that formed to promote democracy and human rights in Spain. These organizations were 
discussed earlier in the dissertation—the Ad Hoc Committee for a Democratic Spain, the 
Madison Committee for a Democratic Spain, the U.S. Committee for a Democratic Spain, 
and the American Committee for Iberian Freedom. While these organizations fought for 
human rights alongside AIUSA, Juan Carlos returned to Spain after his official state visit 
in 1976 and a few months later, addressed the issue of political prisoners. On August 4, 
Juan Carlos issued a royal decree permitting partial amnesty for political prisoners who 
did not commit violent crimes. However, AI raised concerns regarding the royal decree. 
They worried that prisoners of conscience—those imprisoned because they did not share 
the views of the regime—may not be classified as a prisoner who received amnesty. 
Further, the AI research department argued that “gross violations of correct trial 
procedure” occurred during the Franco regime, which led to wrongful convictions of 
prisoners of conscience as violent offenders.47 Therefore, prisoners of conscience may 
not be among those released or considered for amnesty. The United States appeared 
content with the decree, regardless of AI pointing to the loophole.  
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The Ford administration praised the release of more than 6,500 prisoners within 
one week of Franco’s death, and applauded Juan Carlos’s decree of full amnesty for 
nonviolent prisoners for their release of 308 prisoners within a few months.48 In addition, 
the administration criticized AI’s 1974-1975 report on human rights problems in Spain. 
They argued that AI’s reports on Spain were “issued prior to the death of Franco and the 
institution of the new government. In July, [AI] took note without comment of the new 
government’s recent amnesty decree.”49 The United States government dismissed the 
calls for continued human rights investigations in Spain because AI did not have an up-
to-date report or comment, even though the NGO researched and raised serious concerns 
for prisoners of conscience.  
The Ford administration continued the policies of the United States to not upset 
the status quo and accepted the bare minimum from Spain. The Spanish transition to 
democracy represented a prime opportunity to build soft power via human rights. 
However, the Ford administration fell into traps of the Nixon era by focusing on 
maintaining the status quo of U.S.-Spain defensive relations. This is seen through the 
search of loopholes in Congress to maintain control of the Spanish bases. Further, Ford 
ignored the concerns of NGOs—from the committees that formed like the Ad Hoc 
Committee for a Democratic Spain and larger organizations like AI—in their early 
apprehension of Juan Carlos and prisoners of conscience. However, Juan Carlos’s 
decision for amnesty of nonviolent prisoners gave the Ford administration a path towards 
building soft power. Ford and the United States promoted the decree as Spain moving in 
the right direction with human rights despite evidence that Juan Carlos could have done 
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more. The United States fell in with Spanish leaders in promoting the “Pact of 
Forgetting,” a consensus among Spaniards to move forward with democracy and leave 
behind the authoritarianism of Franco without transitional justice.50 
Carter, Reagan, and NGOs during the Transition 
Human rights appeared during the 1976 presidential campaign to be “the perfect 
post-Vietnam, post-Cold War, recession-era antidote” to improve America’s image at 
home and abroad.51 Though Carter made human rights his platform during the campaign, 
actually applying it to foreign policy was an entirely different issue.  Carter believed that 
human rights was “a natural extension of everything that unified Americans—history, 
ideology, and political practice,” and expected human rights “to work in a similar way” 
on the world stage.52 As Brzezinski describes, the Carter administration concluded that a 
moral vacuum appeared in international affairs and committed to a teleology of human 
rights. Brzezinski argues “a major emphasis on human rights as a component of U.S. 
foreign policy would advance America’s global interests by demonstrating to the Third 
World the reality of our democratic system, in sharp contrast to the political system and 
practices of our adversaries.”53  
Armed with the belief human rights should be a foreign policy goal, Carter began 
investigating methods to enforce this. Director of Policy Planning Anthony Lake 
delineated ambitions for the Carter administration in a letter to Deputy Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher. Lake believed the long-range goals of the United States was to raise 
the standards of human rights abroad through economic, societal, and political goals. 
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However, the administration should consider “most vigorous action … with regard to 
crimes against the person: i.e., officially sanctioned murder, torture, or detention without 
fair trial.”54 Further, Lake believed the United States should work closely with AI. 
Debates happened within the Carter administration of how human rights could negatively 
affect national security interests if the United States angered friendly states. An inter-
agency committee met and prepared an official definition of human rights for the Carter 
administration. As historian Mary Stuckey points out, defining human rights was “a 
thorny issue, and definitions varied over time, but in general, [Carter] seemed to consider 
‘human rights’ to be related to governmental respect for protection of an individual’s 
person, beliefs, and spiritual practices.”55  
The administration knew the U.S. stand on human rights might upset certain 
NATO members and lead to exploitation by the Soviet Union, but they stood for 
reinforcing human rights in Western countries. They believed that NATO and Western 
Europe should make a major effort “to reinforce democratic tendencies, particularly in 
countries that have only recently established or reestablished democracy” like Spain.56 
Therefore, the Carter administration believed Spain should promote and accommodate 
human rights into the transition to democracy. After a year in office, Lake wrote to Vance 
to discuss what the United States accomplished in their human rights policy. Lake argued 
the most notable advances in political freedom came in Spain, which was “independent of 
our human rights advocacy, but democratic forces … seem to be taking heart from our 
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new focus.”57 AI debunked this unrealistic appraisal with several reports on human rights 
violations. 
 In a report published in October 1979, AI examined whether human rights made 
any progress during the Spanish transition. The report explored the timeframe of 1977 to 
1979 and discussed both international and domestic issues. On the international stage, AI 
noted that Spain did join the Council of Europe, an organization that promoted 
democracy, law, and human rights in Europe. The Council of Europe required Spain to 
pledge to the European Convention on Human Rights when it enlisted in 1977.58 
However, AI indicated that Spain signed but did not ratify the European Convention on 
Human Rights.59 Domestically, AI appraised the political acts passed during this period. 
The report extolled Juan Carlos for his amnesties and pardons of political prisoners and 
the decline of torture in prisoners in the first years of the transitions. Yet, AI believed that 
new laws and international procedures—Law 21/1978 and Royal Decree-Law 3/1979—
circumvented the strides made. These acts allowed police to detain those they suspected 
of being in “armed groups” and those who defend “the conduct or activities of anyone 
who is a member of an armed group.”60 This happened particularly around the Basque 
and Catalan regions.  
 The AI report discussed the alleged torture of fourteen select victims in five 
different Guardia Civil stations for maltreatment and torture. AI sent a coalition to 
examine the victims, which consisted of two Danish doctors, a lawyer from the Federal 
Republic of Germany, and AI staff researchers. The doctors visited Madrid, Barcelona 
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and Bilbao from October 23 through 28, the lawyer visited San Sebastian, Pamplona, and 
Madrid, and the research staff traveled around the country throughout October. AI 
discovered these issues from thirteen interviews: thirteen were threatened or next-of-kin 
threatened, five endured mock executions, one stomached “la bañera,” eleven had mental 
exhaustion, eight had physical exhaustion from constant exercise, fourteen suffered 
maltreatment, ten subjected to “la barra,” five given electric shocks, three tormented by 
“la moto,” five suffered semi-suffocation, one person half strangled by mock hanging, ten 
stretched between two tables, two harrowed by “el quirófano,” and seven faced verbal 
humiliation.61 The research staff found inconsistencies in two of the fourteen cases, but 
the doctors’ medical findings supported the allegations of maltreatment.62 AI concluded 
the police officers mistreated and tortured the detainees, and allegations against police 
officers continued following the publication of the report.  
 The calls for human rights from NGOs began to weigh heavily on the Carter 
administration. In a memo to White House Counsel Robert J. Lipshutz, Samuel 
Huntington described “a growing and increasingly self-conscious and articulate human 
rights constituency, involving … groups which are both centrally concerned with the 
issue, such as Freedom House or Amnesty International.”63 In December 1977, 
Brzezinski proposed the formation of a government organization for human rights, the 
aptly named Human Rights Foundation. This represented Brzezinski attempting to filch 
NGO soft power to benefit the Carter administration in Spain. 
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However, this suggestion met resistance within the administration. Mondale did 
not fully object to the idea but did not support it. He explained that the Human Rights 
Foundation would just duplicate NGOs like AI and be governmental, which meant the 
government “would take blame for ineffectiveness or inaction on those difficult human 
rights which cannot be resolved immediately.”64 Brzezinski believed one of the functions 
the proposed foundation would do is provide financial and other types of support to 
NGOs. He argued against Mondale’s position by explaining that even if the Human 
Rights Foundation “were to do no more than increase the funds available to NGOs, it 
would have performed a valuable service.”65 However, Brzezinski faced another 
challenge, this time from Vance. The Secretary of State argued that NGOs like AI already 
“do a great deal of information gathering,” and if the government offered them funds it 
“might be seen to compromise their appearance of objectivity and potentially undermine 
their effectiveness.”66 The debate among Carter officials illustrates the needless 
complication of intermingling government organizations with NGOs. Both Carter and AI 
had the same soft power objective in mind—the improvement of human rights in Spain. 
However, the administration succumbed to infighting about integrating human rights 
because of bureaucracy and fears of compromising foreign policy.  
 Yet, the prominence of NGOs and their soft power made them hard to ignore. 
Their prestige forced the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs from the 
State Department—already under attack by other bureaus, departments, and the White 
House—to meet with several NGOs, including AI, and discuss the perceptions and 
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recommendations for the Carter administration.67 These NGOs strongly supported Carter 
placing human rights on the policy agenda, but the administration’s lack of enforcement 
against those who violated human rights disturbed them. The NGOs cited copious 
amounts of evidence the United States distanced themselves from human rights 
advocacy, but the strongest argument was “diminishing U.S. pressure on major 
violators.”68 In the case of Spain, the United States continued to struggle as bastions of 
human rights because of the military bases and connection to Franco. 
There were several recommendations for the Carter administration to address, 
including a major speech from a high-level administration official, a foreign service 
education program on teaching human rights, and a reflection in U.S. aid patterns to 
democratic nations or developing democratic nations. In addition, they asked the ICA to 
review programs to endorse human rights concerns. One recommendation from NGOs 
was a request for the State Department to “inform them more quickly about changes in 
human rights conditions and consult them more frequently during ‘the process of making 
a decision.’”69 Though AI was one of the major NGOs to highlight the importance of 
human rights, the 1970s saw a flurry of major foundations providing funding for human 
rights activity. The Ford Foundation was one of these with the creation of the Helsinki 
Watch (soon to be renamed Human Rights Watch). The Ford Foundation funded 
educational initiatives during the Cold War, but they began to fund initiatives like 
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Helsinki Watch, which grew into a dominant force in human rights during the Madrid 
Conference of CSCE in 1980-1983.70 
Historians often point to the ideological differences between Reagan and Carter, 
but there is a correlation which appears—a moralistic, ideological approach to human 
rights and democracy abroad. Huntington attributes Reagan’s criticism of Carter’s 
approach to human rights to Carter’s focus on “individual human rights abuses rather 
than on the political systems that denied human rights.”71 Reagan believed the promotion 
of an American style democracy was an important factor in human rights. Westad 
highlights that Reagan and his ideological advisors were a continuation of Brzezinski—
not Kissinger’s regional policeman—with their support of any who opposed the 
Soviets.72  In the context of the Cold War, Reagan believed that the United States was 
moralistic and the American political system was part of this virtuosity. Stuckey 
highlights how Reagan consistently argued “for the virtues of democracy over the vices 
of totalitarian rule” with human rights and constitutional democracy as the intersection.73 
 The Cold War paradigm informed the way Reagan related human rights and the 
Spanish transition to democracy. In a research memo from the USIA, the Reagan 
administration learned where the Spanish public stood on both U.S. and Soviet foreign 
policies, which included human rights. According to the memo, those who contributed to 
a survey rated the Soviet Union “negatively and divide evenly on protection of human 
rights in the United States.”74 In head-to-head comparisons with the Soviet Union, the 
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United States was considered the nation that “fosters human rights in other countries, 
helps poorer nations to develop, and is willing to negotiate disputes;” however, the 
United States is “more frequently viewed as the power that seeks world domination, uses 
military force to attain its goals, intervenes in the affairs of other countries, supports 
subversive groups and uses ‘terrorism’ to weaken other governments.”75 Therefore, the 
administration understood the Spanish public respected the United States when it comes 
to human rights, but denounced the Cold War aggression of Reagan. 
 The parallel between Reagan and Carter on human rights is best seen through 
comparisons of their rhetoric. Carter used Spain to show to the world how democracy 
helped human rights, and Reagan emphasized the role of democracy in the stability of 
Spain. During his trip to Madrid in 1985, Reagan gave a few speeches and emphasized 
the importance of democracy in Spain. In remarks to community leaders, Reagan 
highlighted the growth of democracy and human rights in Spain: “We salute, too, the 
remarkable achievement of the people of this land. Any visitor here can see that freedom 
is flourishing. For democracy to succeed, its roots must grow deep and wide.”76 This last 
sentence was a reference to the importance of Spanish democracy on Latin America. 
After a meeting with González, Reagan reiterated this point and emphasized the 
importance of how Spain’s transition to democracy impacted the globe. Finally, at a State 
Dinner that night, Reagan detailed the importance of human rights in the transition. He 
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explained the transition remained “ever true to the humane values at the core of 
representative government.”77  
 The Reagan administration monitored the development of human rights in Spain, 
specifically those that involved religious issues. These included the introduction of a 
divorce law and the legalization of abortion, and whether Spain had the leadership 
capabilities to integrate them into the new Spain. In the research for a speech on Juan 
Carlos and Sofía’s official visit, the administration clipped a Washington Post article on 
Spain’s legalization of divorce. The article details how the 1981 Spanish parliament, then 
under the control of the UCD, put forth legislation with the PSOE to allow for divorces. 
The caveats included that “uncontested divorce suits to be settled within two years of 
filing for separation and delays of up to five years for contested suits.”78 The Justice 
Ministry expected protests from the Catholic Church immediately, but over time “the 
existence of divorce will be accepted by Catholics and non-Catholics alike as part of the 
modernity of post-Franco Spain.”79 Once the PSOE took over, the Reagan administration 
acknowledged that they smartly controlled the pace of human rights. Specifically, the 
United States monitored how the Socialist government planned to legalize abortion. 
Gonzalez narrowly defined the grounds on when an abortion would be permitted. The 
Reagan administration complimented him for maintaining neutrality with conservatives, 
and how he “minimized the damage” with the Catholic Church.80 
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 Though Reagan illustrated the advancement of human rights in Spain, AI showed 
that human rights violations still occurred in Spain well into the 1980s. The largest 
campaign undertaken by AIUSA involved the campaign against torture. AI published a 
book, Torture in the Eighties, which examined the use of torture throughout the world. 
Reports on torture involving the Guardia Civil continued to appear in the report. There 
was evidence presented by former detainees, medical doctors, lawyers, the Catholic 
Church, and human rights groups on the torture occurred in Guardia Civil stations, 
especially in March 1983 in Bilbao. The Code of Criminal Procedure in the Constitution 
had safeguards for detainees, but it also permitted suspension of certain “safeguard 
rights” if the investigation is about “armed groups or terrorist elements.”81 Further, the 
Organic Law 11/80 allowed those detained to be held incommunicado, denied a lawyer, 
offered no medical treatment, and denied right to phone their families for seventy-two 
hours. Between the implementation of this law in December 1980 to March 1983, AI 
discovered 3,205 incommunicado detentions.82 Most of those detained were alleged 
members of ETA and tortured in order to obtain confessions or information. 
 AIUSA began a Campaign Against Torture (CAT), which involved writing 
campaigns to prominent political figures. Two such cases involved Joaquín Olano and 
José María Olarra. A volunteer from Washington—Martha G. Burnett—wrote a letter to 
Felipe González on behalf of Olano. Burnett wrote, 
I am writing to you out of concern for Joaquin Olano, a mechanic from the 
Basque region of Spain. He was arrested last summer and held incommunicado at 
the Civil Guard headquarters in San Sebastian. He was admitted to a hospital after 
a local resident reported the sound of cries above loud music coming from the 
headquarters. A doctor at the San Sebastian Red Cross hospital stated that Olano 
had suffered a concussion and was cut and bruised on both head and body. 
                                                   






Olano’s judicial declaration claims he was tortured: beaten on the head and body, 
given electrical shocks, and nearly asphyxiated with a plastic bag.” 
The United Nations has adopted the Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners, which establish that prisoners are not to be subjected to 
undignified treatment or exposed to health-threatening conditions. I urge humane 
treatment of Joaquin Olano.83 
 
Burnett’s letter was part of a CAT group that sent thousands of similar letters to 
González, who sent a response to the Secretary General of AI. González explained the 
mistreatment of detainees concerned the Spanish government, and “preliminary 
proceedings have been ordered by a Court of Instruction in San Sebastián” for the Olano 
case.84 In August 1984, there was a call to stop action on the Olano case, and by February 
1985 the case was still open and under investigation. Following the Olano case, AIUSA 
focused on José María Olarra alongside his brothers. A bookstore worker and assistant 
mayor, Olarra was tortured incommunicado in a Guardia Civil station in October 1983. 
Olarra described in a formal declaration how “the leader of a group of eight or ten men in 
plain clothes hit him in the testicles and that he was then indiscriminately punched and 
slapped on the head and body by the others.”85 Similar to the outcome of Olano, Olarra’s 
case underwent official investigation in 1985.  
The Olano and Olarra campaigns would be the final letter writing campaigns for 
torture victims in Spain. The CAT in Spain ended in April 1985 when AIUSA narrowed 
its country focus, which left Spain off the list.86 The reason for Spain’s removal from 
AIUSA’s list dealt with the introduction of habeas corpus to Spain’s Constitution. Under 
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the Law of Habeas Corpus of 24 May 1984, “a judge can order that a detainee be 
produced in court, and that the reasons and conditions of detention be justified.”87 AI 
warned that the application of this procedure was difficult, but the government of Spain 
“stressed its willingness to cooperate in achieving Amnesty International’s aims.”88 This 
illustrates AIUSA’s use of soft power as the CAT was successful.  
Ultimately, human rights played a pivotal role in U.S.-Spain power relations 
during the Spanish transition to democracy. The subject played a pivotal role in the hard 
power of base negotiations and the attempt to build soft power through rhetoric. While 
the United States used education and television as avenues to build soft power, human 
rights threatened to upend this by illustrating the hypocrisy of supporting a dictator and 
maintaining military bases while championing a transition to democracy. Further, human 
rights are a useful cultural paradigm to show how each U.S. administration used power in 
their relations with Spain. Nixon ignored human rights in favor of hard power toward the 
Franco regime. Ford used smart power in praising the recently crowned Juan Carlos but 
used a hard power approach to AI in their condemnation of reports. The Carter 
administration used soft power as it emphasized human rights rhetoric and research from 
NGOs in their policies. However, they could not find a happy medium with the 
government, which hindered their soft power in the eyes of international NGOs. The 
Reagan administration praised Spain from afar in speeches and monitored the country’s 
liberalization but did not speak against the Spanish after NGOs presented evidence of 
continued torture. 
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In addition, human rights illustrate how government organizations and NGOs 
often competed with one another on the power relationship. The four administrations had 
varying power relationships with Spain, but all refused to call them out for violations. 
This can be attributed to both reasons of hard and soft power. The United States chose to 
praise Spain to keep American authority of the bases. Moreover, the United States elected 
to exploit the Spanish transition to democracy just as they needed to repair their global 
image after the Vietnam War and Watergate. Conversely, the United States believed it 
could support human rights by championing the successful transition to democracy in 
Spain. While the presidential administrations had to maintain bilateral relationships, 
NGOs could point to human rights abuses and not fear upsetting an alliance. Even in the 
face of meticulous research and criticism from NGOs, the United States chose to not 
upset the balance of the Franco regime and the transition to democracy. In the end, 
whatever soft power the United States received from human rights came from NGOs and 


















 The arc of U.S. smart power in Spain from its implementation in the late 1960s to 
the ascension to NATO and the EC in the 1980s illustrates the danger of relying too much 
on hard power. The negotiations for the Spanish military bases between the United States 
and the Franco regime kept him in power and helped solidify his authority. The benefits 
of these agreements for Franco were innumerable but were especially helpful in 
economic ways. By negotiating these agreements, the United States created anti-
Americanism within the Spanish public. Furthering the pessimism in Spain was the 
disapproval and apathy of the American public. Although the Vietnam War caused the 
U.S. Congress and citizens to question the involvement with the authoritarian regime, it 
was not until the transition to democracy that Americans appeared interested in events of 
Spain. However, the Reagan administration’s “wait and see” response to the 23-F coup 
solidified the anti-Americanism within Spain. Though they did not care for the 
paternalism of the United States, Spain did anticipate help from a democratic ally. 





United States did not care about the political system but cared about sustaining American 
friendly leadership. 
Hard power continued to foster anti-Americanism in Spain as the United States 
bullied Spain through base negotiations, entrance to NATO, and ascension to the EC. The 
base negotiations showed the hard power of the United States fully. The presidents who 
oversaw base negotiations—Nixon, Ford, and Reagan—endeavored to get the best deal 
for the United States regardless of what Spain desired. This is best seen with Spain’s 
desire for a treaty. During the negotiations, the Nixon administration discussed the 
possibility of a treaty, but then backed out by claiming Congress would never allow it. 
The United States wanted control of the bases to suit their Cold War needs, not the needs 
of Spain. In addition, the United States used a hard power inducement of Spanish 
entrance to NATO. Since World War II, Spain desired acceptance into the Western 
military structure and NATO was a key goal. The United States knew that their NATO 
allies did not want Francoist Spain to enter the Atlantic Alliance. Again, the U.S. 
administrations knowingly lied to Spain but this time about Spanish entrance into NATO. 
Finally, the United States tried to block the ascension of Spain into the EC. Spain actively 
sought Europeanization and sold themselves to the EC as an intermediary between 
Europe and Latin America. However, the United States feared Spanish EC membership 
because it threatened their domination of Spain’s foreign policy and as the go-between of 
the United States and Latin America. The United States took Spain to GATT when Spain 
signed preferential trade agreements with the EC. Yet, as the transition to democracy 





held a referendum to enter NATO. The Spanish public took the hard power enticements 
of the United States and implemented it themselves without American input. 
 To balance the negativity of hard power, the United States relied upon the USIA 
to build soft power. The main goal of the USIA was to employ public diplomacy to show 
the special connection between the United States and Spain. This can be seen with the 
promotion of NASA and Spain’s involvement in the organizations and in the 
Bicentennial with the shared history of the two countries. As the transition occurred, the 
USIA’s initiative changed to teach Spain about the economic rights of a democracy—
labor unions and consumer protections. However, public diplomacy in Spain struggled to 
remain coherent and maintain public interest. For example, the NASA exhibits in Madrid 
and Barcelona produced meager foot traffic as well as the unexceptional reaction to 
Ford’s visit to Madrid in 1975 showed disinterest by the Spanish public on USIA 
initiatives. Even during the Franco regime, the development of anti-Americanism hurt the 
USIA’s public diplomacy. Further hindering the USIA were the changeovers of Carter 
and Reagan. Carter intended public diplomacy to be a megaphone for his speeches and 
policy decisions as opposed to programs and exchanges. Reagan returned the emphasis 
on these two issues in Spain, but most of the public diplomacy in his administration went 
to repairing the image of the United States following 23-F. 
 Other government organizations, along with the USIA, attempted to build U.S. 
soft power. The Fulbright program emphasized educational exchanges and initiatives in 
Spain. This included teaching English so that students connect the language with the 
United States, funding exchanges with labor unions leaders, and promoting the 





through NMAs for the 1970 General Law of Education. However, Fulbright’s focus was 
to grow American Studies programs despite the low enrollment numbers and interest 
among Spaniards. USIA utilized television and provided TVE with documentaries to air 
that covered racial issues in the United States and the democratic process of the 1972 
election cycle. The limited availability of television sets called into question whether this 
was a smart dissemination of knowledge, but it proved to be worthwhile as the number of 
television sets and networks grew. The United States had an opportunity with the Spanish 
transition to promote human rights. The implementation of democracy provided the 
United States with the model they could export to other regions, especially the Global 
South. Yet, there were still incidents of torture and Franco-era human rights abuses that 
the United States glossed over in their promotion of Spanish democracy. The presidential 
administrations chose not to upset the balance of U.S.-Spain relations by forcing the 
country to adapt human rights initiatives despite evidence from NGOs of the denial of 
civil liberties and torture. 
 The United State government was not the only group that provided methods of 
soft power during the Spanish transition to democracy. The FF helped Spain in their 
desire to develop and carry out educational reform. In his role as facilitator, Fraenkel 
travelled to Spain to help with the application of the 1970 General Law of Education. 
Further, the FF gave funding for academic conferences and publications that discussed 
the importance of the Spain and the transition to democracy. CTW offered Spain with a 
program to fit their lack of educational programming for children and young adults. 
Barrio Sésamo and 3-2-1 Contacto gave TVE entertaining as well as educational 





Sésamo gave TVE an opportunity to develop Spanish identity in the successor generation 
through children’s educational programming. The episodes allowed TVE to build 
Spanish pride through regional characters and Spanish art and culture. Human rights 
NGOs—from AI to U.S. ad hoc organizations—worked hard to make sure the Spanish 
transition adhered to civil liberties and human rights. AI and AIUSA provided evidence 
to the United States that torture and imprisonment of prisoners of conscience continued in 
Spain after the death of Franco. 
 What is evident from the FF, CTW, and AI, NGOs can provide the United States 
with soft power. The FF developed soft power with Fraenkel and their work in 
implementing educational reform. CTW provided an international co-production that 
detailed American ideals as well as an avenue to develop a Spanish national identity. AI 
and other human rights NGOs provided a voice for those in Spain who suffered and those 
who wanted to promote civil liberties. However, there can be some danger from NGOs’ 
soft power. CTW could have upended the progress made with Spanish television with the 
misunderstandings and censoring of Spanish culture. Further, human rights NGOs 
pointed to torture and imprisonment, which the United States government ignored to keep 
the status quo with the Spanish government. Yet, soft power is not the goal of NGOs. The 
priority for these organizations is the improvement of another country not selling the 
American image. Though it is not their initiative, NGOs did contribute to the 
development of soft power and smart power in Spain. 
Coda: To 1992 and Beyond 
 
 Smart power continued to influence U.S.-Spain relations into the 1990s. In the fall 





Spain came from a public opinion poll in Spain that found negative attitudes on the 
United States, NATO, and the military bases in Spain. The focus group consisted of 
eighty-seven participants. Those who partook ranged from the general public to elites, 
came from Madrid, Seville, and Barcelona, and their ages ranged from twenty-five to 
fifty-seven. The general public included housewives, secretaries, clerks, technicians, and 
those looking for their first jobs. The elites were university professors, lawyers, medical 
doctors, economists, and high-level executives. One-fourth of the participants were 
women. The central finding of the study stressed the importance of Spain and the events 
in 1992—total integration into the EC, the Summer Olympics in Barcelona, the World’s 
Expo in Seville, and the designation of Madrid as the cultural capital of Europe.1 Spain 
was to become European in 1992 and no longer needed the United States. 
 Some of the key discussions broke into three categories: expectations for 1992, 
Europeanization, and the United States. The public saw 1992 as the year Spain would 
showcase their progress to the world. The Olympics, World’s Expo, and Madrid as the 
cultural capital were events that Spain knew would put the global eye on them. However, 
these events took a backseat to the importance of Europeanization. The Spanish public 
eagerly anticipated entering the EC and passively accepted that NATO membership was 
integral for Europeanization. The emphasis on Europeanization of Spain was because 
some in Spain believed this was “one of the last opportunities for Spain to catch up with 
the countries of the developed world.” Though the public was united on 1992 and 
Europeanization, Spain was divided over the United States. As one elite from Madrid 
explained, “I believe that with the Americans we have an authentic schizophrenia.” 
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Further, the study identified the Spanish identification of the United States as the older 
brother or uncle—some who “is admired and imitated, but against whom one also rebels 
and asserts one’s independence.” These split views of the United States can be attributed 
to U.S. smart power during the transition.2 
 The focus group found a few topics to discuss on domestic politics such as the 
development of the Spanish democracy and anti-Americanism. The conversations on 
democratization illustrate the perception of Juan Carlos and the Spanish people as the 
drivers of democracy. As one member of the general public in Madrid said, “If it wasn’t 
for the Spanish people there wouldn’t be a democracy.” This is further insinuated by the 
focus group in a discussion on anti-Americanism. The right-leaning participants believed 
anti-Americanism was a result of media manipulation, but the left-leaning members saw 
it as a result of Franco support. One individual from Seville compared the U.S. support of 
Franco to the contemporaneous example of Augusto Pinochet in Chile: “They supported 
Franco. If they hadn’t, Franco wouldn’t have lasted five minutes. When General 
Eisenhower came to embrace him, that was it. The regime was consolidated. As it is now 
with Pinochet. If he goes, we all know why he goes, because the United States says so. 
And why does it say so? Because its interests are now better defined by a democracy.”3 
 What this illustrates is that those within Spain did not associate foreign support 
with the establishment of democracy. The common belief was that the King of Spain 
developed, instituted, and fostered the implementation of the constitutional monarchy. 
The Spanish public grasped this and pushed the transition to democracy through 
democratic elections and referendums. In no way do they believe the United States 







imported democracy. Instead, that paternalistic portrayal of the United States carried over 
the anti-Americanism that developed under the bilateral relationship with Franco. The use 
of hard power by U.S. leader during the transition did little to engender any sort of 
believe that the bilateral relationship would change. Further, the comment by Haig on 23-
F cemented the anti-Americanism. The Spanish public witnessed their lone friend on the 
global stage remain neutral to see what would happen instead of intervening to protect 
Spanish democracy. 
 Anti-Americanism remained prevalent when discussions turned to U.S. foreign 
policy. In dialogues of the U.S.-Spain bilateral agreement, opinions fell into three distinct 
categories: those who were indifferent, those who believed the bases should remain, and 
those who believed the United States must go. The major argument of those who wanted 
U.S. removal from the bases was that if the United States controlled the bases then there 
will be no independence or national sovereignty for Spain. Across all categories, the 
participants believed the Spanish government “negotiated badly and some even say that 
the protracted negotiations made them look bad throughout Europe.” Further, the Spanish 
public still believed that the Americans dominated NATO and the connection between 
the United States and the Atlantic Alliance was too close. They reason that NATO was “a 
powerful negative symbol which has the potential of arousing hostile reactions among the 
Spanish mass public.” Some participants argued for the Western European Union for 
their defensive and security concerns alongside their economic assistance with the EC.4  
 Hard power continued to define how Spaniards viewed the United States. 
Particularly, the fear that U.S. hard power would have negative effects on Spain during 
their Europeanization. The bases issue split the focus group much like how it split about 






anti-Americanism. Yet, there was a consensus that the United States took advantage of a 
weak Franco regime and negotiated the previous agreements in bad faith. The tactics of 
the U.S. administrations during negotiations, especially those of Nixon and Reagan, did 
nothing to engender confidence and dispel anti-Americanism in Spain. In addition, 
because the Franco regime and early transition politicians placed so much emphasis on 
NATO entrance, the Spanish public believed the United States dominated the 
organization. Instead, those in the focus group wanted to join a weaker European security 
organization just to get away from the United States.  
 Imperialism was a common theme in the depiction of the United States whether it 
be cultural imperialism or economic imperialism. The Spaniards in the focus group 
believed the only shared value with the United States was consumerism. American 
culture permeated Spain in various forms, but the imports became slogans for inferior and 
brash. American culture such as films, televisions, and corporations were a challenge to 
Spanish values. The study found that Spaniards resented the United States because “the 
Spanish believe that Americans don’t know anything about them … nor does it care.” 
What these participants believed was that the United States took their cultural model and 
placed it in Spain, and by doing this made Spain economically dependent upon the 
United States. This can be seen in the discussion of military bases as well. Those who 
proposed keeping the military bases voiced concerns over the economic fallout if the 
United States were to leave. Further, many Spaniards believed dependence on the United 
States allowed them to interfere in domestic politics.5 
 Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, and the USIA spent much of their efforts attempting 
to tie Spain and the United States historically. The results of this focus group demonstrate 






that this clearly did not work. In the most damning quote of the study, the Spanish public 
believed that Americans did not care about Spain, their historical connections, or their 
values despite the claims of the U.S. presidents. The first issue discussed as a shared 
value with the United States was not a sense of history but that of consumerism. While 
consumer rights and protections were a goal of the Reagan USIA, there was more an 
emphasis on cultural imperialism through consumerism. The abundance of American 
culture was not seen as a complement to Spanish culture but as a competitor. As this 
permeated Spanish culture, it made Spain dependent on the United States. 
 The findings of the focus group study illustrate the impact of the soft power of 
educational exchanges, television, and human rights. The focus group viewed American 
science and technology in a favorable light. Spanish companies, laboratories, hospitals, 
and universities were eager to adapt the models presented to them by the United States. 
However, the focus group believed that Americans did not have a grasp of world events 
as they were too insular. They compared the United States to the Soviet Union and 
argued that Russians were “an educated man while the American does not even know any 
geography.” Those in the focus group explained that they got most of their knowledge on 
the United States from movies and television. Their understanding of racial problems, the 
homeless, violence, and drug use came from the visual media that the United States 
exported. Shows like Dallas, Dynasty, and Falcon Crest crafted Spanish perceptions of 
Americans. One member of the general public in Madrid explained the Spanish version 
of The Price is Right—El Precio Justo aired on TVE sporadically from 1988 to 2004—
was popular but was a distinctly “American idea and they’re exporting it to everyone.” 





other transitioning nations, the Spanish public believed that Spain still had work to do. 
Many felt there were defects in the judicial system, lack of equality, and corrupt 
politicians. As one member of the general public in Barcelona explained, “There’s a bit 
left … we need what good wines need, time to get used to living under a different system 
from the one we had for so many years.”6 
 The focus group illustrates the success and failures of U.S. and NGO soft power. 
The approval of American science and technology in Spain illustrates that the efforts of 
the Fulbright program to promote the subjects. Yet, the belief in Spain was that the 
United States was not an educated country, but instead a nation that promoted their ideals 
through media. In Spain, they were aware of the societal problems of the United States, 
which illustrates that the USIA documentaries and news programs did work in providing 
a balanced account of U.S. society. Yet, the television programs the focus group 
highlighted were shows about the opulence of the United States. These entertainments 
informed the Spanish public of American values and they could not separate them from 
their views of the United States, which is like the reactions to ¡Abrete Sésamo! When 
asked about democracy and human rights, the focus group believed that while Spain 
made strides in their democratic evolution, they still needed time to progress. The study 
pointed to various issues with civil liberties, which also received discussions from human 
rights NGOs like Amnesty International.  
 Overall, what the Spanish focus group study illustrates is that U.S. smart power in 
Spain during the transition to democracy struggled to change the perception of Americans 
in the eyes of Spaniards. The hard power of the United States—the military bases and 
NATO—dominated how the Spanish public viewed Americans. The U.S. administrations 






and their attempts to bully Spain in negotiations left a sour impression. Ford and Carter 
attempted to ease the tensions of U.S. hard power, but the Cold War stances of Nixon and 
Reagan were too much. The soft power attempted by GOs and NGOs found mixed results 
at best, which made it difficult for the United States to establish smart power with Spain. 
Educational exchanges from the Fulbright program and FF built support for science and 
technology, but the American Studies programs in Spain did not engender the United 
States as a bastion for education. U.S. television programs sent through the USIA and 
CTW allowed the United States to interact in a more direct manner with the Spanish 
public, but the messages taken from the programs shown often portrayed the United 
States in a negative light. The Spanish were proud of their participation in the transition 
to democracy; however, as NGOs pointed out, believed they still had many strides left to 
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